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Abstract 
This dissertation amends the Crisis Renewal Model of corporate rhetoric based on 
analyses of two multinational organizational crises in Nigeria and Cameroon. The 
Renewal model revises the dominant apologia model of corporate crisis rhetoric to focus 
on strengthening relationships with stakeholders following a crisis rather than solely on 
repairing or restoring reputation. Yet while the renewal model redresses the classic 
Aristotelian premises of apologia, the Nigerian and Cameroonian situations call for a 
significant reframing of rhetorical strategies in response to the colonialist legacies, 
cultural traditions, political volatilities, and socioeconomic particularities of these 
contexts. The research questions driving the dissertation are: What are the limitations of 
the Crisis Renewal model for multinationals operating in West African countries? How 
can this model be amended based on African communication principles? Data about the 
cases came from newspapers, company documents, and local and international NGO 
reports, and radio texts generated from LexisNexis. The data for Shell in Nigeria spans 
1993-2016 while the data for Herakles Farms in Cameroon spans 2009-2016. The 
analyses found that both apologia and renewal were evident in corporate rhetoric 
produced by Shell and Herakles Farms; nonetheless, their respective crises damaged 
corporate reputation and stakeholder relationships. Drawing from lessons learned in these 
cases in West Africa, I turn to African communication concepts of communality and 
hybridity to rethink the Western premises of the Crisis Renewal model, particularly 
dimensions of ethical leadership, prospective vision, and organizational learning and 
build on Spivak’s arguments in “Can the Subaltern Speak?” and Kraidy’s notion of 
hybridity. I propose a concept I call responsive hybridity to modify the Crisis Renewal 
model. Responsive hybridity reframes renewal as a creative self-reflexive process 
producing hybrid forms, relationships, and practices.  
 
Key words: Crisis renewal model, responsive hybridity, self-reflexivity, multinational 






For contemporary organizations, crises can come in many guises: natural 
disasters, financial meltdowns, political upheavals, social media outbreaks, management 
mistakes, product failures, or brand hijacking. The list is long and ever-expanding. 
Whereas the prevailing sense used to be that crises threatening a corporation’s brand 
(Mitroff, 1986), image, or reputation were rare, today these threats are all too common. 
The field of corporate crisis communication has emerged in the past two decades in 
response to this changing actuality.  
Corporate crisis communication has developed through case descriptions of the 
communication strategies used by corporate leaders and spokespeople in reaction to 
image threats. Based on post-hoc rhetorical analyses, crisis scholars have categorized 
these strategies. The schemas drew on classical Aristotelian conceptions of apologia, a 
speaker-centered approach that mitigates the threat to corporate image through various 
strategies of apology or denial. A later schema is informed by psychological theories of 
attribution to offer schemas based in stakeholder perceptions of responsibility and blame. 
Yet the emphasis on corporate leaders, defensive strategies, and the goal of protecting or 
reinstating corporate image remained. More recently, a proactive and positive approach 
to corporate crisis communication has been advanced that shifts from post-hoc analyses 
and defensive strategies to ethical communicative relationships: the Crisis Renewal 
Model. This dissertation focuses on this renewal theory and seeks to amend it to address 
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the stakeholder relationships and local-global complexities in crises faced by 
multinational corporations operating beyond the U.S. 
The renewal model shifts the focus from protecting organizational image and 
reputation against threats to making the most of opportunities for reducing uncertainties 
and creating mutually beneficial solutions. The model recommends communication 
practices that, according to Robert Ulmer, a founder of this perspective, “emphasize 
collaboration with stakeholders, open communication processes, and honesty and 
timeliness in providing information about the crisis” (p. 529). Collaboration, honesty, and 
openness are contrasted to “practices of deception, secrecy, and values of upholding the 
reputation of [an organization] over human life.” The focus is on what leaders value 
precrisis and the key communication values they should develop in order to build their 
crisis communication skills.  
Ulmer holds that an ethic of significant choice frames the ethicality of crisis 
communication best practices: This is best facilitated by “providing stakeholders with 
complete known information about the crisis, avoiding incomplete information, avoiding 
biased information, avoiding statistics that are inadequately defined or incomplete, 
avoiding vague or ambiguous communication designed to create erroneous meaning, or 
using emotional language designed to distort meaning” (p. 532). Whereas reactive crisis 
responses tend to be utilitarian (doing what is best for the greatest number while ignoring 
the damage done to the rest), proactive and ethically responsive approaches adopt 
strategies based in principles of stakeholder equity and corporate transparency, thereby 
seeking more expansive and lasting solutions to crisis situations.  
3 
This dissertation addresses Ulmer’s call for thought leadership in crisis 
communication not only by contributing to a normative model based on principles of 
ethical communication but also by redressing the parochial limits of crisis 
communication scholarship. Crisis communication scholarship has been developed 
almost exclusively in the U.S. through studies of U.S. corporate crises. Further, the most 
well-established models are based in classical rhetorical traditions, particularly 
Aristotelian traditions, that have been canonized in the history of Western rhetoric and 
particularly in the development of American pedagogies of speaking and writing. For 
example, one of the premier survey textbooks in the field, The Rhetoric of Western 
Thought, in continuous production since 1976, extols the Aristotelian and Greco-Roman 
foundations of philosophical, literary, and oratorical practices and philosophies (Golden, 
Berquist, & Coleman, 1976). These models prioritize the corporate rhetor and corporate 
image, promoting strategies intended to deflect or deny criticism and blame in order to 
minimize threats. 
In contrast, the goal of this dissertation is to consider corporate crisis 
communication in the context of globalization, specifically, the operations of 
multinational corporations on the African continent. Prevailing neoliberal management 
and financial logics exacerbate the impact of crisis reactions for stakeholder relationships. 
Indeed, the emphasis on short-term profits, efficiency measures, and cost reductions in 
the tightly-coupled and globalized relations of production, distribution, and consumption 
especially in such critical and multinational-dominated industries as resource extraction 
and agribusiness invite proliferating crises and tremendous crisis scalability. In addition, 
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the model of communication on which crisis communication models have been founded 
is itself suspect in the context of African cultures and communicative practices. 
Developing collaborative sense-making with local stakeholders most subject to the fall-
out of corporate crisis management requires attunement to sense-making logics-in-use 
rather than the imposition of a transcultural model of rhetoric.  
1.2. Rationale for Amendment 
I should immediately point out here that “amendment” in this dissertation means 
the research is adding to the model so that organizational leaders and spokespersons are 
able to apply the components that constitute the model in a more responsive manner.  But 
why amend the crisis renewal model through its encounter with multinational crises in 
sub-Saharan Africa? First, while the presence of multinational enterprises on the African 
continent is long-standing, financial incentives to exploit resources, labor, and land on the 
continent have intensified even as conditions of crisis increase--political instabilities, 
climate disasters, human disasters of famine and disease, the prevalence of violence by 
both state and disenfranchised actors, widespread civil and state corruption. Clearly, 
crisis response is requisite to doing business in this region. Second, the contemporary 
African conjuncture is complex, bringing together a plethora of antagonisms within 
configurations of neoliberal financialization and post-colonial governance and cultures. 
The politics of representation are at the heart of relations of global capital, state stability, 
sustainable production, and political subjectivities. Thus, amending the renewal model 
entails confronting relations of power that complicate the model’s goals of equity, 
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transparency, and ethicality. Note here Bhabba’s notion of mimicry: rather than 
respecting the differences and otherness of local cultures, the renewal model implies the 
idea of “colonial mimicry” or “the desire for a reformed, recognizable Other, as a subject 
of a difference that is almost the same but not quite” (Bhabba, 1994, p. 86). Given that 
there is always ambivalence and slippage between the dominant and the mimic, the 
renewal model is doomed to inadequacy.  
Finally, and critically, the crisis renewal model fails to address its inherent 
assumptions about power relations. Most troublingly, the model assumes its own 
universality: values of corporate/paternalistic leadership, ethicality, a certain kind of 
organizational learning/sense-making, and effective (reality-constructing) rhetoric are 
assumed to apply everywhere to everyone with no translation needed. Instead of being 
transcultural, these dimensions are meaningful in situ and as enacted. Hence, they do not 
offer a one-size-fits-all guarantee of renewal. In addition, a corporate bias unreflectively 
advances corporate dominance, paternalism, and monologic rhetoric. Despite the ethical 
injunction to respect stakeholder perspectives and seek equitable participation, the model 
emphasizes the dominance of corporate leaders over collaborative goals and processes. 
Hence, a conception of inequitable power relations is inherent to this model. Critical 
perspectives on organizational communication counter corporate bias and promote 
systemic change in organization-societal relations (Mumby & Stohl). Such critical 
perspectives often champion the enactment of democratic or dialogic relations through 
resistance to the dominance of corporate interests. However, the African context 
complicates such goals. For example, the colonialist legacies that permeate histories and 
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practices in many African societies lend themselves to a superior/inferior epistemological 
dynamic that can be readily taken up in crisis responses to dismiss indigenous meanings, 
perspectives, and moral relations. 
In considering the role of multinational corporations in Africa, a critical 
perspective on crisis rhetoric and renewal must engage two interpenetrating contexts: 
colonialism and neoliberalism. Colonialism is an economic, political, material, and 
historical model of power, the legacies of which continue to impact the development of 
African societies. In the wake of colonialism, Spivak posed a critical discursive question: 
“Can the subaltern speak?” It is a question that the renewal model of corporate crisis 
management must address because it is central to the goals of stakeholder equity and 
ethicality. Yet given the failure to directly question the assumptions about power in this 
model, renewal remains in thrall to corporatist interests and economic-political 
exploitations. In her essay, Spivak cautions against taking up conceptions of power 
developed by Western intellectuals – specifically, Foucault and Deleuze – because such 
conceptions abet colonialist economic exploitation by marginalizing, erasing, or silencing 
subaltern others, that is, those who are most marginalized and subjugated in relation to 
both colonizers and indigenous elites. She points out that her question entails a 
complicated politics of recognition and representation involving both political proxy (the 
representation of interests) and re-presentation (existential and ontological presence). 
Importantly, Spivak’s analysis rests on the complications of otherness that are requisite to 
political and existential self-representation. She shows how otherness can enact a 
hierarchy of subjugations and silences. Yet, as Hall presciently pointed out, “Our lives 
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have been transformed by the struggle of the margins to come into representation—not 
just to be placed by a dominant, imperializing regime but to reclaim some form of 
representation for themselves” (p.183).  
In the crises considered in the two dissertation case studies, villagers who live the 
consequences of crisis management by multinational agribusiness or extraction 
corporations are spoken for in complex articulations issued by chiefs, NGOs, local and 
national politicians, courts and legal relations, multinational agreements and statements, 
and local and transnational journalists. Yet these are representations of otherness that 
depend on the continued marginalization of the villagers themselves. For example, 
villagers affected by the development of multinational palm oil plantations in Cameroon 
are disempowered in the very representations advanced in their interests: by local chiefs 
bribed to consent to negotiations over labor and land; by environmentalist and 
conservationist NGOs both local and transnational concerned about deforestation, 
logging, and bushmeat consumption; by a complicated tangle of land-ownership 
regulations, fees, boards, and courts; by non-profit multinational philanthropic 
associations like All for Africa seeking to lift them from poverty; by logging and 
plantation managers making promises about work and pay; by government ministers 
negotiating “sweetheart deals” with palm oil multinational CEOs and nationalized palm 
oil companies; by President Biya’s vision “Cameroon 2035” in which agricultural 
“smallholders” figure prominently with little regard for the lived conditions. 
In similar ways, African communities continue to be articulated by neoliberalism. 
Tangled in the politics of representation, neoliberalism frames the global environment as 
8 
a “free market” that encourages competition, efficiency, and economic growth. 
International financial institutions including the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and other transnational organizations push the logic of expanding 
free markets; and speak for African states concerning what social, economic and even 
political realities need to be pursued to ensure growth. Neoliberal policies are touted as 
the remedy that will save Africans from poverty, ensure economic growth, and reduce 
dependency on foreign aid. The African states/government on the other hand translate 
and articulate these neoliberal discourses to local communities. Cameroon’s Vison 2035 
is a succinct example of how the country’s government is articulating the neoliberal 
agenda for ordinary Cameroonians neglecting the lived experiences of ordinary citizens. 
Vision 2035 has articulated the ‘prosperity’ of the country in similar ways that 
neoliberalism framed its “free market” agenda. Cameroon’s vision 2035 has as 
overarching objective: (1) tying the country’s economy to the industrialized West such 
that; (2) the country’s economy is mainstreamed into the “global economy” by opening 
up local financial markets to foreign trade so that the country attains an “emerging 
economy” status in the world (see “Platform2035”). Looking at this vision from a more 
critical perspective, the vision clearly regurgitates neoliberal ideals – by being active in 
international trade and selling farm products and minerals, Cameroon will be able to 
acquire enough revenue to develop its own economies and increase production of goods 
for both national and international consumption. It is thus evident how Vision 2035 
frames the Cameroonian experience from the lenses of neoliberal ideologies that continue 
to foster the paternalistic relationship in which local people must look up to the 
government and allied Western financial and economic institutions to survive. The 
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government discourse of making Cameroon become a “newly industrialized country” (a 
period when the country moves from primary agricultural production to a manufacturing 
industry) neglects the lived experiences of local people who must first struggle with 
multinational corporations over such issues as land ownership, subsistence wages, and 
civil protection. 
Neoliberal policies continue to contribute to the expanding crises plaguing the 
African continent in the MNCs’ scramble for African markets and resources. Even when 
local NGOs oppose foreign interference in the economic and social life of local 
communities, the villagers who are most affected by these widening neoliberal policies 
do not get to speak for themselves. In this situation, we notice international organizations, 
home government, foreign activists, as well as local NGOs speaking for and about the 
ordinary people. 
1.3. Research Questions 
Amending the renewal model proceeds in two parts. First, two cases of corporate 
crisis communication in sub-Saharan African countries will be analyzed. The research 
questions motivating these case analyses are the following: 
 
RQ1: What are the limitations of the Crisis Renewal model for multinationals operating 
in West African countries?   
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The second part of the amendment project addresses African communication philosophy 
and how it is a resource for amending the dimensions of the renewal model. Along with 
explicating this communication philosophy the research question focuses on the salience 
of this African perspective for the renewal model:  
RQ2: How can the Crisis Renewal model be amended based on African communication 
principles? 
1.4 Brief Overview of Remaining Chapters 
 
Chapters 2 and 3 establish the analytic framework. Chapter 2 explicates the 
models of corporate crisis communication and the dimensions of the renewal model. It 
also frames the larger contexts for the operation of multinational corporations on the 
African continent including dynamics of globalization, neoliberalism and colonialism. 
Chapter 3 details the data, coding, and thematic analysis that informs each case. The 
chapter clearly identifies and describes the analytic frameworks and coding categories 
and procedures. 
Chapters 4 and 5 narrate the cases of Shell Oil in Nigeria and Herakles Farms in 
Cameroon, respectively. Chapters 4 and 5 also present lessons learned from the cases 
analyzed; as well as a discussion of what these lessons mean for amending the Renewal 
Model. Each of these two chapters describes the history of the case and examines 
evidence of crisis communication strategies by the MNC. In both cases, the MNC shifted 
strategies, from a defensive apologia to a strategy incorporating dimensions of the 
renewal model. This is not to claim that either MNC knowingly adopted the renewal 
11 
model; nonetheless, there is convincing evidence that both adopted more stakeholder-
responsive strategies at particular moments in their prolonged crises. 
Chapter 6 turns to the question of African communication principles and practices 
as resources for amending the Renewal Model. Chapter 7 draws together both the lessons 
from chapters 4 and 5 and the African communication principles to propose an 
amendment to the crisis Renewal Model. Chapter 8 summarizes the findings on the 












2 Review of Crisis Rhetoric Models 
 
2.1 Introduction  
This chapter discusses models of corporate crisis rhetoric that are current in the 
crisis communication literature. In discussing these models, I lay emphasis on the 
Discourse of Renewal (also referred to as Organizational Renewal theory and Crisis 
Renewal Model) for an obvious reason: my research has as its main objective to amend 
this model. The literature on globalization, and multinational corporations (MNCs) in this 
chapter further provide relevant complex contexts within which analyses of the MNCs’ 
crisis communication occurs in sub-Saharan Africa. 
With the widening interconnectedness in social, cultural, economic, and political 
relations that the world is experiencing, the local and the global are only separated by 
blurred lines (Appadurai, 2010; Tomlinson, 2007; Braman, 1996); yet this means that 
local patterns in social and cultural relations have not been completely erased and cannot 
be coopted into a model of rhetoric that fails to respond to otherness. Accordingly, this 
chapter’s goal is to examine the theoretical dimensions of the Discourse of Renewal, 
discuss the foundational conceptual critique framing the amendment that I offer in 
Chapter 7, and situate the crisis renewal model within the complex contexts of 
postcolonialism and corporate globalization in order to justify an amendment to the 
model.  
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I begin with a review of crisis communication models, arguing that most models 
rely too heavily on a neo-Aristotelian framework with a heavy focus on issues of blame 
and reputation. The Discourse of Renewal, in contrast, draws on contemporary 
conceptions of corporate rhetoric and ethics. However, this model has not as yet been 
adequately reframed by relations of globalization, neoliberalism and postcolonialism. I 
draw attention to the complexities of global politics and multinational corruption as I 
consider these larger frameworks and their implications for the Discourse of Renewal. 
2.2. Crisis Models 
Crisis communication has been theorized through five major approaches – (1) 
Corporate Apologia (Hearit, 2006a); (2) Image Repair (Benoit, 1997); (3) Situational 
Crisis Communication Theory (Coombs, 2007a; Coombs, 1995); Discourse of Renewal 
(Ulmer, Sellnow, & Seeger, 2011, 2013); and (5) Rhetorical Approach (Heath & Millars, 
2004). These approaches have guided case studies on organizational crisis (e.g., Hearit, 
2006e; Blaney, 2002; Harlow, et al, 2011; Sisco & Zoch, 2010; Seeger, Ulmer, & 
Sellnow, 2005). I begin with apologia given that this has been the foundational model in 
the area of corporate crisis communication. 
2.2.1. Apologia  
Ware and Linkugel (1973) first established Apologia in the communication 
discipline as a framework for analyzing public discourses. Apologia according to Ware 
and Linkugel, is primarily a response of “self-defense” (p. 274). They stated that when 
speakers engage in self-defense (of their reputation) one of four strategies are applied: 
14 
absolution, vindication, explanation, or justification (p. 282). In these instances speakers 
seek acquittal or absolution from guilt; the “preservation of the accused’s reputation and 
the recognition of his (sic) greater worth as a human being relative to the worth of his 
accusers” and “approval” (p. 283). Communication scholars have built on these 
typologies by Ware and Linkugel to develop extended versions of apologia. Hearit 
(2006a) referred to Ware and Linkugel (1973) when he explained apologia as originating 
from classical Greek rhetoric meaning “defense” or “speech in defense” (Hearit, 2006a, 
p. 4).  
While early use of apologia was “concerned with individuals accused of wrong 
doing who seek to clear their names” (Hearit, 2006a, p. 3), contemporary crisis 
communication scholars have extended the apologia framework to organizations by 
investigating how companies or institutions respond to accusations of wrongdoing. Hearit 
(2006) is one of the scholars who has produced extensive work on corporate apologia to 
analyze how organizations manage crises (see Hearit, 2006b, 2006c, 2006d, 2006e, & 
2006f) and I will rely on his publications to explain corporate apologia. Image Repair 
theory (Benoit, 1997), and Situational Crisis Communication Theory (2007) are 
extensions of the work of Ware and Linkugel (1973) and will be discussed separately 
because of the widely applied nature of their models in crisis cases. 
The main premise of corporate apologia is that organizations will take a defensive 
position to counter accusations of wrongdoing in order to allay guilt. Several strategic 
rhetorical responses are advanced: denial, e.g. it did not happen, we are not guilty; 
counterattack, e.g. “directly attacking the accuser and claiming that the charges are false 
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or come from malicious intent” (Hearit, 2006f, p. 124); differentiation, e.g., redefining 
the context of the misdeed, explaining the wrongdoing, or justifying the event or 
occurrence; apology, e.g., admitting guilt, and confessing involvement; and legal 
strategy, e.g., the organization says nothing at all in public, but instead engages in legal 
actions to “seek legal absolution of their guilt and ignore public concerns” (Hearit, 2006a, 
p. 125). Overall, the focus of corporate apologia is the denial of wrongdoing by not 
admitting guilt. 
2.2.2. Image Repair 
Developed by Benoit (1995/1997), Image Repair is an extension of Ware and 
Linkugel’s (1973) apologia discourse. Benoit claims to have “developed a more 
complete” approach to apologia (p. 265). The main premises of Benoit’s theorization are 
(1) an organization is accused and held responsible for an action or event; and (2) that act 
or event is considered offensive (Benoit, 1997, p. 178). It is important to note that “unless 
that company is believed to be responsible for the act” and because “perceptions are 
more important than reality” (emphasis is original), it is not about whether the company 
actually committed the act or not. It suffices for the organization’s “salient audience” 
(Benoit, 1997, p. 178) to feel that the act is offensive and believe the organization is 
responsible for the act.  Both conditions must be “thought to be true” by the company’s 
salient audiences for the organization’s reputation “to be at risk” (Benoit, 2004, p. 264). 
The image repair strategies modify the apologia strategies. These strategies include denial 
(simple denial, and shifting blame); evasion of responsibility (e.g., we were provoked, 
defeasibility, i.e. lack of information, accident, etc.); offensiveness reduction (e.g. 
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bolstering, minimization, differentiation); corrective action (e.g., promises to correct 
problem); and mortification (e.g., confessing and ask for forgiveness) (Benoit, 1997, pp. 
265-269). 
Image repair, just as apologia, focuses on how individuals and organizations can 
choose to correct negative public perceptions directed on them following a crisis. The 
focus is more on strategic responses or tactics aimed at “clearing” the names of 
individuals and organizations. Image repair and apologia are crucially denial and blame 
discourses. Image repair continues to be a dominant model informing crisis 
communication research that focuses on image management during crisis (Harlow, 
Brantley, & Harlow, 2011).   
2.2.3. Situational Crisis Communication Theory (SCCT) 
Coombs (2007) has popularized this approach in crisis communication. While 
traces of  apologia could be seen in this model, the SCCT draws from the attribution 
theory framework which holds that people make judgements and/or search for the causes 
of events and “attribute responsibility for an event and will experience emotional reaction 
to that event” (Coombs, 2007, p. 165). It emphasizes the need for organizational crisis 
communicators and/or managers to have robust knowledge on the “crisis situation” (i.e., 
type of crisis and performance history), in order to determine which crisis response “will 
maximize reputational protection” (Coombs, 2007, p. 166). Understanding the type of 
crisis and the organization’s performance history is vital if the crisis manager is to 
effectively match response strategies to crisis situations. The crisis type is an important 
component because stakeholders will be more likely to attribute crisis responsibility to 
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the organization in some situations than in others. For instance, having categorized crises 
into clusters (victim, accidental, and preventable), Coombs explains that crises in the 
victim cluster, for example, will attract sympathy, hence low crisis responsibility 
attribution on the organization, while preventable cluster crises will attract anger, and so, 
high crisis responsibility on the organization. Understanding this allows the crisis 
manager to better match responses to specific crisis events.  
Meanwhile, organizations can choose to use either primary or secondary 
responses or a mix of both. Primary response strategies include denial strategies (e.g. 
attack, shifting blame, clarification), diminish responses (e.g. excuse, justification), and 
rebuild strategies (e.g., apology, compensation). The secondary strategy is bolstering 
(e.g., ingratiation, victimage, and reminder) (see Coombs & Holladay, 2004; Coombs, 
2007). Using bolstering as a secondary response strategy requires that organizations do 
one or all of the following during crises: praise stakeholders so stakeholders remain 
attracted to the organization (ingratiation); play the victim card by telling stakeholders 
that the organization is also a victim to the crisis (victimage); tell stakeholders of all 
previous good works of the organization (remind). SCCT as an approach to crisis 
communication also falls into the category of image management discourses.  
2.2.4. The Rhetorical Approach  
This approach perceives crisis as inherently “rhetorical,” that is, as a “rhetorical 
problem” (Heath & Millar, 2004, p. 5). The rhetorical problem frames organizational 
crisis situations as exigencies and argues for the importance of precrisis image 
management (Crable & Vibbert, 1983). Heath and Millar (2004) hold that a rhetorical 
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problem occurs when situations “call for a statement from one or more persons or 
organizations” (p. 6). Depending on their locations and “role” in the crisis, organizations, 
“are looked to for a statement that is a wise, ethical, and strategic response to a rhetorical 
problem” (Heath & Millar, 2004, p. 6). This approach holds that there is an “actual 
dimension” and “perceived dimension” to crises in organization. These dimensions are 
important because some crises are perceived to be more severe or threatening than they 
might actually be. And of course, many factors could be behind these perceptions 
including sabotage.  
The rhetorical approach “explicitly acknowledges that the responsibility for the 
crisis, its magnitude, and its duration are contestable [and] stresses the message 
development and presentation part of the response” (Heath & Millar, p. 5). It is about 
meaning creation and meaning (re)construction, and the need for crisis managers to 
reflect on the role interpretation plays in crisis responses (Theus, 2004). This perspective 
points to “what needs to be said before, during, and after a crisis” (Heath & Millar, 2004, 
p. 6) and seeks to answer the question, “What can be and must be said to react in a 
reasonable, responsible, and ethical way to the concerns of the stakeholders affected by 
the crisis?” (Heath & Millar, 2004, p. 7).  
Using a rhetorical approach, Huxman (2004) classifies crisis communication 
response strategies following three Aristotelian genres of rhetoric – epideictic, 
deliberative, and forensic (pp. 292-293). Huxman categorizes the denial strategies as 
forensic; apology/mortification responses (admitting guilt, and asking for forgiveness), 
and bolstering as epideictic; and transcendence, corrective action, minimization, as 
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deliberative (pp. 292-293). Conceiving a crisis as a “rhetorical problem” has strong 
implications for communicative responses during crises. A crisis might never be a crisis 
until so conceived by the organization. In turn, responses are crafted to address how an 
organization perceives the crisis. Crisis can indeed be manipulated using premeditated 
communication aimed at denying the existence of a crisis and reconstructing meanings 
that emerge from the situation.    
These four models – (Corporate) apologia, image repair, SCCT, and the rhetorical 
approach—are tied to the neo-Aristotelian tradition and place considerable emphasis on 
the corporate rhetor who appears to have insurmountable power in determining the topoi, 
content, and structure of all communication for dissemination to an audience at the 
opportune moment. Communication becomes reactive (strategic or tactical) directed by 
the intentions of the rhetor. It is a defensive approach to communication that we find in 
these models with an overarching focus being image management and absolution from 
guilt. But crises are themselves complexities which a defensive, linear, speaker-centered 
discourse is hardly sufficient to adequately address. Responses to multinational corporate 
crises cannot be preoccupied with concerns of image or reputation management. Crises 
reveal centers of power and complex interests in today’s global environment. There is 
therefore a need to address these complexities by moving beyond issues of image and a 
reactive, defensive rhetorical approach.  
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2.3. Discourse of Renewal 
Introduced by Ulmer, Seeger, and Sellnow in 2007, the Discourse of Renewal 
(also called organizational renewal theory) shifts from reactive image repair and 
reputation management accounts to a proactive relational perspective (Seeger & Ulmer, 
2001, 2002; Ulmer, Novak, & Sellnow, 2005; Ulmer, Seeger, & Sellnow, 2007). Early 
formulations of the Discourse of Renewal (Seeger and Ulmer, 2001, 2002) raised 
concerns about the absence of a critical perspective in crisis rhetoric. Ulmer et al., (2017) 
argued for ethical, optimistic, provisional, and prospective communication. This 
perspective is evidenced in the cases of “virtuous responses” by CEO Aaron Feuerstein 
of Malden Mills, and Milt Cole, owner of Cole Hardwoods during the fire disasters that 
razed their firms. Seeger, Ulmer, Novak, and Sellnow (2005) further invoked the notion 
of “change” that accompanies crises, grounding their argument in a study of a “post-crisis 
discourse of renewal” in the response of executives in the firm Cantor Fitzgerald to the 
September 11, 2001 World Trade center attacks in which the firm is reported to have lost 
658 of its 960 employees.  
In the model’s early development, the proponents pointed to the following as 
important characteristics in the Discourse of Renewal: (1) provisional as opposed to 
strategic responses; (2) prospective rather than retrospective vision; (3) capitalizing on 
the opportunities embedded in the crisis; and (4) effective leadership (Ulmer et al., 2007). 
Further, certain conditions were considered to be more conducive for renewal discourse.  
First, crisis type: the scholars argued that natural disasters such as floods and fires 
were more conducive for the application of the discourse of renewal. Second, private 
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corporations as opposed to public corporations: private corporations are more conducive 
for engaging with the discourse of renewal because “there is often more of an 
entrepreneurial spirit and greater autonomy exercised by private owners of companies” 
(Ulmer et al., 2007). Also, Ulmer et al., suggested that because owners of private 
companies are “willing to spend resources” on “rebuilding and moving beyond” crises (p. 
133), the discourse of renewal is better conditioned to succeed within privately held 
companies. Third, corrective action and change: renewal is based on an organization’s 
willingness to correct mistakes and move on. Finally, fourth, stakeholder relationships: 
sustaining good relationships with stakeholders prior to crisis occurrence is necessary for 
renewal (Ulmer et al., 2007, p. 130).  
Subsequently, Ulmer et al. (2011) developed theoretical dimensions of the 
discourse of renewal to include: (1) organizational learning; (2) ethical communication; 
(3) prospective rather than retrospective vision; and (4) effective organizational rhetoric. 
The ethical communication component includes the need to maintain positive stakeholder 
relationships prior to crisis and an instinctive or provisional response to crisis. A 
prospective rather than retrospective vision includes optimism and emphasizes the need 
to focus on future opportunities. The last component, effective organizational rhetoric, 
has to do with organizational leaders constructing or “structuring a particular reality for 
organizational stakeholders and publics” (Ulmer et al., 2011, p. 219). The goal is to make 
use of opportunities for renewal inherent in crises. The following section elaborates the 
four theoretical dimensions that inform the discourse of renewal model. 
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2.4. Theoretical Components of Discourse of Renewal 
2.4.1. Ethical Communication 
This component focuses on a leader-centric, positive, and ethical approach to 
communication during a crisis, as opposed to a strategic, defensive position. Discourse of 
Renewal typically “is an immediate and instinctive response based upon the positive 
values and virtues of a leader rather than a strategic response that emphasizes issues of 
responsibility or blame” (Ulmer et al., 2011, p. 216; see Sellnow & Seeger, 2013). In fact, 
Ulmer, Sellnow, and Seeger (2011) asserted that: “renewal is often based on a leader’s 
established ethical character” (p. 216; also see Sellnow & Seeger, 2013); ethical 
communication response to crisis must be “based upon the positive values and virtues of 
a leader” (p. 216).  They maintain that: “Organizations that institute strong, positive value 
positions with key stakeholders, such as honesty, responsibility, accountability, and 
trustworthiness, before a crisis happens are best able to create renewal following the 
crisis” (Ulmer, Sellnow, and Seeger, 2011, p. 215).  
Stakeholder relationships are key: to be successful in ethical communication, 
organizations are called upon to sustain “strong stakeholder relationships,” be 
“provisional rather than strategic” when responding to crisis situations, as well as keeping 
the standards for “significant choice” (p. 215). Ulmer, et al. suggest organizations “must 
invest in true equal partnerships” with stakeholders before crisis hits, if the organization 
is to benefit from stakeholders’ “goodwill” during crisis moments (p. 216). Provisional 
response is spontaneous and/or “instinctive” rather than strategic such as “employing spin 
to deflect blame from the organization” (p. 216).  Talking about “significant choice” as 
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an ethical aspect, Ulmer et al. insist on the need for organizational leadership to 
communicate about “what is best for the stakeholders” (p. 217). This requires 
disseminating information that allows stakeholders to make rational choices in their 
decision-making processes.  
2.4.2. Prospective versus Retrospective vision 
Prospective vision is one that looks beyond the actual crisis and focuses on what 
the future holds for the organization (Ulmer, Sellnow & Seeger, 2011; Sellnow & Seeger, 
2013). In contrast, in a retrospective vision, organizations engage in blame tactics – there 
is a general tendency for communication to be more about looking back into what might 
have sparked the crisis with the intention of deflecting blame from the organization. The 
proponents of discourse of renewal point to the need for a “future-oriented’ 
communication with the ultimate goal being to “rebuild rather than on issues of blame or 
fault” (Ulmer et al., 2011, p. 218). To communicate prospectively, organizational leaders 
are called upon to be “optimistic” about the future of the company in their 
communication. Optimism according to the proponents is an inevitable aspect of the 
discourse of renewal if communication that is prospective in nature must make sense 
during a crisis. As Ulmer et al., have argued, “[t]he discourse of renewal is inherently an 
optimistic form of communication and focuses on the ability of the organization to 
reconstitute itself by capitalizing on the opportunities embedded in a crisis” (p. 218). 
Sellnow and Seeger (2013) note that instead of focusing on the past and apportioning 
blame, “organizations committed to renewal direct their messages toward the ultimate 
goal of rebuilding the organization so that it is resilient to crisis” (p. 98). A reactive 
24 
image and reputation restoration strategies clearly make way for a proactive and 
prospective communication. 
2.4.3. Organizational Learning 
Opportunities for learning following a crisis are also central to the renewal 
process (Ulmer, Sellnow, & Seeger, 2007; Ulmer, et al, 2011; Sellnow & Seeger, 2013).  
Proponents argue that when a crisis occurs, an organization’s deficiencies, weaknesses, 
and strengths are exposed. Organizations are thus advised to communicate what they 
have learned in the aftermath of a crisis to increase the confidence level of stakeholders 
concerning the organization’s ability to overcome future crises. In the renewal spirit, if 
stakeholders are to be aware that learning is happening, organizational leaders “should 
illustrate how the organization is learning from the crisis and what they are doing to 
ensure the crisis does not happen again” (Sellnow & Seeger, 2011, p. 215).  
Types of organizational learning include “behavioral”, “systemic”, and 
“paradigmatic” (Simon & Pauchant, 2000, cited in Ulmer et al., p. 214). In behavioral 
learning, changes are not willingly enacted by the organization but come because of 
external forces and are therefore not “internalized” by the organization, but are rather 
“maintained through external control, through rules, regulations or technological 
systems” (Simon & Pauchant, 2000, cited in Ulmer et al., 2011, p. 214). Behavioral 
learning is monitored and enforced by an external agency. Systemic learning occurs when 
an organization learns proactively or preemptively to avoid crisis. Paradigmatic learning 
involves changes integrated at all levels of the organization such that they offset previous 
basic business routine management and operational practices. These changes require 
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consistent training of all employees. The changes are not a result of external agency 
intervention and must be enacted by the organization itself. Ulmer, et al. suggest 
organizations should aim at systemic learning because changes that emerge from this 
learning focus on preventing a crisis from occurring or reoccurring and are derived from 
organizational leadership commitment. The proactive or preemptive nature of these 
changes not only effectively shifts organizational focus from reactive image management 
concerns but offers long term benefits for the organization including opportunities for 
renewal. 
2.4.4. Effective Organizational Rhetoric 
Ulmer, Sellnow and Seeger (2011) explicitly state that the renewal model is 
“grounded in a larger framework of effective organizational rhetoric” (p. 219). As such, 
the renewal process “involves leaders structuring a particular reality for organizational 
stakeholders and publics” (p. 219). The purpose is to have stakeholders aligned with the 
organization’s crisis response and increase their support for the organization during the 
crisis. To ensure that this happens, Sellnow and Seeger (2013) call on organizational 
leaders to “frame the crisis in a way that inspires, empowers and motivates” (p. 98). This 
advice draws on a social construction view of rhetoric; whereas a classical Aristotelian 
view holds that a rhetor must work within a pre-given reality, this view holds that rhetoric 
constructs reality.  
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2.5. Implication of renewal components for Crisis Communication 
The implication of the elements in the renewal model for the communication 
process can be perceived at several levels: (1) the organization is constituted as rhetor – 
the organization is entitized. (2) The leader or crisis communication professional acts as a 
corporate rhetor oriented towards the values, virtues, and goals of the organization which 
in turn determine the communication response to the crisis. (3) A leader-centric focus 
dominates the communication process during crisis response. I am aware that some 
organizations might have a decentralized/participatory management structure that 
routinely disseminates information and tasks, but it is the leader or the organizational 
crisis rhetor who is in-charge with “structuring” and “modeling” communication to 
achieve the behavior they “seek” from stakeholders during crisis (Sellnow & Seeger, 
2013, p. 98). (4) We clearly see a strong reference to classical Greco-Roman rhetoric 
where teachers of rhetoric such as Isocrates, Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian insisted on 
the potentials of the rhetor’s character influencing the message’s reception. A brief 
digression is warranted to explain this allusion.  
 In the ethical communication component of the discourse of renewal model, the 
overall focus on “positive values” of the organization as enacted by the crisis 
communicator/leader echoes the tensions and debates that gripped Classical Greco-
Roman rhetoric about virtue especially concerning the rhetor’s credibility as enacted 
through notions of “good sense”, “good will” and/or “good moral character”. According 
to Isocrates, “the technique of speech is neither morally good nor bad; only individuals 
are good and bad” (Kennedy, 1999, p. 41). Cicero and Quintilian later built on these 
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ethical concerns to advance the image of the vir bona persona as a speaker’s moral 
character and insisted that “only a good man can be a good orator” (Kennedy, 1999, p. 
41). For Quintilian, “moral goodness” should remain the guiding principle for every 
orator. He argued that “the perfect orator should be a good man” (Book 2.15, 39-42). 
Kennedy (2007) has noted that “Aristotle shows a greater sense of urgency toward 
knowing and doing what is morally right” (p. 61). Concerns for ethical behavior are 
articulated in one of his three means of persuasion – ethos. The argument is that the 
credibility of the orator will facilitate whatever tasks she/he has set out to accomplish. 
This credibility is built partly on moral character; but Aristotle also claims that “the 
virtuous person makes a DECISION to do the virtuous action for its own sake” (Irwin, 
1999, p. xviii). The bottom line is that communication was situated within the ability of 
the individual to influence her/his community, and this is heavily reflected in models of 
crisis communication.  
However, in contemporary situations, a rhetor might merely just sound or look 
like a good person to influence public perception during crisis. Sellnow and Seeger 
sidestepped this argument when they noted that organizations that apply the discourse of 
renewal following a crisis “direct their messages toward the ultimate goal of rebuilding 
the organization so that it is resilient to crisis” (p. 98). It should be noted that it is the 
organization in the capacity of rhetor that designs its message while perhaps drawing 
from public or stakeholders’ perceptions during a crisis with an obsessive focus on 
“rebuilding” – a key organizational goal necessary for organizational survival in times of 
crisis. 
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In addition, worthy of note is the fact that when discussing ethical communication 
as a theoretical element, Ulmer et al. mentioned the need for the organizational rhetor to 
communicate in a provisional manner during a crisis. This conditional and at times 
spontaneous or improvisational communication is still heavily tied to the entity 
communicating. Provisional or improvisational communication is a product of the rhetor. 
It is the individual’s uncanny ability to improvise under unusual circumstances that 
makes improvisation or provisional communication work – a clear reference to the 
classical Greek rhetorical concept of kairos or seizing the opportune moment or right 
timing. But kairos is particularly popular in relation to crisis as a rhetorical situation. The 
rhetorical situation according to Bitzer (1966) is a complex mix of “persons, events, 
objects, and relations presenting an actual or potential exigence which can be completely 
or partially removed if discourse, introduced into the situation, can so constrain human 
decision or action as to bring about the significant modification of the exigence" (p. 6). It 
is within this mix of inter-relations that kairos lends its strength to the rhetor allowing 
she/he to seize the “opportune moment” or “right timing” which Boer (2013) notes 
“appears unexpectedly” (p. 116). Kairos empowers the provisional rhetor as a leader 
responding to the opportunity of a crisis situation to frame realities, rework stakeholder 
relationships, and claim moral rectitude. Hence, even as the Discourse of Renewal 
redresses the reactive, defensive posture of earlier crisis rhetoric models and adopts a 
social constructionist metatheoretical frame, there remains a debt to classical Greco-
Roman rhetorical concepts, particularly the vir bona tradition and the privileging of a 
corporate rhetor who embodies and extols values and virtues favored by targeted 
stakeholders.  
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To counter these ideas about speaking and situation, I turn to postcolonial 
feminist theorist Gayatari Spivak.   
2.6. Spivak “Can the Subaltern speak?” 
Spivak’s (1988) question “can the subaltern speak?” demonstrates the unequal 
power relations that define the struggle for the survival of indigenous epistemologies in a 
colonized context. While the colonized has always had to struggle to survive 
epistemologically, economically, politically, psychologically and materially, there is a 
level of paternalistic dependency that has been forced on the colonized by the colonizer. 
To break free from this domination, these power relations must be checked. There is need 
for the valorization of indigenous epistemologies, and the paternalistic dependency by the 
colonized on the colonizer has to be disrupted, if  the subaltern must have agency in these 
power relations. The “epistemic violence” which Spivak clearly alludes to, is the outcome 
of repeating the circle of domination by postcolonial epistemologies that seek to “free” 
indigenous knowledge. 
Spivak thus warns postcolonial scholars and other elite who have made it a 
project to counter imperialist discourses on marginalized communities to guard against 
creating reality for these silenced communities as this spirals back to the same imperialist 
discourses. This warning is not only for postcolonial critics and elites, but also to NGOs 
and groups spearheading campaigns to “protect” local or community interests or the 
interests of marginalized segments of that community. Speaking for marginalized people 
simply repeats the same silencing that oppresses and marginalizes these 
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communities/segments. Instead, “speaking for” must be abandoned in favor of what she 
calls “unlearning”: Spivak argued that “in seeking to learn to speak to (rather than listen 
to or speak for) the historically muted subject of the subaltern…[we] systematically 
unlearn [the subaltern]” (p. 295). In other words, to speak for the Other(s) draws on what 
we have learned about those who have been historically marginalized, ignored, and 
oppressed. Spivak warns against attempts from the outside to grant a form of collective 
speech to marginalized people, groups or communities as this often results in a 
logocentric suspension in favor of a certain unity or solidarity among diverse people, 
community, interests or goals.  
2.7. Globalization and Multinationals 
In this section of the chapter, I take a critical look at globalization with a greater 
focus on economic globalization and how multinational corporations are situated in 
global networks because the context of globalization provides a purview within which we 
could better understand the complex relations when applying the Discourse of Renewal. I 
pay particular attention to the manifestations of the global economic process in a bid to 
contextualize the multinationals within global relations through which we can better 
capture the drive behind multinational corporations’ communication practices in 
developing countries – sub-Saharan Africa, in particular.   
2.7.1. Globalization 
 Globalization is a contentious term. Critics see globalization as synonymous to 
imperialism – conquering, exploitation, and full-blown domination of developing, less 
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powerful nations by imperialists like the US and the UK (e.g., Ikenberry, 2007; 
Callinicos, 2007). But globalists have argued from the perspectives of the convergence 
thesis, which holds that interconnections among nations especially in economic terms 
lead to efficiency – hence economic growth for all nations involved in the process. 
Proponents agree that nations benefit from trade and financial openness (Mosley, 2007). 
For the globalists, this convergence is noticeable and applicable not only to the country’s 
national policies, but also benefits the “lowest common denominator” (Mosley, 2007, p. 
110), a result of an open-market competitiveness. Mosley (2007) argues that 
“competition reduces government’s abilities to provide goods and services to their 
citizens, and it renders governments more accountable to external economic agents than 
to citizens of the polity” (p. 111). This is where divergent thesis theorists come in. 
Divergent theorists argue that “the global economy has placed governments, particularly 
in the developing world, in a ‘golden straightjacket’ [so they] must compete in order to 
survive, and the only means of competing is reducing government intervention, lowering 
taxes, and steadfastly pruning environmental, health and safety, and labor regulations” 
(Mosley, 2007, pp. 116-117). Mosley concludes that despite widespread support for the 
convergence thesis, “a cross-national, downward convergence of national policies has not 
occurred” (p. 121), meaning nation states have not witnessed widespread economic 
growth despite tying local economies to policies that favor global integration. 
Neo-liberalism is also an important concept in discussions of globalization. Many 
scholars infer that economic globalization has simply been a transportation of neo-
liberalism to developing countries and that these poor nations have been significantly 
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impacted (e.g. Harvey, 2006; El-Ojeili, 2006; Held & McGrew, 2002). Critical 
approaches to neo-liberalism identify it with expanding opportunities for profitable 
capital accumulation (Harvey, 2006; El-Ojeili & Hayden, 2006) involving global flows of 
corporate capital, finance, and trade, and subsequent stratifications and the 
commodification of the environment. 
For Harvey (2006), neoliberalism emerged as a globalizing force to counter the 
“threats” which the structural crisis of the 1970s had on the “power of the upper classes”; 
as such neo-liberalism from the outset is understood to be a design to protect and restore 
“class power to the richest strata in the population” (Harvey, 2006, p. 13). To be clear, 
even though neo-liberalism, as Harvey (2006) puts it, “had long been lurking in the wings 
of public policy … it was only during the troubled years of the 1970s that it began to 
move center stage, particularly in the US and Britain” (p. 15). Built along the lines of 
“free market, privatization of public assets, opening up natural resources to private 
exploitation and facilitating foreign direct investment and free trade” (Harvey, 2006, p. 
12), neo-liberalism is perceived by critics as a machinery for the exploitation and 
widening of inequalities in relations between developed and developing countries. Tied to 
this neo-liberal agenda was a set of assumptions: privatization of state enterprises will 
lead to efficient management and improved performance; foreign direct investment 
should be promoted; deregulation of the economy is indispensable as is trade and 
financial liberalization, with interest rates determined by the market. But by insisting on 
reducing or removing barriers to international trade and minimal state control of the 
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economy, globalization was paving the way for economic downturn of developing 
countries.  
2.7.2. Sub-Saharan Africa 
To substantiate these criticisms (economic) globalization, critics have looked at 
the impacts which international financial institutions, international trade organizations, 
and multinational corporations have on developing countries (e.g., Held, 2004; Anderson 
& Cavanagh, 2000; Frynas, 2003, Harvey, 2006; El-Ojeili & Hayden, 2006). I focus here 
on Sub-Saharan Africa. For example, El-Ojeili and Hayden (2006) argue that economic 
globalization (often tied to political and cultural global processes) has led to global 
inequalities among nations of the North and those of the South, among multinational 
corporations and citizens of developing countries – with heavy impact on Sub-Saharan 
Africa – involving expansive exploitation of developing countries by corporate and 
investment actors of richer economies including the US and Britain. These scholars see in 
globalization, “clear winners and drivers of corporate-led globalization” and they contest 
the notion of globalization as put forth by globalists “as a set of processes that move by 
themselves” (p. 88). This to El-Ojeili and Hayden is an ideology that secures the power 
and wealth of the industrialized world. 
Many globalists think that globalization is unstoppable, and that any attempts to 
resist the movement will lead to devastating economic consequences, or as El-Ojeili & 
Hayden put it, “economic woes” (p. 70). The global interconnectedness that has emerged 
from the global movement according to globalists has opened up opportunities for growth 
to every country. There are financial opportunities for everyone involved in the process, 
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communication barriers reduced, technology transfer and more democratic governance, 
and free market systems that all add up to both private and public wealth of nations and 
citizens (see Friedman, 2005). The competitiveness of the free market is in fact a major 
justification for economic globalization. However, critics examine relations between 
international financial institutions – the IMF, World Bank, World Trade Organization – 
and developing countries, as well as global financial flows, multinational operations, 
global inequalities, and the craze for profits on a global scale. 
Critics argue that “the speed and uncontrollability of global financial flows is an 
urgent problem…” potentially displacing national economic and social sovereignty (El-
Ojeili & Hayden, 2006). A telling case is the 1997 financial crisis that swept across 
Southeast Asia impacting countries like Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia. There was 
general fright among investors who quickly withdrew over $100 billion and this led to 
currency depreciation in these countries. Turning to Sub-Saharan Africa following the 
1970s worldwide financial crises, the IMF became a supervisory body for developing 
each country’s economies, gauging performance, and insisting on the adoption of a free 
market system as a stringent condition for loans (see El-Ojeili and Hayden, 2006). 
While neo-liberalists continue pushing for free and open market economies 
between developed and developing nations on grounds that competition and innovation 
are fostered under these conditions, Harvey (2006) insists that in practice free market 
ideology proved “to be the great vehicle for the consolidation of monopoly corporate and 
multinational powers as the nexus for class rule” (p. 18). This is especially the case given 
the hegemonic economic relations among the U.S. and Britain and developing countries 
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despite the neo-liberal argument that poorer countries all have global opportunities to 
advance. For example, neo-liberal apologist Thomas Friedman (2005) argues that 
globalization incentivizes individuals to work ever harder in a “flat world” full of 
opportunities for all. Friedman not only noted how globalization is “empowering 
individuals,” but asserted that the next stage of globalization, “globalization 3.0,” was 
“not only going to be driven more by individuals but also by a much more diverse – non-
Western, nonwhite – group of individuals” (p. 34). 
Critics however see disturbing inequalities in the manner in which the 
globalization movement has stratified the globe. About thirteen years ago scholars 
indicated the growing inequalities among people in the developed world and those in 
developing countries by pointing to disparate distribution of poverty.  Perrons (2004, in 
El-Ojeili &Hayden, 2006) explained that about 1.2 billion people survived on less than 
$1 a day while 2.8 billion others lived on less than $2 a day. Not much has changed as the 
World Bank’s 2016 global poverty statistics show that 12.7 percent of the world’s 
population lived at or below $1.90 a day in 2012. The World Bank’s statistics also 
indicate that developing countries are worst hit by poverty as over 2.1 billion people in 
the developing world lived on less than US $ 3.10 a day in 2012. The number of people 
living in “extreme” poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa has increased by 100 million more 
than the 284 million in 1990 -- that’s 384 million people (Beegle, Christiaensen, Dabalen, 
& Gaddis 2016). It is to be noted that Sub-Saharan Africa is just a region of the continent. 
Malnutrition is widespread in developing countries. Between 2014 and 2016, the 
United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization estimates that 795 million people 
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suffer chronic undernourishment in the world, and nearly all of these chronic 
undernourished cases – 780 million – live in developing countries. This means that most 
chronically undernourished people in the world are in developing countries. Moreover, 
the current available statistics for the Gross National Income per capita for the whole of 
Sub-Saharan Africa is $1,638 billion, for a sub-continent of 973.4 million people, 
compared to the GNI per capita for countries in the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) which stands at $44,311 billion (World Bank, 
2016).  
It can be argued that fundamental programs of neoliberal development have 
contributed to if not created the ongoing imbalances troubling world populations. In 
particular, the structural adjustment programs implemented by the IMF and World Bank 
as conditions for substantial national loans are suspect. These programs demand that 
recipient countries institute a move toward privatization of public assets and 
liberalization of all sectors of the economy. These conditions were imposed on 
developing African economies; when their loans became debts, these countries’ most 
prized natural resources became open to capital appropriation by foreign companies 
including the extractive industries and agriculture sector. This brings me to the role of 
multinational corporations in the global neoliberal economy. 
 
37 
2.7.3. Multinational Corporations (MNCs)  
In discussing MNCs, my goal is to critique the activities of these corporations by 
highlighting the power (influence) they wield in the global economy, with a particular 
focus on developing economies in Sub-Saharan Africa. The overall focus will be to show 
how profits obsession drives the activities of these organizations (see Frynas, 2003; Pegg, 
2003) and how this mode of conducting operations impacts MNCs’ communication with 
stakeholders during crises. 
The following characteristics define an MNC according to Cohen and Kennedy 
(2000, p. 121, cited in El-Ojeili & Hayden, 2006): (1) control of economic activities in 
two or more countries, (2) ability to maximize the comparative advantage between 
countries, (3) benefits from endowments, wage rates, market conditions and political and 
fiscal regimes, (4) has geographical flexibility, that is an ability to shift resources and 
operations between different locations on a global scale, (5) operate through financial and 
operational flows among different segments of the MNC that are greater than the flows 
within a particular country, (6) has significant economic and social effects at a global 
level. 
2.7.3.1. MNCs’ Dominance – Economic and Social 
Statistics from a World Bank blog post by Duncan Green (2016) show an increase 
in the number of corporations whose revenue is larger than most countries in the world 
(from 63 corporations in 2014 to 69 in 2015). Among these big companies are Walmart, 
Royal Dutch Shell, Exxon Mobil, Volkswagen, Toyota Motor, Apple, and BP. The 
Guardian newspaper correspondent Phillip Inman (2016), reporting on these findings, 
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indicated that Walmart, Shell, and Apple “make more money than most countries in the 
world combined” (para. 4). The report added that 153 corporations are above many 
nations from Africa, Asia and South America. The annual revenue of many 
multinationals is larger than that of most African countries. For example, Royal Dutch 
Shell’s revenue as reported in 2016 stands at $272 billion compared to Nigeria’s $54.48 
billion and Cameroon’s $24.204 billion. Shell has a GDP of $556 – larger than that of 
any one country in Africa – including that of the two largest economies in Africa – 
Nigeria (GDP is $405 billion) and South Africa (GDP $294.8). Other than the top 9 
countries with the largest economies in the world – namely United States, China, 
Germany, Japan, France, United Kingdom, Italy, Brazil, and Canada – it is corporations 
that dominate the world’s economy. This dominance is reflected in the paternalistic 
relationships sustained by these corporations with most countries. Phillip Inman (2016) 
cited a report by the charity Global Justice Now that highlighted this dominance. The 
report stated: “vast wealth and power of corporations is at the heart of so many of the 
world’s problems – like inequality…” adding that “drive for short-term profits today 
seems to trump basic human rights for millions of people on the planet” (paras. 10-11). 
Clearly, what this means is that not only is the global economy effectively controlled by 
multinationals, but the enormous power they wield around the globe is often oppressive.  
2.7.3.2. Foreign Investment 
MNCs expand their influence through Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) – 
overseas investments by companies. These investments could involve purchasing or 
establishing income-generating assets in a foreign country that entails the control of the 
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operation or organization. This can mean setting up subsidiaries or acquiring tangible 
assets in an overseas company. FDI is strategic in that it is not a passive form of 
investment like owning shares in another company, instead it actually offers “control” to 
the foreign company setting up the investment overseas (see World Bank; Financial 
Times Lexicon). In the case of sub-Saharan African countries, multinational corporations 
are able to wield economic and political power which often influences policy decisions of 
host governments in these countries, especially as many countries in Africa see these 
foreign investments as sources of revenue.  
For decades, economic growth in Africa has “depended” on foreign direct 
investment (Bobo, 2005, p.15). As such, proponents of global trade see MNCs as 
indispensable for the provision of goods, services, and technical skills, plus their ability 
to provide revenue in company taxes, making the corporations necessary partners in 
economic growth and employment. The argument for globalists has been that 
development in Africa “can be best orchestrated through relations with the developed 
countries” (Bobo, 2005, pp. 13-14). A particular emphasis by globalists has been the 
notion that “through the diffusion of the developed world’s capital, technology, values, 
and institutions to developing countries, a spawning of economic development will 
result” (Bobo, 2005, p. 14). But critics argue that the relations between developed and 
developing countries have been that of the usurper and usurped. Other critics (e.g., Bobo, 
2005) have taken a somewhat middle-ground by arguing that relations between 
developed and developing countries is rather a “give-and-take” – that’s the relationship 
benefits both parties, although the argument holds that the benefits are 
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“disproportionately” shared such that much of the gains realized in economic operations 
are “skewed” (p. 14) into the developed countries. At the center of this practice are 
multinational corporations (Bobo, 2005). In fact, it appears impossible to talk of 
development in economic terms by trying to separate developed countries from MNCs, 
because multinationals are the drivers of these same countries’ economic growth. 
2.8. Colonialism and Neocolonialism 
2.8.1. Legacies of Colonialism 
Scholars have explained colonial experiences as forces that transformed ethnic 
groups in Africa, although they also argue that contemporary ethnic groups in Africa 
have further been modified by processes beyond the colonial era. Pelican (2015) has 
argued that “many aspects of traditional organization, history and legal arrangements in 
contemporary Africa are not based on locally developed customs, but were the outcome 
of colonial subjects” (p. 49). But Pelican suggested it would be a misconception to 
completely wipe out the influence which early traditions in Africa still have on current 
organizing practices in African communities. For example, in his analysis of “tradition” 
and “custom” in Cameroon, Pelican (2015) found that tradition commonly referred to as 
“country fashion,” to Cameroonians, denotes “practices inherited from previous 
generations and still relevant in everyday life, and therefore variable and adaptable to 
contemporary situations” (p. 49); whereas custom refers to “practices and procedures 
introduced or fixed by colonial authorities” (p. 49). The bottom line is that contemporary 
characterizations of African societies cannot neglect colonialism and neocolonial 
experiences as forces that transform organizing (i.e., ways of doing) in Africa, but at the 
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same time, such characterizations must not ignore those practices inherited from earlier 
practices that are still relevant and adaptable to contemporary circumstances in African 
communities.  
Colonialism according to Mudimbe (1988) was an implantation of a “colonizing 
structure” that was at once “the domination of physical space, the reformation of natives' 
minds, and the integration of local economic histories into the Western perspective” (p. 
15). Mudimbe insists this colonizing structure was responsible for “producing marginal 
societies, cultures, and human beings” (p. 4) through its “policies of domesticating 
natives” (p. 2). No aspect of native life was left unaffected by the colonial encounter. 
Even the local economic practices of the natives were assimilated into the colonialists’ 
capitalist economic systems. The African traditional religion was permeated by the 
colonizing experience. New spiritual values were transmitted through churches that were 
established by missionaries. The colonial educational system and the colonial press were 
also effective mediums for reforming the minds of natives: “new attitudes” considered 
“contradictory” to so-called African traditional ways of life were transmitted to the local 
people (Mudimbe, 1988). The short and long-term impact of this experience, according to 
Mudimbe, was the trivialization of those core values that appeared to define native life 
and personhood including mode of worship and organizing. 
The “new culture” that emerged from the colonial “transformations” led to the 
“rejection [by the colonial structure] of unadapted persons and confused minds” 
(Mudimbe, 1988, p. 4). To survive and remain useful in the new environment created by 
the colonial experience, the natives had to integrate themselves into what Mudimbe calls 
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“intermediate space between” (p. 5). The “intermediate space between” is a marginal 
space in which interaction occurred between the African tradition and the implanted 
colonial culture. To survive in this space was to live at a borderline, a life that adapts to 
emergent cultural and social environments in a non-totalizing manner in order to be 
useful to therein. Colonial experiences are succinct examples of how the “subaltern” was 
deliberately silenced through representations that created new realities for communities. 
Indirect rule was a policy in which the British colonialists used local chiefs “to 
implement colonial policies” (Jua, 1995, p. 39). This policy was very active in the 
Southern Cameroons also referred to as British Cameroon and in Nigeria. Jua (1995) 
notes that in Cameroon, while the policy of indirect rule “served to create the requisite 
enabling environment” for “maximum economic exploitation” (p. 39), the policy seen as 
“cultural imperialism” (p. 39) also led to the “redefinition of power relations” and the 
“invention of tradition” (p. 41) by the British. African traditional institutions were 
weakened, indigenous modes of organizing disrupted, and power now flowed through a 
centrifugal structure. Indirect rule also saw the British blending the colonial 
administration with local chiefs and other elites schooled in the colonial education 
system, even though this blending didn’t reflect a robust participatory process capable of 
empowering the natives. In Cameroon and Nigeria, chiefs were appointed as Native 
Authorities, while Africans who emerged from the colonial education establishment were 
integrated into the British colonial administration. This process has been described by 
some African scholars as “Africanization” (e.g., Jua, 1995; Chilver, 1963). This form of 
Africanization emerged in 1948 for the Southern Cameroons as a policy within the 
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indirect rule framework. By Africanization, the British were transforming the already 
established colonial administration into an “improved system of Native Administration 
and local government” (Chilver, 1963, p. 129). 
French African colonies for their part saw an implementation of the policy of 
assimilation. Assimilation was a French ideology set out to expand the French culture and 
language as Africans in French colonies were taught that by “adopting the French culture 
and language” they could “become French” which from the perspectives of colonialists 
was a privilege (Sesan, 2014, p. 2). The outcome of this policy in these colonies was 
“high disregard” for African religious orientation and beliefs, natives’ culture, traditional 
institutions, and power structures. The chiefs’ power was weakened through this tactic to 
disempower what was indigenous African authority (Sessan, 2014, p. 6). For the 
disruption of native institutions, belief systems and power relations to be effective, a 
colonial structure in which communication was initiated, produced, and disseminated by 
the colonialists was established. Local chiefs and other African elites carried the 
information from colonialist administrative agencies to the local people and from 
communities to the colonialists. The colonial administration then tailored the information 
to the exact goals and impact desired by the colonial government and then, retransmitted 
to the local people through this network of chiefs or “extension officers” (Ansu-
Kyeremeh, 1997). 
As mentioned already, this colonial history relating to the British and French 
policies of indirect rule and assimilation is important because it allows us to see how the 
colonial encounter heavily contributed to the production of hybridized experiences. Jua 
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(1995) has consistently argued that indirect rule was actually the creation of new ways of 
life that contradicted what appeared to be the norms in African traditions. In so doing, the 
policies of indirect rule, and assimilation transformed the social space within which 
cultures met, and in which the local people, and arguably, the colonialists too, had to 
negotiate new ways of being if they were to remain relevant to the new social space that 
emerged.  
2.8.2. Contexts of Neocolonialism  
The post-colonial African states that emerged sustained the legacy of colonialism 
(Jua, 1995). The African elites who served the colonial administration and were now in 
top government positions remained determined to reproduce colonial structures to protect 
their political, social, and economic power. For these elites, it was not necessarily a 
question to return to the celebrated precolonial past but to rather fortify the colonial 
legacy. In Cameroon, for example, chiefs continue to serve as “auxiliaries” acting as 
“intermediaries” between the administration and the people by carrying out government 
directives (Jua, 1995, pp. 42-43). The top-down colonial communication structures were 
also vigorously maintained. 
The Shell crisis in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria, and the Herakles Farms 
crisis in the Southwest region of Cameroon cannot be separated from these neoliberal 
relations and free market concepts. In both crises, the companies, host governments, and 
local elites were charged with capitalistic corruption. Permeated by corrupt practices, 
these companies’ relations with communities resulted in a divide among local 
populations and their elites, as well as traditional rulers. Personal economic gains took 
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precedence in negotiations between leaders of these communities and the corporations. 
As a result of this situation in the sub-Saharan region, Fomin and Forje (2005) have 
argued that after many years of colonialist and neocolonialist exploitation of these riches 
[minerals, crude oil reserves, land], little or nothing is there in terms of development, to 
attest to the tremendous wealth that foreign imperialists and their African collaborators 
have looted from the whole sub-region. 
Critics of multinationals have noted that their presence in many developing 
countries exerts too much power in their relations with developing nations, and most 
especially with local communities. In addition, MNCs too often evade taxes, exploit local 
communities, and can relocate to other lands if they think it will serve their best interests. 
Optimists (as indicated in Cameroon’s Vision 2035) argue that by being active in 
international markets that foster strong relationships with multinational corporations, 
African nations will be able to acquire sufficient revenue to develop their own economies 
and increase production of goods for both national and international consumption. 
However, Lanning and Mueller (1979) examined the mining industry in Africa and 
insisted that development in African countries has been undermined noting that “Africa’s 
mineral resources are being depleted without generating economic development” (p. 
485). These scholars noted that “control of the mineral exports is firmly in the hands of 
the mining companies, who exploit the mineral resources at a rate and in a manner 
consistent with their interests and not with those of the host nation” (pp. 485-486). As 
mentioned already, this trend of doing business in Sub-Saharan Africa has been affecting 
all sectors of economic operations in which MNCs are also major partners. 
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The main argument in this chapter has been that the Discourse of Renewal must 
be responsive to complex contexts that frame rhetoric. These contexts are enmeshed in 
differential patterns of communication, exigencies, and complex relations. The discussion 
on globalization, neoliberalism, colonialism and MNCs provided a purview into the 
interpenetrating contexts that complicate crisis rhetoric in transcultural settings.  
The following chapter explains the data, coding, and thematic analysis that inform 





This dissertation compares two cases to illuminate the limitations and need for the 
amendment of the renewal model of crisis communication. These cases can suggest how 
the management of crisis by MNCs in non-Western contexts are shaped by specific 
African cultures and histories. So, bringing together lessons from these cases can in turn 
inform the amendment of the renewal model. Further, these cases are used in this 
research as a way to organize data and findings. This chapter details the data, coding, and 
thematic analysis that informs each case.   
Data and analyses in this research aimed at answering the research questions I 
introduced in Chapter 1: 
RQ1: What are the limitations of the Crisis Renewal model for multinationals operating 
in West African countries?  
RQ2: How can this model be amended based on African communication principles?  
3.2. Rationale for Cases 
Cases are widely applied in crisis communication research. The current renewal 
model developed through case analyses (Seeger & Ulmer, 2001, 2002; Seeger et al., 
2005; Ulmer, 2001; Ulmer & Sellnow, 2002). The method of case analysis that examines 
contemporary complex phenomenon in real-world contexts makes case analysis a suitable 
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research method (Yin, 1994, 2004, 2009). However, crisis communication scholars do 
not develop cases as a method of analysis but rather employ modes of rhetorical analysis 
that apply concepts of classical rhetoric (apologia) or psychological processes 
(attribution) to the exigencies of a corporate crisis. Theoretical components of a crisis 
communication model are applied to ongoing or post crisis communicative processes of 
organizations, institutions, or entities as ways of investigating the salient issues.  
The case development in crisis communication is descriptive and the analysis 
proceeds deductively by fitting the rhetorical model to the description of the case. 
However, these models were developed inductively by examining cases of corporate 
crises to identify rhetorical strategies. Thus, the image repair model has been expanded 
by examining particular cases for additional elements of classical apologia. Similarly, the 
discourse of renewal model was developed by identifying affirmative, responsive 
strategies in particular exemplars of corporate crisis response.  
3.3. Data and Procedure 
3.3.1. Data Sources   
There were two sets of data. The first set was data about the Shell oil crisis in 
Nigeria and the second set was data about the Herakles’ Farms crisis in Cameroon. For 
the Nigerian case data sources included newspaper reports and radio texts, company 
documents (e.g., environmental impact assessment reports, mission and value statements, 
ethical code of conduct statements, press releases, and statements on Shell’s website as 
well as news releases and reports from NGOs and Civil Society Organizations directly 
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involved in the crises). The reports came from local Nigerian and international 
newspapers and wire services. The radio texts were specifically from the BBC World 
Service. Three hundred and ninety-one (391) documents were collected on the Nigerian 
case. The time frame for the crisis in Nigeria runs from 1993 through 2016. The Niger 
Delta oil crisis involving Shell, the Nigerian government, and local communities has a 
long history. However, this study is limited to documents between 1993 and 2016. This 
timeframe reflects the most intense moments in the crisis cycle; international attention 
was drawn to the crisis during these years. The crisis is ongoing. 
Data sources for Herakles Farms crisis in Cameroon include Open Letters 
published by the company in direct response to accusations. These letters were found on 
the websites of Oakland Institute, Business and Human Rights Resource Center, Herakles 
Farms, and Greenpeace. Other documents include a letter to investors, Investment 
Opportunity document; Herakles Farms’ Value Drivers document also accessed via the 
website of Oakland Institute; Herakles Farms’ Environmental Social Impact Assessment 
Report downloaded from the NGO Center for the Environment and Development; letters 
of opposition from communities; and newspaper reports (downloaded from LexisNexis). 
There were reports published by the international NGOs mentioned in this case. There 
were also five news videos accessed via YouTube and Facebook page of the journalist 
who produced the report. I later transcribed these news feeds. Herakles Farms crisis time 
frame is 2009 to 2016. A total of 91 documents were found to be relevant for the analysis 
in the Herakles Farms case.  
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3.3.2. Data Collection Strategies and Organization   
For both cases, newspaper reports and radio texts were downloaded from the 
online database LexisNexis. Online searches were also made on Google Search Engine. 
Preliminary searches using words relating to the crises in Nigeria and Cameroon resulted 
in massive search results. For the crisis in Nigeria, terms such as Ogoni crisis, Ogoni oil, 
Ken Saro-Wiwa, Ogoni shell protests, Ijaw oil crisis, Itsekiri oil, MOSOP, Niger Delta 
killings, Niger Delta crisis, Shell Nigeria crisis, Nigeria oil spills, and Nigerian 
government oil protests, appeared to generate the most data. Following are search results 
when these terms are entered on LexisNexis: Ogoni crisis (705 items), Ogoni oil (996 
items), Ogoniland (995 items), Niger Delta crisis (991 items), Nigerian oil spill (996 
items found), MOSOP (998 items), Shell Nigeria crisis (998 items), Ken Saro Wiwa (997 
items), Nigerian government oil protests (996 items), Ijaw oil crisis (731 items), Itsekiri 
oil (718 items). Repeated searches found that many of these items were duplicates as 
different newspapers simply republished reports that other reporters already published. 
This was a particular trend noticed with some local Nigerian Newspapers. Relevant 
documents were also downloaded from the websites of Shell Global, SPDC, Ministry of 
Niger Delta Affairs, and Niger Delta Development Commission, and NGOs involved in 
the crisis. 
This same search strategy was applied to the Herakles Farms case in Cameroon. 
Some key terms used include: Herakles farms, Palm oil crisis Cameroon, Cameroon palm 
plantation, Herakles crisis. Since the website of Herakles farms was no longer available 
at the time of data collection, most search results came from local and international 
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including NGOs Center for the Environment and Development, Struggle to Economize 
Future Environmnet (SEFE), Oakland Institute, Green Peace International, Human Rights 
Watch as well as online Google searches that provided links to some newspaper reports 
not found on LexisNexis. 
The next step was to organize the data. For the Nigerian case data types include:  
(a) Newspaper reports, (b) Government documents, (c) Royal Dutch Shell documents, (d) 
NGO reports. Data types for the case in Cameroon include: (a) Cameroon Government 
dossier, (b) Communities opposition, (c) NGO reports, (d) News reports. 
Once organized into types, data was collected based on the characteristic 
communicative organization of each type. For example, a preliminary scan of ‘headlines’ 
for the newspaper reports proved to be effective. Headlines are important parts of every 
news story and headlines effectively provide hints on the most important content of the 
story. I also read the “lead”, “graph” or opening paragraph of the news reports to further 
ascertain the focus of the news item. The lead is an important part of every news report as 
it summarizes the most important information in a news story. News stories normally 
follow an inverted pyramid approach widely taught in journalism. According to this 
approach, a news story begins with the most important information to the least – but this 
rule might not always be the case in every news story – a direct consequence of news 
organization’s or journalist’s judgement (including organizational and personal bias). 
Aware of this, the first two paragraphs of each news story was scanned through before 
the item was selected. The first paragraph in a newspaper story called “lead” or “graph” 
is considered the most important portion of the entire news story because that is where 
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the reporter highlights the most important aspects of the story. A similar process was 
applied to company and NGO documents, and government documents. I then read the 
whole article for coding. 
3.4. Coding approach 
In this dissertation, both focused coding and first cycle coding methods are 
applied. Focused coding was most appropriate when coding statements made by 
organizational leaders and spokespersons since coding categories were already known to 
be the four theoretical dimensions of the Discourse of Renewal. Focused coding is most 
appropriate at the level of organizing data into categories (Saldana, 2009; Tracy, 2013; 
Boyatzis, 1998); and since the four theoretical components are the frames of analysis in 
the amendments I offer to the model, it was logical to begin coding at this level. 
However, when coding statements made by villagers, community leaders and/or 
representatives of local communities as they responded to the two multinationals’ 
messages, the process began with initial coding and then progressed to focused coding 
(see Tracy, 2013). The rationale for this was that I was looking for themes from the point 
of view of local communities and these had to emerge from the data.  
3.4.1. Coding process  
Coding corporate crisis communication was based on the dimensions of either the 
apologia model or the discourse of renewal. I was looking for words, phrases, or 
sentences in statements made by organizational leaders and spokespersons about the 
crisis that were closest to the theoretical premises provided in the model. Categorizing 
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these codes required making judgements not just on the use of these words, phrases or 
sentences, but also in relation to the context in which these codes are used. Meanwhile, 
when coding statements by local communities in response to corporate crisis 
communication or to other stakeholders in the crisis, emphasis was on identifying themes 
specific to these responses. 
The overall coding process proceeded as such:  I read the statements line-by-line 
repeatedly and coded them by identifying either those words, phrases, or sentences that 
addressed the four theoretical dimensions or the words, phrases, and sentences that were 
recurrent, given emphasis, and/or phrased forcefully in communities’ response (Owen, 
1984). The purpose for doing this was for me to be able to identify potential data 
belonging to a particular theme or category. The next step was to critically examine the 
codes identified and then to organize them into themes or categories. Codes that reflected 
each of the four theoretical dimensions of the discourse of renewal were pattern-matched 
to the premises of the model. Codes that emerged out of my examination of responses to 
corporate rhetoric were later reframed in terms of Africentric communication concepts.  
3.4.2. Conceptualizing and Operationalizing Categories 
The conceptual explanations of each of the categories are based on the theoretical 
explications provided in the model. I then inductively provided operational definitions for 
each of the categories. In doing so, I provided examples of what is included and what is 
not included in each category (See Table 1) For communities’ response, the focus was on 
themes. I discuss themes in the “thematic analysis” section in this chapter.  
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and fault, into an 
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3.5. Unit of Analysis  
The unit of analysis was specific statements made during and about the crisis 
drawn from data sources. The four theoretical dimensions that inform the Discourse of 
Renewal model served as frames of analysis. However, this dissertation also analyzed the 
early communication of the two multinationals to provide a comparative frame regarding 
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the shift in communication strategies – from defensive/reactive to proactive/renewal. To 
do this, Benoit’s (1995/1997) five typologies informed by Apologia were the frames of 
analysis. The unit of analysis constituted direct statements from company leaders and 
spokespersons about the crisis.  
3.6. Thematic analysis  
This section focuses on communities’ response to the Discourse of Renewal 
applied by the two multinationals. It was important to code themes because from these 
themes, it would be possible to fully understand the concerns of local communities and 
point to possible areas of amendments in the Discourse of Renewal. 
Boyatzis (1998, p. 31) identified five elements that constitute a rigorously coded 
theme:  
(1) a label, that is, a name; (2) explanation of what constitutes the theme; (3) description 
of how to know when the theme occurs; (4) description of what is not included in the 
theme; (5) examples of what is included and what is excluded from the theme. Following 
the second cycle coding in which the focus was to regroup recurrent codes for thematic 
analysis, I was able to identify major themes that emerged from communities’ response to 





Table 2. Themes in Communities’ Response to Shell’s Discourse of Renewal 
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Note: while there was no direct apology from either of two companies analyzed, the 
notion of “revamped impetus” mentioned by Herakles Officials explaining the renewal 
approach they took in the second phase of the crisis could be seen as alluding to an 
apology. The same applies to Shell in which they described their new approach to the 
crisis as a result of the mistakes of the past. 
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Summary 
This chapter is a description of my methods in data collection, coding procedure, 
and thematic analysis. Conceptual and operational definitions of the categories are 
explained as well as the frames of analysis in this research.  
In the following two chapters, I analyze two cases of transnational crisis rhetoric 
in African contexts using the model of communication. My effort is to inductively 
identify communicative dynamics and contexts that challenge the assumptions of these 
models in order to modify the renewal model as appropriate. In doing so, I intend to add 
to the current model and to contribute to the development of a more culturally grounded 
understanding of multinational crisis communication in Nigeria and Cameroon. 
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4 Case 1: Royal Dutch Oil Crisis in Nigeria 
 
4.1.  Introduction 
This chapter is an analysis of the Shell oil crisis in the Niger Delta region of 
Nigeria. To better situate the crisis within the context of the current research, the 
characteristics of Niger Delta are discussed by looking at the history, governance, and 
economic and social relations in the region. The chapter also provides a background for 
Shell’s operations and its community relations in the Niger Delta. The overarching 
purpose is to understand Shell’s corporate rhetoric in response by critically analyzing the 
points of conflict in this crisis set within contextual complexities and exigencies, 
situational contradictions, and tenacious histories. The chapter develops an assessment of 
lessons learned from the company’s crisis communication response and a discussion of 
what these lessons mean for organizational crisis rhetoric and communication practices 
keeping in mind the political dynamics of postcolonial representation. 
4.1. Niger Delta Region 
 The Niger Delta is located in Southern Nigeria and shares its eastern boundary 
with Cameroon (Niger Delta Development Commission (NDCC), “Master Plan,” 2007). 
The region has an estimated population of 32 million – that is, 22 percent of Nigeria’s 
total population (Francis, Lain & Rossiasco, 2011). The region covers 112,110 square 
kilometers or 43,286 square miles (NDDC, “Master Plan,” 2007). According to the 
Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs (MNDA) and Niger Delta Development Commission 
(NDDC), there are 40 ethnic groups speaking some 250 languages and/or dialects (also 
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see United Nations Development Program (UNDP) “Human Development Report,” 
2006). Agriculture and fishing constitute 48 percent of primary occupations and sources 
of livelihood (Francis et al., 2011). 
The region’s colonial experience effectively began when the area was established 
as a protectorate under British rule (Wikipedia, “Niger Delta”). In 1885 the region was 
known as British Oil Rivers Protectorate until 1893 when it was expanded into the Niger 
Coast Protectorate (Wikipedia, “Niger Delta”). In 1951, Niger Delta became part of the 
Eastern Region of Nigeria – one of three and later four regions of the country.  
Nigeria is the largest oil producing nation in Africa and the world’s fourth largest 
crude oil exporter (United States Energy Information Administration, 2016) thanks to the 
oil rich Niger Delta. The Niger Delta region originally comprised three states, namely, 
Bayelsa, Delta, and Rivers (Alagoa, 2004). However, the region was expanded to include 
all nine of the petroleum oil and gas producing states (Nigeria has 36 states). The nine 
states include Abia, Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross Rivers, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo, and 
Rivers. Several reasons explain this expansion. Some scholars dispute the current 
geography of the Niger Delta on the grounds that what currently constitutes the region is 
based on political mapping and not the historical location of the region (see UNDP, 2006; 
Ibaba, 2005). The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in its 2006 “Niger 
Delta Development Report” suggested the Nigerian government’s decision to include all 
nine oil and gas producing states in the Niger Delta Region was for “administrative 
convenience,” “political expedience,” and “development objectives” (p. 19). Shell 
Petroleum Development Company is the largest oil company in Nigeria, alongside the 
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Nigerian National Petroleum Company, Chevron/Texaco, Exxon Mobil, Total Fina, ELF 
Aquitaine, and Agip (see Orogun, 2010).  
4.2. The Niger Delta Question 
Enshrined in the history of the Niger Delta is what scholars refer to as “the Niger 
Delta question” (see Orugon, 2010). This question revolves around issues of ownership 
of oil resources in the region and asks why the Niger Delta region is so rich in oil yet 
communities live in abject poverty (Orugon, 2010; Alagoa, 2004). Control over oil 
resources has been a major point of contention in the region. Orugon (2010) explains the 
Niger Delta question as pointing to communities’ “claims of landownership as well as 
mineral resources within their delineated territorial boundaries” (p. 466). The question 
also entails the impact of oil production activities in the region including environmental 
problems caused by oil spills and gas flaring (Orugon, 2010). The Niger Delta question 
must be understood as well through the perspectives of some militant groups in region. 
Militant groups, including the most prominent militia – Movement for the 
Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) – charge “internal colonialism,” “political 
marginalization,” and environmental neglect by both the oil companies and the host 
government (Orogun, 2010). The deplorable situation in the Niger Delta is also captured 
in a UNDP (2006) report which noted that the region is “suffering from administrative 
neglect, crumbling social infrastructure and services, high unemployment, social 
deprivation, abject poverty, filth and squalor, and endemic conflict” (p. 9). Several 
marginalized ethnic groups in the Niger Delta, particularly the Ogoni, Ijaw, Urhobo and 
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Itsekiri, contest the role of multinational oil corporations in the region. Community 
protests that have turned into deadly riots evidence the ongoing unrest in this region. 
The Niger Delta question has haunted the Nigerian government and transnational 
oil corporations operating in the region. Since the 1990s, the region has been engulfed in 
unending violence resulting to the militarization of nearly the entire region by ethnic 
militia groups and Nigerian military and police forces (Koos & Jan, 2015). Elite and local 
politicians often fund competing militia groups to advance their economic and political 
agendas including gaining access to oil and gas resources in the region. The government 
of Nigeria regularly launches huge military crackdowns on militant groups as was the 
case in 2008 and 2009 and the MEND militant group has been a major target for 
government forces in the Niger Delta region (Fatade, 2009). The violence in this region 
has led to thousands of people fleeing their villages while hundreds are reported dead 
(Walker, 2009; IRIN Africa, 2009). The government of Nigeria has offered amnesty to 
members of militant groups and in return, the militants are required to surrender their 
weapons and undergo vocational training and rehabilitation sponsored by the Nigerian 
government (BBC News, 2011). However, this has not completely deterred militant 
violence in the region. The ongoing militant violence in the Niger Delta has been blamed 
on marginalization of the region by the Nigerian government as well as on oil operation 
activities of multinational corporations’ oil exploitation and relations with local 
communities (see Orugon, 2010). 
Oil companies are in the midst of the violence. Foreign oil workers including 
sailors are regularly kidnaped and held by militant groups for ransom. A regular target for 
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militants has been pipelines operated by multinational oil companies with Shell as the 
largest foreign oil company operating in Nigeria being the most affected. In 2016, Shell 
Petroleum company was a major target when militants launched a heavy attack on 
pipelines run by the multinational. Oil production in Nigeria was reported to be down 
300,000 barrels a day following a huge explosion on the pipelines (Uguru & Faul, 2016). 
It was also in 2016 that a new militant group, the Niger Delta Avengers, announced its 
creation (BBC News, 2016). This militant group attacked several pipelines and oil 
facilities in the region; the attack resulted in a 20-year record low oil production for 
Nigeria, dropping the country to the second largest oil producer in Africa after Angola. 
The significance is that Nigeria has always been the largest oil producing country in 
Africa and has frequently been ranked fourth largest producer of oil in the world 
(Holodny, 2016; The Economist, 2016).  
4.2.1. Governance 
 Nigeria has three-tier administrative structure: federal, state, and local. The 
federal government level holds “exclusive powers” but sustains “concurrent powers” with 
state governments (NDDC “Master Plan,” 2005, p. 52). At the same time, the state and 
local government levels exercise “residual power” (NDDC “Master Plan,” 2007, p. 52). 
This means that the federal government has the power to veto certain state government 
decisions, and the same applies to the relationship between the state and local 
governments. Key actors in the affairs of this region can be broadly described as local 
communities, community leaders, local, state and federal offices and agencies, and 
multinational oil corporations. The United Nations Development Program in a 2006 study 
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conducted in the Niger Delta pointed to prevailing “inequalities in the allocation of 
resources from oil and gas” (p. 19) and a heavy top-down administrative approach to 
management in the country noting that “transparency,” “accountability,” and “integrity” 
continue to elude governance in the region (p. 5). Scholars have argued that governance 
in the Niger Delta is strongly influenced by multinational oil companies, who are 
perceived as influencing policies and development programs in the region (Orugon, 2010; 
also see Alagoa, 2004). Given the overlap between the host government’s authority and 
the power of the oil companies operating in the Niger Delta, inhabitants and scholars 
alike blame protests, killings, widening gaps of economic inequalities, and environmental 
problems plaguing the region, on both the government and the multinational oil 
companies (see Ojefia, 2004).  
4.2.2. Economic and Social relations 
 Turning to the local level, history and communality play a role in governance and 
decision-making. As Alagoa (2004) observes, in the Niger Delta “[t]he past is . . . 
manifestly a part of the present” (p. 63) as present actions or conduct are contextualized 
within communities’ history (Alagoa, 2004). In fact, Alagoa argued that conflicts occur 
in the region when “history” is not considered by parties involved. He pointed out that 
“policymaking…has proved ineffective to contain the enormous problems of the Niger 
Delta region…in part, the result of disagreements over historical interpretation within 
communities, and the lack of a historical perspective or neglect of the historical factor by 
government and oil corporations” (p. 64).  
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The economic and social relations among the local people of Niger Delta are 
generally described as “symbiotic” (Usuanlele, 2007, p. 484; also see Lloyd, 2007). 
Tracing the nature of these relations among ethnic groups, Usuanlele (2007) and Lloyd 
(2007) point to both group and communal structures as mutually beneficial to the people. 
Communities continue to sustain a group decision-making process and communal 
structures of power alongside government administration (see Amodu, 2013). These 
communal structures include several decision-making bodies and participation by 
families, women, and youth. A chief or traditional ruler along with a Council of Elders 
heads local communities. The Council of Elders whose members are from families 
constituting the community (Amodu, 2013) handles disputes at all levels of the 
community. A Trustee Board usually serves as the body that implements decisions 
(Amodu, 2013).  
The struggle over who owns land and oil resources continues to deepen the 
antagonisms that characterize the economic and social relations in the area. Orugon 
(2010) noted that, “The issues of land ownership and proprietorship of crude oil resource 
endowment have pitched the Nigerian federal government and the transnational oil 
corporations against the feuding ethno-communities of the Niger Delta” (p. 469). These 
issues and conflicts are strongly enshrined in articulations of the Niger Delta question. 
Another aspect characterizing economic and social relations in the region is social 
exclusion. The Niger Delta is the poorest oil-producing region in the world despite being 
the fourth largest exporter of crude oil (see US Energy Information Administration, 
2016). For decades, communities in this region have felt neglected in the development 
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process in Nigeria, while some groups within the region have further been marginalized 
(See UNDP “Human Development Report,” 2006; NDDC “Master Plan,” 2007). A case 
often pointed to is the Ogoni people whose leader, Ken Saro-Wiwa, was executed by 
hanging in 1995 for confronting the government and oil companies over exploiting oil 
but doing very little for the economic and social development of Ogoniland. I will say 
more about this case shortly. 
4.3. Shell in Nigeria 
Shell is a global group of energy and petrochemicals companies with about 
93,000 employees in more than 90 countries and territories (“Shell Nigeria”). The Royal 
Dutch Shell Group first established an oil venture with BP Plc in Nigeria in 1936 and two 
years later, the company was issued an exploration license to prospect for oil throughout 
Nigeria under the name Shell D’Arcy (“Shell in Nigeria”). The company first drilled an 
oil well in Nigeria in January 1956; that same year, the company name was changed to 
Shell-BP Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Limited. The first export of oil 
from Nigeria by the company was in February 1958 (Shell Nigeria, “Our history”). In 
1979, Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria (SPDC) was created 
incorporating assets of the older Shell-BP consortium (Reuters, “Timeline Shell in 
Nigeria,” 2013).  
Shell Petroleum Development Company produces 39 percent of the total oil in 
Nigeria. Operations are in the shallow water and onshore in Niger Delta (“Shell Interests 
in Nigeria,” 2012). The company holds a land lease contract of operation for an area of 
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30,000 square kilometers and has a network of more than 9,000km of flowlines and 
pipelines, 71 producing oil fields, nearly 1,000 oil producing wells, 87 flow stations, nine 
gas plants and two big oil terminals for export (“Shell Interests in Nigeria,” 2012). 
SPDC’s average production is over one million barrels of oil per day (“Shell Interests in 
Nigeria,” 2012).  
4.4. The Crisis  
Shell’s operations and community relations in the Niger Delta region have been 
disrupted by protests in many communities. Shell has been accused by communities of 
environmental degradation including heavy pollution, poisoning of fishing grounds, and 
destruction of farmlands by frequent oil spills and gas flaring. In addition, accusations of 
exploitation, human rights abuse, corruption, and killings continue to trouble Shell in the 
Niger Delta. This crisis can be understood by looking at the issues raised by local 
communities and other stakeholders regarding Shell’s operations. Specifically, the 
following discussion addresses oil spills and gas flaring from Shell’s operations in the 
region; the protests plaguing Shell’s operations in Niger Delta communities; and the 
lawsuits against Shell. 
4.4.1. Oil Spills and Gas Flaring 
According to company documents, oil spills occur year-round. Between 2011 and 
2016, there have been spills every month with the monthly average just over 11 spills a 
month in 2014 (“Shell Oil Spill Data”). A study published in 2010 by the Ecumenical 
Council for Corporate Responsibility (ECCR) describes what it refers to as “systemic 
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problems” (p. 44) as the major causes of oil spills including aging pipelines and delayed 
spill response. Specifically, the study blames Shell for allowing oil to flow through 40-
year old pipelines. The study also pointed to delayed oil spill response by Shell, noting 
that oil spill inspection can take 24 hours to several days, weeks or even months, 
allowing much of the spill to disperse into widespread pollution and making the reported 
spilled amount seem smaller than what has actually been lost (p. 42). In addition, Shell 
contractors are accused of using topsoil transported from other localities to “mask 
contaminated sites” (ECCR “Three Challenges Facing Shell,” 2010). The ECCR study 
estimates that yearly oil spills in the Niger Delta region compare to the Exxon Valdese oil 
spill disaster. A United Nations Report (2011) estimated that it would take three decades 
to clean up oil spills in the Niger Delta at the cost of US $1billion (also see Mark, 2011). 
An Amnesty International (2015) report accused Shell of making “false claims” (para 3) 
about cleaning spills in the region. The report pointed to the impact of the spills: “By 
inadequately cleaning up the pollution from its pipelines and wells, Shell is leaving 
thousands of women, men and children exposed to contaminated land, water and air, in 
some cases for years or even decades” (Amnesty International, 2015, para 3). 
A 1993 newspaper report painted the picture of oil spills in the Niger Delta by 
quoting a resident of one of the communities in the region who watched for weeks as a 
“fine spray of petroleum coated the bamboo and palm trees around the Sasiga rivulet 
until, mixed with acid rain and humid air, it gave the plants the milky brown sheen of a 
chocolate forest” (McGreal, 1993, p. A8; also see Amanze-Nwachuku, 2011). The news 
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report indicates that this was the result of a burst pipe from Shell’s pumping station at 
Korokoro, another community in the region.  
Strong demands for cleaning up spills, a share of oil profits, and a fairer 
compensation for land are at the center of the crisis pitting communities against Shell. In 
1995, just months before his execution, Ken Saro-Wiwa, the leader of the Movement for 
the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), summed up the situation of the oil spills in 
Ogoniland: “Plants are now dying, land is flooded, fish are killed … our lives are 
becoming unbearable … we have scratches on our body and rashes on our skin any time 
we go into the water” (Vidal, 1995, p. T2). Shell pulled out of its Ogoni ground 
operations in 1993, although its network of oil pipelines still run through Ogoniland. 
 Gas flaring is another important aspect in this crisis. The Nigerian National 
Petroleum Company has reported that major oil companies in the country flared 23.5 
billion cubic feet of gas in January of 2012 (see Reuter, 2012). Shell has been accused of 
this practice. In the Niger Delta, a fisherman recounted the gas flaring ordeal: “Because 
of the flares it is so hot, it is smoky, the air is thick and it is constantly daytime here” 
(Mark, 2012, p. 7). The fisherman further stated: “Our rivers are black and the [acid] rain 
eats our houses. Our bodies are covered in oil. You feel that if you live to old age here, it 
is a miracle" (Mark, 2012, p. 7). The World Bank (as cited in the press release by Friends 
of the Earth) pointed out that flaring in Nigeria contributes more greenhouse gas 
emissions than all other sources in sub-Saharan Africa combined. The press release from 
Friends of the Earth also states that “the cocktail of toxic substances which has been 
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emitted in the flares for over 40 years, including benzene and particulates, has exposed 
Niger Delta communities to severe health risks and property damage” (para 3).  
4.4.2. Protests against Shell 
 Anger against Shell in the Niger Delta is endemic as communities have struggled 
to cope with severe oil spills and gas flaring causing widespread pollution and other 
forms of environmental degradation including contamination of fishing grounds, 
farmlands, and destruction of the ecosystem (mangroves and forest products as well as 
animals). Additional infrastructure issues such as lack of social amenities (including 
water and electricity), roads, and overall underdevelopment are choking the Niger Delta 
communities. There is also anger over the failure to fairly distribute oil royalties. These 
layered complaints have for decades generated negative perceptions and little confidence 
in Shell among local peoples, plaguing Shell’s operations (see Orugon, 2010).  
Specific protests tell the story of Shell’s exploitation in the Niger Delta. In 1990, 
the Etche people in the Niger Delta protested against Shell. Jonathan Steele of the 
London-based newspaper, The Guardian, described the protest as “peaceful” but noted 
that “Shell’s response was to call for police in case of further action” (p. 3). The outcome 
was the massacre of 80 people and 495 homes destroyed (p. 3). According to the report, 
local communities “held Shell accountable” for choosing to invite the police rather than 
“negotiating” (Steele, 1995, p. 3). As protests spread against Shell, in the summer of 
1992, the Mobile Police Force (MPF) was sent to quell a protest in the Gbaran oilfield 
where 30 people were reported shot and 150 others beaten (Steele, 1995).  
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However, it was not until January 4, 1993, that Shell faced the largest protests in 
its history of operations in the Niger Delta. Three hundred thousand Nigerians from 
Ogoni communities held a mass protest (Reuters, “Timeline Shell in Nigeria,” 2013; 
University of Maryland “Minorities at Risk,” 2016). The MPF is reported to have killed 
2,000 Ogoni people, burnt down 27 villages and forced 80, 000 out of their homes 
(Steele, 1995, p. 3). April 30, 1993, saw another protest against Shell by 10,000 Ogoni 
people. The protests came following the destruction of a newly planted farmland by 
construction work on a Shell pipeline. Soldiers are reported to have opened fire on 
protesters leaving at least 10 wounded (University of Maryland “Minority at Risk,” 
2016). The leader of the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) was 
Ken Saro-Wiwa, who led protest movements first against Shell, then against the Nigerian 
Government for the neglect of the oil-rich region. These protests brought considerable 
national and international attention to the underdevelopment plaguing the people of 
Ogoni and the Niger Delta in general. Together with eight other Ogoni people, Saro-
Wiwa was sentenced to death by hanging on November 10, 1995. This provoked anger 
and condemnation against Shell as communities accused the company of condoning the 
executions. Jonathan Steele (1995) pointed out that Ken Saro-Wiwa was paying the price 
for daring to “take action against the rape of their land, which left their soil and water 
polluted and gave them nothing except a legacy of rusting pipelines, thousands of 
unsightly wells and refineries, and no material benefits from the oil profits at all” (p. 3). 
The Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni people (MOSOP) vowed to continue 
protesting any resumption of oil production in Ogoniland (Amanze-Nwachuku, 2011). 
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As in earlier protests, Durban protesters accused the oil company of “summary 
execution, crimes against humanity, torture, inhumane treatment as well as arbitrary 
arrest and detention” (Umar, 2009, para 1). In June 2016, Shell’s pipelines in Forcados, a 
local community in the Niger Delta, were attacked (BBC Monitoring Africa, June 4, 
2016). Clearly, Shell’s crisis in the Niger Delta is prolonged and ongoing. 
4.4.3. Lawsuits against Shell 
NGO reports suggest the weak and corrupt judicial and legal system in Nigeria 
has been unable to adequately hold Shell accountable, hence, cases against Shell are tried 
in international courts (see Amnesty International, 2017). Shell was sued in a United 
States federal court in Manhattan by relatives of the nine Ogoni activists executed in 
1995 (see ccrjustice.org). The lawsuit was filed on November 8, 1996, by the Center for 
Constitutional Rights (CCR) and co-counsel EarthRight International on behalf of the 
plaintiffs (ccrjustice.org). A statement on ccrjustice.org indicates that Shell was accused 
of complicity in human rights abuses against the Ogoni people in the Niger Delta, 
including summary executions, crimes against humanity, torture, inhumane treatment, 
arbitrary arrests, wrongful death, assault and battery, and infliction of emotional distress 
(CCR “Wiwa et al v. Royal Dutch Petroleum et al.,” para 2; see Business Day, June 19, 
2009). On June 8, 2009, the eve of the hearing, all parties in the case agreed to a 
settlement for all three lawsuits. Shell agreed “to compensate the injuries and the deaths 
of their family members, and also create a trust for the benefit of the Ogoni, as well as 
pay [some of] the costs of litigations” (Business Day, June 19, 2009, para 1). According 
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to the Center for Constitutional Rights, the settlement provided a total of US $15.5 
million to be paid by Shell (ccrjustice.org).  
In recent years, Shell has had to face several other lawsuits over its operations in 
the Niger Delta in European nations’ courts. In January 2015, the company agreed to 
settlement in a case in the UK by paying £55 million as compensation to the Niger Delta 
community of Bodo for oil spills and other environmental damage (Alike, 2015). The 
company, on December 18, 2015, was scheduled for a hearing in a Dutch Court of 
Appeal for “its failure to stop and clean up decades of oil pollution” in the Niger Delta 
(Alike, 2015, para 1). According to Amnesty International (as cited in Alike, 2015), the 
case is a renewed attempt by the communities of Niger Delta “to hold Shell to account” 
(para 2) for its operations in the region.  
4.5. Shell’s crisis communication and management approach 
 Between 1993 and mid-2000s, Shell’s response to the crisis haunting its 
operations in the Niger Delta very much contrasted with the approach it effectively 
engaged with between 2006 and 2016. Shell refers to its response to the crisis in the 
1990s to mid-2000s as “old” or the “previous” approach. The “new approach” for the 
company’s crisis response was effectively implemented starting in 2006. This company 
identified distinction aligns with my distinction between the apologia models of corporate 
crisis rhetoric and the alternative renewal model, as I explain below. 
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4.5.1. Old Approach to Crisis (1993-mid-2000s) 
 Shell has described its old approach to events in the Niger Delta as top-down, 
which they now argue, was inefficient. Shell claims in the old approach, the company 
assumed “direct responsibility for development” in the Niger Delta region; and that there 
was “limited capacity building” for local communities (“Global Memorandum of 
Understanding,” 2006). The company also noted that in the old approach, communities 
were “relegated to passive a role” (“Global Memorandum of Understanding,” 2006). 
This, according to Shell, resulted in “lack of trust” and “transparency” in their relations 
with local communities.  
This old approach was predominantly defensive (apologia) rhetoric (see, Benoit, 
1995, 1997; Coombs, 2007; also see chapter 2 of this dissertation). Denial was the 
principal strategy Shell used in public communication. Other strategies vividly applied 
were scapegoating (blame) and attack the accuser. There were also several attempts to 
position the company as a victim (see Coombs, 2007). It is worthy of note that these 
crisis communication strategies were enacted by Shell leaders and spokespersons. The 
following paragraphs present evidence of defensive (reactive) strategies. When coding 
data to analyze Shell’s early communication, Apologia typologies (see Benoit, 1995, 
1997) were frames of analysis. The unit of analysis was direct statements from company 
leaders and spokespersons about the crisis. These strategies were identified by applying 
the coding procedure described in chapter 3.  
In 1995, the communities in the Niger Delta repeatedly accused Shell of 
conniving with the Nigerian military (by paying them) to quell protests against its 
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operations during which many deaths were often reported (see Viddal, 1995). Shell 
officials “denied completely” the company’s involvement in the unrest in Ogoni, 
describing the accusations as “distorted and inaccurate” and blaming protestors’ deaths 
on ethnic conflict between communities and disputes over territory (Vidal, 1995, p. T2). 
Responding to accusations of exploitation (which the people said had increased poverty) 
and the lack of social amenities such as water, electricity, and roads in the Niger Delta, 
Shell officials pointed to the Nigerian federal government as being responsible for 
development and wealth-sharing (Vidal, 1995, p. T2). 
Denial and scapegoating are two strategies used in this instance by Shell officials. 
Shell International spokesperson, David Williams, used denial and attempts to scapegoat 
in his response: “It is totally unjustified to suggest that Shell, by virtue of endeavoring to 
carry out its legitimate business of oil exploration is in some way responsible for such 
conflict or the level of the Nigerian government's response to them . . . private companies 
have neither the right nor the competence to become involved” (Vidal, 1995, p. T2). 
On accusations of the killings in Ogoniland, and the eventual hanging of Ken-
Saro Wiwa, a statement on Shell Nigeria’s website denies the accusation. The statement 
reads in part:  
Although SPDC was not responsible for those tragic events, and SPDC – and 
Shell International in London – had attempted to persuade the government to 
grant clemency, the family of Ken Saro-Wiwa and others brought a court case 
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against Shell. The allegations being made are false and without merit. (Shell, 
“Ken Saro-Wiwa”)  
However, newspaper reports cite what the press widely referred to as “secret documents” 
–company memos, faxes, letters and witness statements which emerged from court cases 
– as showing that “in the 1990s it [Shell] routinely worked with Nigeria’s military to 
suppress resistance to its activities, often from Ogoniland, in the delta region, some of 
them ending in deaths” (Oluwarotmi, 2011, para 1; also see Vidal, 2011). 
Shell also used the denial strategy to respond to accusations that it was selling 
some oil wells in communities that protested against their operations. A news report 
quotes a Shell spokesperson as responding to this accusation, describing it as “false” 
(Ahon, 2011, para 3). In the same report, the national president of the Niger Delta Youth 
Movement, Godspower Ordenema, called on the Nigerian federal government and the 
international community to “stop” Shell from selling the oil wells (Ahon, 2011, Para 1). 
The Youth leader insisted “Shell had always acted in flagrant disregard to Nigerian laws 
and universally accepted regulations guiding oil exploitation and exploration” (Ahon, 
2011, para 7). 
Shell, through its leaders and spokespersons also applied rhetorical strategies of 
denial, blame, and scapegoating to address oil spills. The company has consistently 
pointed to “sabotage” and “theft” as causes of “85 percent” of oil spills (“Shell Oil spill 
data”). A company spokesperson stated that a “bulk” of the oil spills in the Niger Delta 
were “deliberately caused for economic gain” (The Irish Times, 2005, p. 13). The 
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spokesperson also pointed to raids by heavily-armed criminal gangs or “compensation 
scams,” adding that in 2004, ninety-seven percent of spills in terms of volume was the 
result of “willful damage” (The Irish Times, 2005, p. 13).  
Company documents also show Shell’s communication focusing on attacking the 
accuser. The company planned to “create coalitions, isolate the opposition and shift the 
debate” (Lubbers & Rowell, 2010, p. 21). This strategy aimed to “challenge” the “basis” 
on which opposing groups “continue their campaign against Shell in order to make it 
more difficult for them to sustain it” (Lubbers & Rowell, 2010, p. 21). This is a glaring 
example of Benoit’s attack the accuser strategy (1995, 1997; also see Coombs, 2007). 
Summarily, Shell’s “old approach” to crisis management in the Niger Delta relied 
on defensive strategies of apologia including denial, blame, and scapegoating and 
attacking the accuser.   
4.5.2. New Approach to Crisis (2006-2016)  
An approach to the crisis emerged which focused on rebranding the company as 
the “New Shell” and, as I will show, this approach strongly reflected the Discourse of 
Renewal. In 2006 the company brought forth a Global Memorandum of Understanding 
(GMoU) designed to improve its community relations. The GMoU is a written statement 
of understanding between Shell and clusters of communities that detail roles of all parties 
in the implementation of community development projects. Shell refers to this document 
as a “new way of working with communities” (See Shell in Nigeria, “Global 
Memorandum of Understanding,” 2012).  
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According to Shell, “the GMoU represents an important shift in approach, placing 
emphasis on more transparent and accountable processes, regular communication with 
the grassroots, sustainability and conflict prevention” (see Shell “GMoU,” 2012). Shell 
explains this new approach as one which prioritizes upward flow of information and 
decisions from communities to Shell and the government levels. Thus, the GMoU 
presents Shell, the state, and local governments in Nigeria as actors who simply facilitate 
the implementation of decisions made by communities. In concrete terms, Shell describes 
its role in the GMoU as a “funding” and “capacity building” body (“GMoU”, para 1). 
Shell explains that communities “take key decisions” and “drive” their own development 
as they elect representatives to Community Development Boards (CDBs); these boards 
decide on community developments (“GMoU,” para 2). Shell contends that this approach 
has been successful, pointing to several benefits: (1) more representative and transparent 
management; (2) promotes cohesion and cooperation; (3) increased local ownership and 
accountability; (4) increased participation, including from women; (4) encourages 
innovation and learning; (5) creates platform for other development actors (“GMoU”, 
para 3). In the following section, I detail the elements of a Discourse of Renewal in 
Shell’s “new approach.”  
4.6. Shell’s Discourse of Renewal 
 As stated in Chapter 3, the four theoretical dimensions that inform the crisis 
renewal model served as the frames of analysis. The unit of analysis was specific 
statements made during and about the crisis drawn from data in the study (see Chapter 3 
for detailed descriptions of data and procedures). 
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4.6.1. Ethical Communication 
Shell’s communication strategy to frequently evoke ethical standpoints aligns 
with Ulmer, Sellnow, and Seeger’s (2011) argument that “organizations that institute 
strong, positive value positions with key stakeholders, such as honesty, responsibility, 
accountability, and trustworthiness” (p. 215) are able to attain renewal. The ethical 
communication element of the Discourse of Renewal emerged as the company’s leaders 
repeatedly pointed to virtues of accountability, transparency, and responsibility in their 
communication. Company officials touted the new approach to managing the crisis as a 
strategy that “seeks to increase transparency and accountability around project delivery 
and give communities greater ownership of projects from their inception” (Nwachukwu, 
2015, para 14). Following an oil spill in a local community called Bonga, Shell’s Country 
Managing Director positioned the company as a responsible organization stating that, “as 
a prudent corporate citizen, [Shell] will tackle all the oil its teams can see offshore or 
which has come onshore in this area, including oil spilled by third parties” (Global Data 
“SNEPCO Update on Bonga Oil Leak,” 2011). In another statement, the Country 
Managing Director praised the company for being socially responsible, declaring that 
“[t]his is one of the biggest corporate social responsibility portfolios operated by a private 
company in Sub-Saharan Africa, and it shows that we care for the wellbeing of the 
communities in which we do business” (Alike, 2011, para 5).  
Company leaders and spokespersons frequently communicated Shell’s 
“commitments” to working with communities (Oyadongha, 2011, para, 5) and would 
frequently portray the company as an organization that fulfils promises and respects and 
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implements agreements reached with clusters of communities and international bodies. 
One such statement declares: “[Shell] has always been committed to contributing its 
share of the environmental restoration fund” (Alike, 2015, para 60; also see Onukwugha, 
2011; Chinwo, 2013). The ethical component of the Discourse of Renewal as enacted by 
Shell also had company leaders identifying the company with principles of good 
leadership by regularly pointing to the importance of “quality community leadership” 
(Chinwo, 2013, para 6), and also noting that the company “believed in value-driven 
partnership” with communities (Oyadongha, 2010, para 10). 
Further positioning the company as a virtuous organization, Shell’s 
communication frequently emphasized that the company promotes “capacity building” 
and frequently mentioned the need for community projects to have “positive impact” on 
the people as seen in statements by company officials (see Onah, 2010; Daily 
Independent, November 10, 2014; Onukwugha, 2011). In another statement that directly 
references virtuous behavior, an official of the company noted that “we will continue to 
partner with communities that are well led by notable individuals” (Chinwo, 2013). 
Finally, Shell’s Managing Director evoked a sense of respect and trust in a statement to 
the recipient communities of development projects by pointing out that “communities 
decide and drive their development programs while Shell provides the funding and 
technical assistance to implement the programs” (Onukwugha, 2011, para 5).   
4.6.2. Organizational Learning  
Shell’s communication approach has consistently emphasized learning as a 
significant outcome of the new crisis response approach. Sellnow and Seeger (2011) 
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advise that organizational spokespeople “should illustrate how the organization is 
learning from the crisis and what they are doing to ensure the crisis does not happen 
again” (p. 215). In this light, the managing director of Shell in Nigeria is quoted in a 2011 
news report that Shell has “improved upon how it engaged its host communities to 
deliver projects and programs,” adding that the company “introduced the GMoU in 2006 
as a novel way of working with communities” (Onukwugha, 2011, para 4). 
This statement strongly suggests the element of organizational learning and 
willingness to implement lessons learned for positive change. Earlier in 2010, another 
company official evoked the fact that Shell has learned from previous failed management 
approach saying “the overall purpose [of the GMOU] was to eliminate the inherent 
weakness in previous social performance strategies and to involve communities in project 
identification, implementation and management” (Onah, 2010, para 7). In a meeting in 
2012 with then Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan, following his accusations that 
Shell had not done enough to clean up oil spills and prevent further spills, Shell’s 
outgoing Managing Director Brindel evoked lessons learned by pointing out that “they 
[Shell] have come a long way which led to the fashioning of the Global Memorandum of 
Understanding (GMoU)” and that the company had proactively begun to address the 
issues (Ogbu, 2012, para 21). Statements from company officials also frequently pointed 
to how they “continue to seek ways to improve” community relations (Gbemudu, 2010, 
para 9). As might be seen from these statements, the company positioned itself such that 
stakeholders perceive it as being proactive in addressing the mistakes of the past. 
Proponents of the Discourse of Renewal suggest organizations that engage in 
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communicating learning are able to move beyond defensive communication which 
focuses reactively on issues of blame. 
4.6.3. Prospective vs. Retrospective Vision 
Shell’s communication also exhibits elements of prospective vision as opposed to 
retrospective vision. Ulmer et al. (2011) explain prospective vision as a situation in which 
organizational leaders focus their communication on a brighter future for both the 
organization and stakeholders, stressing the need for leaders and spokespersons to look 
beyond the crisis. In contrast organizations enact a retrospective vision during a crisis by 
applying blame tactics, and spending more time on attributing responsibility over the 
causes of the crisis. Seeger, et al., call on leaders and spokespersons to communicate in a 
manner that emphasizes a bright future, as this could spur optimism and willingness for 
stakeholders to collaborate with the organization to navigate the crisis.  
In many press statements, Shell officials portrayed the company as being 
proactive rather than defensive, focusing on the future. For example, the Managing 
Director and Country Chair of Shell in a 2014 news report, promoted Shell’s community 
development projects as indications of the “company’s commitment to a long-term future 
for Nigeria” (Alike, 2014, para 5).  On another occasion, the Director said, “Shell 
remains in the forefront of converting Nigeria's oil and gas resources to more jobs and 
opportunities for Nigerians” (Daily Independent, November 10, 2014, para 5). This 
clearly takes away the focus of blame for a past crisis and instead directs people to 
anticipate a bright future with the company. Describing the performance of the company 
in the Niger Delta, the Country Director, speaking to communities at an award ceremony, 
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explained that the development projects in Niger Delta communities “provided the best 
road map towards ensuring that the communities achieved socio-economic empowerment 
and improve standard of living” (Oduma, 2011, para 9). In another instance, the Director 
assured that the company’s projects are “on course to significantly increasing Nigeria's 
oil and gas production while at the same time, delivering great benefits to the host 
communities” (Daily Independent, February 20, 2011, para 4). The Managing Director 
told communities: “We remain committed to the sustainable development of the Niger 
Delta” (Oyadongha, 2011, para 9). By continually evoking the terms “sustainable 
development” and “sustainability,” Shell’s communication clearly tied the company to a 
future that was greater than the failed past, as espoused in the Discourse of Renewal.  
A Discourse of Renewal is also instantiated in the “provisional” management 
practices characterizing Shell’s revised relations with local communities. For example, 
Shell Nigeria’s Managing Director lauded a cluster of communities in Rivers State for 
“thinking outside the box” (Chinwo, 2013, para 3) in achieving a major project, adding 
that “this community thought outside the box and it is a unique thing” (Chinwo, 2013, 
para 12). Praising a community for being provisional in their tasks aligns with the 
emphasis on the need for organizational leaders and spokespersons to be provisional 
(spontaneous) as much as possible. As could be noticed from statements by leaders and 
spokespeople, Shell’s crisis rhetoric applied the ethical element of the Discourse of 
Renewal. 
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4.6.4. Effective Organizational Rhetoric  
Proponents of the Discourse of Renewal call on organizational leaders to 
effectively structure their crisis rhetoric such that organizational publics or stakeholders 
can make informed decisions. The emphasis is for leaders and spokespersons to structure 
reality in ways that allow stakeholders to see the bigger picture rather than focusing on 
immediate causes of a crisis. But in doing so, leaders and spokespersons are advised to 
“frame the crisis in a way that inspires, empowers and motivates” (Sellnow & Seeger, 
2013, p. 98). 
In almost every instance in which company officials communicated with 
communities, there were explicit efforts to structure or construct public perceptions of the 
crisis and ensuing events. Company officials accomplished this by giving a bigger picture 
of Shell’s operations in the Niger Delta. For example, addressing some communities in 
the Niger Delta during the launching of electricity generation power plants, Shell’s 
General Manager for Sustainable Development and Community Relations told the 
people: “We recognize that electricity is key to socio-economic development, and that is 
why we have implemented these projects in addition to our interventions in economic 
empowerment, health, agriculture and human capital development” (Vanguard, May 13, 
2010, para 3). In this statement, local communities are invited to perceive a “bigger” 
picture of Shell by looking beyond electricity which was actually the issue in question. In 
another address to communities, the Managing Director stated that the company has “a 
history of investing in social projects and programs in many communities in the [Niger 
Delta] region” (Onukwugha, 2011, para 2). This statement proffers a “history” of Shell as 
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invested in the welfare of communities. Another Shell official addressing local 
communities said, “We will continue to invest in the wellbeing of our people as we do 
business in the Niger Delta, and ask other stakeholders including communities 
themselves to be part of this noble effort” (Alike, 2011, para 16). Officials promoted this 
theme of caring for communities by using catch phrases such as “powering progress 
together” (Alike, 2011, para 3).  
This rhetoric seems designed to frame Shell in ways that organizational publics 
are “inspired” and “motivated” (Sellnow & Seeger, 2013, p. 98). Similarly, Shell’s 
Nigeria Managing Director told communities that the company “shall remain in the 
forefront of converting Nigeria’s oil and gas resources to more jobs and opportunities for 
Nigerians” (Daily Independent, November 10, 2014, para 5). On another occasion, the 
Country Director of Shell explained that a gas and oil project that was being newly 
created was “good news for Nigeria” (“Shell First Oil Produced from SNEPCO”, 2014, 
para 1) adding that being “a new source of oil revenue,” the project “strengthens 
Nigeria’s deep-water expertise” (“Shell First Oil Produced from SNEPCO”, 2014, para 
1), which the Director claimed is a “key driver of economic development” (Royal Dutch 
Shell “First Oil Produced”, 2014, para 1). These are some instances of effective 
organizational rhetoric that not only attempt to structure reality, but do so in a manner 
that motivates. Thus, Shell’s rhetoric evinces this feature of the Discourse of Renewal. 
Summarily, Shell’s discourse of renewal aimed at portraying the “New Shell” as 
being more transparent, accountable, responsible, and trustworthy in its relationship with 
local communities. This rhetoric also sought to show that the company was now engaging 
94 
local communities in participatory processes, as emphasis was now being placed on 
working with communities and allowing communities to “decide” and “drive” 
development projects. The “New Shell” also portrayed itself as aligning with values of 
“sustainability”; that is, achieving sustainable development in those communities and 
sustaining peace among communities. Another feature of the New Shell rebrand was 
portraying the company as having learned from its past crisis management approach and 
showing how it was implementing lessons learned (which generally has been the outcome 
of the Global Memorandum of Understanding). Thus, Shell’s crisis communication 
following its official rebranding as New Shell enacted a Discourse of Renewal. The next 
section discusses how communities in the Niger Delta responded to the New Shell’s 
construction of the realities of Shell’s presence in the Delta. 
4.7. Response to Shell’s Discourse of Renewal  
 This section discusses first, how local communities in the Niger Delta responded 
to Shell’s Discourse of Renewal; and second, the response of international NGOs to 
Shell’s “new approach.”  
Some newspaper reports indicated that “New Shell” was “welcomed” in some of the 
communities (see Chinwo, 2013; Onah, 2010; Gbemudu, 2010; Vanguard, “Why Delta 
Partners with Oil Firms,” December 2, 2013). But this acceptance came primarily from 
members of the Clusters Development Boards (CDBs) set up within the framework of the 
new management approach adopted by Shell, individuals who directly benefited from the 
company’s projects. For example, praising Shell for its new management approach, the 
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traditional ruler of Nembe Kingdom described Shell’s Global Memorandum of 
Understanding (GMoU) as highly successful, and suggested that the GMoU become the 
gold standard for all Nigerian communities (Alike, 2011). It should be noted that for 
members of the Cluster Development Boards (CDBs) success meant the number of so-
called development projects implemented in communities by Shell (see Alike, 2011). 
Shell was praised in 2011 by some members of the CDBs and individuals for executing 
development projects such as roads, ICT center, printing presses, and guest houses 
(Alike, 2011).  
Members of the CDBs are in principle representatives of local communities. 
However, evidence emerged that suggests wealthy elites, traditional rulers, as well as 
local, state, and federal government partisanship often influenced the membership of 
these boards and this often resulted in communities protesting against members of the 
CDBs (see Uwugiaren, 2016; Amaize, 2016). Members were often viewed by the local 
people as being puppets for Shell and the Nigerian government who, more often than not, 
put their own personal interests and gains over those of the communities. Articulating 
such perceptions, some 350 “shoreline communities” declared in a joint statement cited 
in a Vanguard newspaper report, “We wish to inform the whole world that the GMoU 
chairmen/members are not invested with any authority to discuss land acquisition and/or 
oil spill compensation as well as convert compensation into infrastructure on behalf of 
impacted communities” (Amaize, 2016). The communities wanted individuals they had 
chosen themselves to represent their community interests according to the joint 
statement: “[t]he accredited representative/attorney of all the shoreline communities 
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remain Gbutse Property Limited and any negotiation without the presence and/or 
signature of our attorney shall be deemed null and void, and of no effect whatsoever” 
(Amaize, 2016). 
Newspaper reports also show a disjuncture between local development needs and 
what members of the CDBs eventually agreed on as development projects for 
communities. Protests often arose over the choice for development projects, over who 
was to determine what was best for local people, and how these projects were conceived 
and eventually executed. Hence, persistent conflicts, disruptions, and general opposition 
to Shell were evident despite the company’s adoption and implementation of a Discourse 
of Renewal.   
The notion of ownership over resources (oil, gas, land) emerged as a significant 
aspect that rendered Shell’s discourse of renewal ineffective in the Niger Delta. A 
majority of the protests that eventually turned into deadly riots involved local people 
contesting ownership over resources. Following a 2011 riot that left three persons dead 
and one hundred injured, the leader of one of the protesting communities asserted: “It is a 
known fact that Uzere kingdom/land has been blessed with oil and gas” (para. 9). The 
community leader also stated that it is common knowledge that “Shell took the advantage 
to exploit these natural resources on our fatherland for the past 52 years” (Amaize, 2011, 
para 9). Protesters from Koroama community also evoked ownership over resources 
stating that “Shell is taking our oil” adding that “We were told that gas Shell is taking 
from our land is the largest, our community being the largest natural gas reserve in West 
Africa” (Yafugborhi, 2012, para 4). Protesters of Nembe community (whose leader had 
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earlier praised Shell) held placards displaying messages such as “sale of our wealth by 
Shell is theft against mankind” (James, 2015, para 4). Other protesters said the company 
would “never operate in our land” (Folaranmi, 2015, para 8) if their community’s 
demands were not met. 
A related issue was the claim that ownership over land is “ancestral” (Iwori, 2014, 
para 5). As mentioned in Chapter 2, ancestral claims over ownership of land are at the 
heart of a conflictual situation in which host governments lease out lands to multinational 
corporations and these corporations are confronted by oppositional struggles from local 
communities who not only see the land as their inheritance, but also consider the 
resources on these lands (such as forest products and crude oil) as belonging to the 
communities. It should be noted that differential claims over land exist in parts of Nigeria 
even when there is a legal body charged with the regulation of land ownership. Chapter 2 
details the sources of these differential claims over land including pre-colonial 
landownership practices, colonial administrative land reforms, and government 
legislature.  
Shell was also accused of not negotiating with local communities. As we shall see 
later on, the notion of negotiation from local communities’ point of view created a 
disjuncture in the relationship between Shell and these communities. Protestors argued 
that “the company did not enter into any agreement with the people” and failed “to come 
to [our village] to discuss” and “sign GMoU with [our] kingdom” (Amaize, 2011, para 
12). Failure to negotiate was also an issue when another community justified their protest 
action against Shell by asserting: “The protest and the shutdown of the two flow stations 
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were due to the failure of the SPDC to respect the host communities” noting that “To our 
greatest displeasure and dismay, we were made to understand through the media” that an 
oil well “has been sold out, yet we are not in the picture” (James, 2015, para 7). 
The element of negotiation is also related to another point of contention:  
community representatives. Who should negotiate with the oil company is a critical issue 
in the protests Shell faces in the Niger Delta. Protesting communities continue to contest 
who should negotiate on their behalf and insist Shell’s companies in the Niger 
“commence negotiation, with the proper authorized agents of the communities” (Dugbe, 
2014, para 2). In one case, Shell was accused of inviting “unauthorized members of 
affected communities” (Uwugiaren, 2016, para 6) and for getting “chairmen of 24 
communities to sign nefarious agreements on behalf of the impacted communities” 
(Uwugiaren, 2016, para 8). These affected communities warned that they “will definitely 
file a separate claim against Shell in any court of law should Shell fails to commence 
negotiation with our said representative/attorney” (para 18).  
Local communities have mounted protests against executive members of Cluster 
Development Boards as was the case with the Ughelli South Local Government Area in 
which the Umolo-Olomu community requested that Shell should “disband” the executive 
body of the CDB and allow an open process that will “bring in proper executives” – 
individuals chosen by the Umolo-Olomu community to represent the interests of this 
community (Ahon, 2011, para. 4). In a letter written by the Umolo community and cited 
in a Vanguard newspaper report, the people of this community also said they “received 
with great shock and strong sense of disregard, the purported inauguration of an illegal 
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executive for Ughelli South 2 Cluster Development Board on Tuesday, June 7 2011 
without any prior notice to Umolo Community” (Ahon, 2011, para. 5). 
Issues of social justice and equity also undermine Shell’s new approach as 
communities accuse the company of not ensuring “equity” in the execution of the 
agreements including the GMoUs. Protesting communities clearly call on Shell “to 
ensure that all sections of the community are fully represented in the GMoU” (Onah, 
2011, para 4). Also, women and youth have protested over the “partiality in the 
implementation of the understanding” (Onah, 2011, para 5). Women and youth want to 
be part of the GMoU implementation process and have protested against their exclusion 
(see Oyadongha, 2010; Oduma, 2014). Gender imbalance is a particularly important 
factor as women continue to protest their exclusion from the implementing processes of 
signed memoranda of understanding. Given that Shell initiated the GMoUs, the company 
seems culpable on this aspect. Hundreds of women protested by disrupting operation 
activities at an oil facility owned by Shell in Torugbene community. The women blamed 
the oil company “over the alleged connivance between the male dominated leadership of 
the community and Shell in the implementation of the GMoU” (Oyadongha, para 2). It is 
the case that CDBs are dominated by men throughout the Niger Delta region. 
 Another issue undermining the tenets of a Discourse of Renewal in Shell’s new 
approach was that oil spills and gas flaring continued to disrupt communities. Although 
Shell blamed 85 percent of oil spills on theft and sabotage, local communities have 
argued that it is the responsibility of the oil company to protect its network of pipelines, 
clean up spilled oil, and tackle the considerable amount of gas flared more efficiently. 
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Farmlands, fishing grounds, and the ecosystem in the Niger Delta continue to be affected 
by oil spills and gas flaring. As one resident stated in a newspaper report, “The water we 
drink here is from the Taylor Creek, contaminated with all the pollutants which make our 
people sick” (Yafugborhi, 2012, para 4). Shell had also come under criticism from then 
president, Goodluck Jonathan, who assigned responsibility to the corporation for clean-up 
when he expressed “deep concern over environmental pollution in the Niger Delta owing 
to oil exploration” (Ogbu, 2012, para 1) and requested that Shell “urgently take measures 
to ensure integrity of pipelines” (Ogbu, 2012, para 1; also see Alike, 2015; Alike & 
Oyedele, 2016). Thus, both the spills and flares in themselves as well as Shell’s failure to 
adequately address them troubled the local communities and eroded the relationship 
between the company and local communities. 
Shell’s corporate social responsibility implementation approach has also been 
questioned. Communities have protested and accused Shell of selective implementation 
of community development projects – that is, executing projects in some communities 
and not doing so in others; signing the GMoU with some communities and not doing so 
with others; and abandoning and defaulting on implementation in some cases. A 
community leader is quoted as saying “the protest was a warning signal to the 
management of the SPDC to review their policy and honor existing agreements with the 
communities” Segun, 2015, para 7); and upon failure to do so, the community “will shut 
down” Shell’s operations (Onoyume, 2013, para. 5; also see Oyadongha, 2016; James, 
2015; BBC “Monitoring Africa,” October 5, 2015). 
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Meanwhile, in response to Shell’s Discourse of Renewal, international NGOs – 
including human rights and environmental groups – accused the oil company of not being 
transparent and accountable despite its “new approach.” An Amnesty International 
(USA) report accused the company of not providing factual data on the amount of oil 
spilled and underestimating the impact of oil spills in the Niger Delta. The report pointed 
to the Bonga 2008 oil spill (two years after Shell’s new approach went into effect) that 
devastated the Bodo community, noting that the “volume of oil spilt” surpassed “more 
than 60 times the volume” the oil company stated was lost (Amnesty International, “New 
Evidence Reveals”, p. 2, n.d.). The report also indicated that Shell was not being honest 
when it stated that the oil spill at Bonga started on October 5, 2008, when community and 
Nigerian regulators “confirmed” the oil spill began on August 28, 2008. Additionally, 
“Shell repeatedly claims to its investors, customers and the media that the majority of the 
oil spilt in the Niger Delta is caused by sabotage . . . Sabotage is a real and serious 
problem in the Niger Delta, but Shell misuses the issue as a PR shield and makes claims 
that simply don’t stand up to scrutiny” (Amnesty International, “New Evidence Reveals,” 
p. 2, n.d.). In another report authored by Audrey Gaughran (n.d.), Amnesty International 
further accused Shell of “not disclosing” important oil spill investigation information. As 
a direct attack on what can be called the ethical elements of transparency and 
accountability in Shell’s discourse of renewal, the report explains that “a secretly videoed 
oil spill investigation” showed how the oil company unilaterally “changes” the cause 
from “operational failure” to “sabotage” (p. 1). The report stated that this is done “with 
no evidence” at the end of an “official investigation” (pp. 1-2). 
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 Another international NGO, EarthRights International, reported that similar 
accusations were part of a complaint filed in the Dutch Parliament against Shell by 
Amnesty International and Friends of the Earth. Jonathan Kaufman, a blogger with 
EarthRights, stated that Shell remains under public scrutiny for “misleading the public by 
misattributing the blame for oil spills in the Niger Delta to sabotage rather than its own 
substandard practices” (2011, para. 10). Kaufman argued that Shell “consistently 
publicized baseless figures about oil spill responsibility” (para. 12) wherein the company 
claims “85% of all oil spills in the Delta were due to attacks by militants and sabotage by 
Delta residents” (para. 12). 
Finally, the international environmental group Greenpeace continued to accuse 
Shell of failing to clean up past oil spills in the Niger Delta. A report published on 
January 11, 2015, stated that “contamination from hundreds of past spills continues to 
pollute water sources and land in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria” (Keates, 2015, para 
1). The Guardian’s reporter Adam Vaughan on October 9, 2014, reported that 
Greenpeace’s “sustained pressure” against Shell on the basis of environmental 
contamination led the toymaker Lego to “not renew its marketing contract with Shell” 
(para 2). Vaughan explained that this was precisely the outcome of a “viral video against 
Arctic drilling” produced by Greenpeace. These accusations undermine Shell’s discourse 
of renewal, particularly its ethical claims.  
Shell’s new approach as a discourse of renewal was also undermined by 
widespread public perceptions about corruption in the company. A news report (see ICIJ, 
2016) indicated that “Entrepreneurs and corrupt officials across Africa have used shell 
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companies to hide profits from the sale of natural resources and the bribes paid to gain 
access to them” (Shane, 2016, para. 1). The news report, also asserted that “three oil 
ministers, several employees of the national oil company and two former state governors 
who were convicted of laundering ill-gotten money from the industry” are “owners of 
hidden companies” whose “assets cycled through Shell” (paras. 2-3). The report stated 
that some of the hidden assets were used to “buy yachts, private jets, Manhattan 
penthouses and luxury homes in Beverly Hills, Calif.” (para. 3). Such stories of large-
scale corruption undercut Shell’s ethical claims in its communications. 
4.8. Lessons Learned  
What follows is a discussion of lessons learned in this case based on evidence that 
Shell’s new approach and the responses it evoked from local communities can illuminate 
shortcomings in the Discourse of Renewal model.  
 (1) The Discourse of Renewal assumes a corporatist representation of reality. The 
organization as rhetor structures the discourse from the point of view of the corporation. 
The ongoing politics of representation in the model summons a corporate vision that aims 
at aligning affected communities to the realities constituted through corporate biases. In 
this case, the realities advanced by Shell spokespeople were angrily and sometimes 
violently contested by the local populace.  
(2) Even though the model insists on a stakeholder-centered approach to crisis response, 
the communities in this case are spoken for by the organization. This paternalistic 
approach to crisis response resulted in silencing voices, community histories, and 
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indigenous practices, thus effectively denying the lived realities of local stakeholders. For 
example, for some local communities, ownership claims over land and oil are enshrined 
in historical relations that do not recognize land ownership through legal instruments but 
through ancestral claims. Ancestors may be dead, but for local communities, these 
ancestors live on and are treated as members of the community. Shell failed to engage 
with these divergent constructions of ownership and history. 
(3) The element of “significant choice” discussed in the Discourse of Renewal model is 
inadequate to the alternative logics-in-use in the arguments about land and oil made by 
local communities. The very definition of “significant choice” as a rational determination 
is situated in a neoliberal frame that limits the ability of corporate management to engage 
with local stakeholders. Accordingly, when Shell shifted from apologia to a Discourse of 
Renewal, the basis for organizational learning was merely a reproduction of entrenched 
assumptions and arguments.  
(4) Shell’s crisis shows that the past cannot be ignored in favor of a prospective vision. 
Shell’s prospective vision was debilitated by obscuring or (mis)representing the 
corporation’s past abuses, denying or ignoring the realities of local stakeholders, and 
maintaining a position of economic, political, and material dominance that left little 






The Shell crisis in the Niger Delta is a fitting example of organizational crises that 
require attention to contested realities. It is also a cautionary lesson about the need for 
multinational communication to avoid silencing histories and muting “voiceless” people. 
If there is an overarching lesson learned in this crisis, it is one that can be framed in 
response to Spivak’s question: In the Niger Delta, the subaltern cannot speak. I find that 
this lesson highlights the limitations inherent to the Discourse of Renewal and the need 
for an amendment that responds to the complexities of crises based in multinational 
exploitation. The next chapter examines another such crisis occurring in a similarly vexed 
and complex context in Cameroon.  
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5 Case 2: Herakles Farms Palm Crisis in Cameroon 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The overarching purpose of this chapter is to critically analyze major points of 
conflict to understand Herakles Farms’ corporate rhetoric in response to the crisis over 
their palm oil plantation in Cameroon. The focus is to examine how contextual 
complexities and exigencies, situational contradictions, and tenacious histories impacted 
the outcomes of the multinational’s communication response to the crisis. I will offer an 
assessment of lessons learned from the company’s crisis communication response, and 
then, a discussion of what these lessons mean for organizational crisis rhetoric and 
communication practices in relation to marginalized communities.  
The chapter begins with pertinent aspects of the South-West region of Cameroon 
where the Herakles Farms operations are located. The chapter also provides a background 
on Herakles Farms’ establishment as a company in Cameroon and the oppositional 
struggles against its plam plantations there.  
5.2. South-West Region 
Following is a description of the South-West region including history, 





 The country that is now Cameroon was constituted by joining two separate 
colonial regions after their independence. French Cameroun gained independence from 
France in 1960 and Southern Cameroons gained independence from Britain in 1961 
following a plebiscite overseen by the United Nations. It is important to note that 
according to the United Nations Resolution 1349, adopted at the UN General Assembly 
on March 13, 1959, Southern Cameroons, then a Trust territory under Britain, was to 
achieve independence by either voting to join the independent Federal Republic of 
Nigeria or to join the independent Republic of Cameroun (UN General Assembly). An 
independent Federal Republic of Cameroon was created following this plebiscite. In 
1972, following a referendum, the Federal Republic was transformed into a unitary state. 
The “unitary state” appellation was later changed to the Republic of Cameroon. These 
regions had been previously united in the late nineteenth century when this area was 
colonized by the Germans in 1884.  
The country’s colonial history has complicated governance and economic and 
social relations, particularly in regard to tensions between Anglophone and Francophone 
Cameroon. For example, governance follows both the Common Legal System modeled 
after British legal tradition and the Civil Legal System modeled after French legal 
tradition and cases can be tried by using either national or customary law (Garcia, n.d., 
para. 9). Thus the legal system in Cameroon is mired in colonialist legacies and 
complexities that can create tensions in litigations. It is important to note that 
Anglophone lawyers in Cameroon have undertaken several protest actions calling for the 
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effective separation of common law practice from the civil law system (see Mbunwe, 
2015). There are strong sentiments within the Anglophone part of the country that its 
people are being unfairly treated by the central Government dominated by Francophone 
Cameroonians (Geschiere & Nyamjoh, 2000; also see Musoro, 2015). This has created a 
lot of suspicion surrounding particular actions by the central government on aspects 
affecting Anglophone Cameroon. Musoro (2015) has indicated that “[f]or decades since 
the independence of Cameroon, the Anglophones have constantly been in a battle of 
trying to negotiate their identity in the country” (para. 3). Musoro also asserted that 
“[t]here has always been a call [from Anglophone Cameroonians] to denounce the 
Frenchification of Anglophone Cameroon” (para. 3).   
At the time of completing this chapter, there is an ongoing protest by teachers and 
lawyers of English speaking expression in Cameroon over claims of the marginalization 
of the English-speaking communities in the country (Andzongo, 2016). The protests have 
turned into riots and riot police are reported to have shot dead four demonstrators (Okie, 
2016). The protests have grown to include demands for the restoration of the former two-
state federation while others call for the outright breakaway of Anglophone regions from 
the Francophone regions (Okie, 2016, para. 2; also see BBC, “Bamenda Protests,” 2016). 
Anglophone Cameroonians have persistently raised what is now known as the 
“Anglophone Problem, a question of how to address the marginalization of the 
Anglophone portion of the country by the central government heavily dominated by 
Francophone Cameroonians. These tensions and history cannot be neglected when 
addressing crisis situations involving governmental actions in this region. Herakles Farms 
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palm oil plantation sites are all located in the South-West Region, one of two regions that 
constitute the Anglophone portion of the country. The project is seen by local 
communities as an imposition (on their land) by the central government working in 
collaboration with the multinational. 
5.2.2. Political Geography of Plantation Sites 
The colonial experience in the British and French parts of the country was enacted 
through two different systems: indirect rule for the British and assimilation for the 
French (as previously discussed). However, the people of both sections of the country 
sustain social relations that, though not entirely similar in all aspects, are generally 
reflective of the country’s ethnic group arrangements. Traditional institutions such as 
customary law, clan heads, chiefs, and communal organizing continue to organize ways 
of life of the people, even if the influence of these institutions and modes of organizing 
are being weakened by both endogenous and exogenous forces (Lockhart, 1994). There 
are about 250 ethnic groups in Cameroon, and close to 270 indigenous dialects (Gale, 
2007). The country has 18 national parks and protected forest areas estimated to cover 2 
million hectares (6 million acres) (Gale, 2007).  
The South-West region currently comprises six administrative divisions, namely, 
Fako, Meme, Ndian, Kupe-Muanenguba, Lebialem, and Manyu. The estimated 
population of South-West region is nearly 1.5 million according to the 2013 population 
estimate (see “Regions of Cameroon”; Gwillim, 2005). The Herakles palm oil plantation 
sites are located in two of the six administrative Divisions of the South-West region, 
namely, Ndian, and Kupe-Muanenguba. Land tracts demarcated for the project are in 
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Toko and Mundemba districts (also called subdivisions) in Ndian Division, and Nguti 
district (subdivision) in Kupe-Muanenguba Division. Appendix B shows the map of this 
region. 
Toko district is estimated to have a population of 66,000 according to a village 
population survey conducted in 2011 (“Communal Development Plan Toko,” 2012). 
Although another village study (cited in “Communal Development Plan Toko,” 2012) 
puts the population at 14,045, this figure is contested by local government representatives 
who insist the population stands at 66,000 on grounds that this was the total count 
following a survey conducted through Village Development Associations (p. 6). There 
are 49 villages in this district. Toko district has a total land mass of 103,413 hectares and 
much of this land is covered by forest reserves among which are Kurup National Park 
with a land mass of 49,105 hectares; the Rumpi Hills (5,445 hectares), and the Christian 
Philanthropic Community Forest (4,928) (p. 7). Herakles Farms, according to a report by 
the Toko Council, had requested 13,303 hectares of land – this would account for 70 
percent of the total land mass – leaving the communities in these areas with 30 percent of 
the land for farming and hunting (“Communal Development Plan Toko,” 2012).  
Mundemba, a neighboring district to Toko, is estimated to have a land mass of 
1.557 km2 and comprises 50 communities (“Mundemba Communal Development Plan,” 
2012). The area has vast forest reserves including the Korup National Park, Rumpi Hills 
forest reserve, and a council or community forest reserve, as well as wide rivers including 
River Ndian (“Mundemba Communal Development Plan”; also see Herakles “ESIA 
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report,” 2011). The population of the area according to a field survey (as cited in 
“Mundemba Communal Development Plan”) is estimated to be 30,044.  
Nguti district has an estimated population slightly above 20,000, and a land mass 
of 204,852 hectares (Rainforest Foundation, “Nguti Council,” 2016). There are 54 
villages in this district. The area is covered by a council forest, three community forests, 
and two protected forest reserves, namely, Mbayang Mbo Wildlife Sanctuary, and 
Bakossi National Park (Rainforest Foundation). The Rainforest Foundation report 
published in September 2016 noted that local communities rely heavily on land and 
surrounding forests for “livelihoods” (p. 7). Communities also mostly rely on streams as 
sources for water supply, and as the Rainforest Foundation report put it, “poor water 
quality and insufficient water lines” are the immediate outcome of agro-industrial 
activities being undertaken in surrounding forests (p. 11).    
5.2.3. Governance 
 Cameroon has a strong central government even though a semi-autonomous local 
government structure exists. Traditional institutions continue to play a noticeable role in 
local governance (Gale, 2007). The chiefs, for example, are considered as auxiliaries to 
the administration and coordinate with village development associations and cultural and 
social groups to facilitate the administration of villages or local communities. The 
following sub-section expands on the role of traditional institutions and associations in 
local communities.     
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5.2.4. Economic and Social Relations 
An important aspect of economic and social relations in Cameroon remains the 
significant role which community associations play in local, regional, and national life of 
the people in terms of economic, social, and political organizing (Yenshu, 2008). In an 
ethnographic study conducted on “association life” across Cameroon, it was found that 
association life “pervades all facets of national life” (Yenshu, p. 95) and that there 
continue to be a “proliferation of ethnic-based associations in the urban areas” (p. 96). 
These associations include regional development, village development, cultural, youth 
and women associations and typically identify with an ethnicity, village, or homeland. 
They are dominant actors in community, village, and regional development claiming to 
represent the peoples’ interests (p. 96). Yenshu noted that “…more than a century of 
Christian missionary activity, colonial repression and attempts at obliteration by the post-
colonial state have not succeeded in putting out the flame of association life at either the 
local or regional level” (p. 96). As such, Yenshu argues in the ethnographic study that “it 
is still worthwhile examining the value of local forces in building viable social projects if 
we still have to live within the pluralistic world that the imperatives of current nation-
state system and the globalization process place on the diversity of peoples” (p. 97). Such 
associations have proliferated throughout South-West region of Cameroon including the 
South-West Elite Development Association (SWELA) which Yenshu studied.  
Typically, governance in associations having a national spread, occur at several 
levels, namely, Executive committee, General Assembly, Advisory Council or Council of 
Elders, and Nationwide branches (Yenshu, 2008). Such associations, according to 
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Yenshu, arrive at decisions by way of “consensus” or “open ballot” as “proposals for 
decisions” on major issues are brought before the General Assembly (p. 109).  
The people of these areas are heavily involved in communal organizing practices. 
For example, villages have a “Palaver House” locally called “Etane” (“Communal 
Development Plan Toko”, 2012, p. 15). Etane is a community hall used “for conflict 
resolution and other social gatherings” (p. 15; see also “Mundemba Communal 
Development Plan”, 2012). During these gatherings, discussions on community values, 
vision, and development prospects are discussed. There is a strong attachment to 
community or group organizing as these groups are enshrined in the social and economic 
relations of these communities. Community leaders and local government representatives 
rely on group associations for task accomplishment. An example of the important role 
these groups play in a community’s operations was seen when local government 
representatives in these areas contested a village survey’s findings that had reported the 
total population to be 14,045. Instead, they supported another survey conducted through 
village development associations that set the population at 66,000 (“Communal 
Development Plan Toko”, 2012).  
Nguti district is not particularly different from Mundemba and Toko. Village 
development associations, family groups, quarter associations, including youth and 
women meeting groups, play an important role in the social life of communities. While 
associations play a significant role in community organizing, key decisions affecting the 
wellbeing of the community are arrived at following consultations with various 
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representatives of associations, before the decisions are sanctioned by the traditional 
council headed by the Chief.  
The relationship between the people and their traditional rulers during a crisis that 
pits the community against the government or multinational depends on which side the 
chief decides to stand. A rift quickly builds between the people and their leaders if they 
suspect personal interests are taking center stage on the part of these leaders.  
5.3. Land ownership  
 Ordinance No. 74-1 of July 6, 1974, sets general land tenure rules and regulates 
ownership of land in Cameroon. Another ordinance tied to this law is Ordinance No. 74-2 
of July 6, 1974, which specifically relates to the management of state land (USAID, 
2010). These laws allow for individual, communal, or state ownership of land. 
Communal land must be registered and titled to separate it from state or national land. All 
unregistered land, including unoccupied land and land held under customary law is 
government property (USAID, 2010). A 1976 law ordinance allowed government to lease 
and share rents off national lands.  In principle, the state receives 40% of the rent, the 
local Council in whose jurisdiction the land is situated gets 40%, and 20% goes to the 
village community where the leased land is located (Assembe-Mvondo, Brockhaus, & 
Lescuyer, 2013). 
Within this customary law framework, “land rights are heritable” (USAID, 2010, 
p. 6; see Joko, 2006; Fombad, 2009). Formal courts adjudicating land matters are 
required to apply customary laws as applicable in Anglophone regions of the country, 
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while in the Francophone regions, the jurisdiction of customary laws is to handle civil 
matters considered to be outside the jurisdiction of formal courts (USAID, 2010). 
The land registration process can be cumbersome and expensive; this explains 
why only 125,000 certificates of title had been registered by 2008, and only about 3 
percent of rural land had been registered (USAID, 2010; World Bank, 2009b). It takes 93 
days and 18 percent of the value of land to get land registered in Cameroon, while in sub-
Saharan Africa as a whole, it takes about 81 days on average and 10 percent of the value 
of the land to get land registered and titled (USAID, 2010). Communities wanting to 
register land must apply to Land Consultation Boards to reclassify the land as private, 
failure of which such land is considered public or national with the state as administrator. 
The Land Consultation Boards were created as a means to decentralize land tenure in the 
country. Members of the board include:  the district officer, a representative of the Lands 
Service, a representative of the Land Surveying Service, a representative of the Town 
Planning Service (in the case of an urban project), a representative of the Ministry 
concerned with the project, the chief and two leading members of the village or the 
community where the land is situated (Center for Environment and Development, 2013, 
p. 2).  
 Despite the existence of these legal frameworks for land tenure in Cameroon, 
several studies have suggested that individual and community land rights are endangered. 
The USAID (2010) report noted that “only a relatively small percentage of Cameroonians 
have registered their land rights” adding that “most continue to claim rights based on 
diverse customary laws, at times in direct conflict with the government, which seeks to 
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use statutory law to enforce its own access to unregistered land” (p. 1). Rural 
communities, smallholders, pastoralists, and marginalized ethnic groups, as well as 
occupants of informal settlements “lack secure rights to land” (p. 2). These conflicts 
become manifest when the government leases land to multinational corporations who in 
turn, face oppositional struggles with local communities who claim ownership over land 
based on ancestral rights (Rainforest Foundation, 2016). This is the case with the 
Herakles Farms palm oil plantations.  
5.4. Herakles Farms in Cameroon 
 Herakles Farms began as an American multinational corporation according to an 
Environmental Social Impact Assessment (ESIA) report by the corporation published in 
February 2011. Other sources describe Herakles Farms (HF) either as affiliated or fully 
owned by Herakles Capital, headquartered in New York, United States of America 
(“Zoom Company Information,” 2016; US Embassy Diplomatic Cables, March 24, 
2014). The company targets telecommunications, energy, infrastructure, mining and 
agro-industrial projects in Africa (Oakland Institute “Understanding Land Investment 
Deals,” 2012). During its initial foray into Cameroon, the Chairman and Executive 
Director of Herakles Capital was also the head of All for Africa, a transnational 
organization focusing on development in Africa (Oakland Institute “Understanding Land 
Investment Deals”, 2012).  
Herakles Farms is developing long-term large-scale palm oil production on more 
than 200,000 acres in West and Central Africa (“Zoom Company Information”, 2016). 
117 
When fully developed, the palm oil plantation project “will be one of the largest 
commercial palm oil operations in Africa” (“Zoom Company Information”, 2016, para 
1). The company was originally identified as a member of the Roundtable of Sustainable 
Palm Oil (RSPO), an international organization created in 2004 to promote sustainable 
practices in palm oil production including among others, environmental protection and 
inclusion of local stakeholders in the palm oil sector (see RSPO “Factsheet”, 2016). 
Subsequently, the company left the Roundtable over its plantation plans in Cameroon. 
This study will use “SGSOC,” “Herakles,” “Herakles Farms” or simply “HF” when 
referring to the company.  
5.4.1. Bruce Wrobel: Benevolent Capitalist? 
 The original CEO of Herakles Farms, the American investment capitalist Bruce 
Wrobel, articulated the presence of the company and other subsidiaries across Africa with 
representations that seemed to paraphrase Spivak’s criticism of the white salvation ethos 
(see Spivak, 1988). In a tersely worded open letter to both local and international publics 
responding to accusations of wrongdoing by Oakland institute, Wrobel represented 
himself, his family, and colleagues as benevolent people, philanthropists who are 
interested in salvaging the people of Cameroon and the African continent from poverty, 
diseases, and unemployment as well as protecting young women and offering education 
and housing to Cameroon’s and Africa’s poor. He explained how his family “endured 
malaria, gastrointestinal illnesses, strange infections and bites from a wide range of 
insects and reptiles” in order to establish the palm oil project (“Open Letter,” 2012, 
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para.10). Here is Herakles Farms’ CEO describing his mission to save Africa’s 
‘marginalized’:  
I witnessed first-hand the extreme poverty caused in part by the serious conflicts 
in West Africa at the time. In the wake of this trip, I gathered some of the 
brightest and most idealistic managers and engineers I had worked with over my 
career, and together we made a commitment to the identification and development 
of specific opportunities designed to generate sustainable economic growth on a 
regional or national level … We seek to identify a barrier to economic growth 
within a country or region, and then we design a solution which, if implemented, 
would eliminate the barrier and facilitate further economic activity always with 
the goal of building a sustainable middle class. (“Open Letter, 2012, para. 11-12)  
Here we see a CEO envisioning a corporate salvation of African peoples through 
neoliberal economics and AngloAmerican hubris.  
 As CEO of the philanthropy “All for Africa,” Wrobel further articulated the 
vision of the company through representations that aligned the beneficence of 
multinational capitalism with the “implementation of philanthropic projects,” noting how 
“Herakles Farms embraced this as a great social initiative and a way to spread the 
benefits of our project across a much wider geography” including “everything from a 
school for disadvantaged girls in the Democratic Republic of Congo to a women’s 
vocational training center in Monrovia, Liberia” (“Open Letter,” 2012, para. 40). These  
representations of Herakles Farms as “benevolent capitalism” were strongly contested by 
119 
the marginalized villagers in the plantation regions in Cameroon. Wrobel died on 
December 10, 2013, but the rhetoric of benevolent capitalism continued to characterize 
the corporate crisis rhetoric of Herakles Farms. As I will show, the association of such a 
project with the ambitions of Cameroon’s Vision 2035 is a disturbing example of how the 
fate of local communities is reframed in ways that reproduce the subordination and 
exploitation of those very communities. 
5.5 The Palm Oil Plantation Project 
Herakles Farms set out plans for a large-scale palm oil plantation and processing 
mills project in Cameroon in 2008 when a senior Herakles Farms’ representative met 
with then Cameroonian Prime Minister Ephraim Inoni (US Embassy Diplomatic Cables, 
March 24, 2014). This meeting came after the company had “hired” a Cameroonian 
consultant to prospect land for the project (US Embassy Diplomatic Cable, B5). On 
September 17, 2009, Herakles Farms was established in Cameroon following the signing 
of an “Establishment Convention” (see “Establishment Convention”, 2009; also see US 
Embassy Diplomatic Cable, March 24, 2014).  
Herakles Farms reported in its 2011 ESIA report that the company had acquired 
80,506 hectares of land in Mundemba, Toko, and Nguti in the South-West region of 
Cameroon. Of the 80,506 hectares, the company noted that 70,000 would be used for 
plantations while the remaining 10,506 hectares would be used for the company’s 
infrastructure including factories (Herakles, “ESIA report,” 2011). Of the total number of 
hectares acquired, 42,886 were in Nguti district, and 38,020 hectares were located in 
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Mundemba and Toko districts. Herakles projected it would invest US$760 million on the 
project: $295 million on plantations and the remaining amount to be used for other 
operations over a 20 to 25 year-period (Herakles, “ESIA report,” 2011). Herakles Farms 
also estimated that by 2020, the company would have developed 90,000 hectares of 
nurseries, implying the company would acquire more land (Herakles, “ESIA report”, 
2011). The Establishment Convention signed was to expire after 99 years (Achobang, 
2013; also see Reuters, November 26, 2013). It also stipulated that the company would 
pay US$0.50 per undeveloped hectare and US$1.00 per producing hectare (Oakland 
Institute, 2016).  
It is important to mention here that following oppositional struggles the company 
faced with local communities, government officials, and local and international 
environmentalist groups and organizations, the size of the land for the plantation was 
drastically reduced to 19,843 hectares (this marked a major point in the crisis). This was 
the outcome of an executive order by the president on November 25, 2013, after nearly 
three years of the company’s operations. The executive order also readjusted land rents. 
Herakles Farms would now pay approximately US$7.00 per hectare of land (Oakland 
Institute, 2016). This decision will be discussed at length in this chapter. The new lease 
according to the executive order is probationary and subject to renewal with the first 
expiration date being November 2016 (Oakland Institute, 2016). Herakles Farms began 
full operations in Cameroon in 2010, clearing forests and developing three palm oil 
nurseries (Oakland Institute “Understanding Land Investment Deals,” 2012).  
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5.5.1. The Plantation Project Sites 
The project sites have provoked considerable contestation. Even though Herakles 
Farms indicated that 14,000 people would be affected by the project in these localities, a 
petition by Save the Wildlife Conservation Fund states that there are 38 villages within 
the demarcated land area where the company operates; and an estimated 45,000 people 
would be impacted in these areas (“Stop the palm oil plantation in Cameroon”). Further, 
large-scale palm oil operations disrupt the primary occupations of the people, which 
include subsistence farming, hunting, fishing, and collecting forest products, as well as 
the production of common crops like millet, cocoa, cassava, beans, rice, and fruits 
(Mousseau, 2012, p. 2). There are also conservation issues at these sites. The sites for the 
palm oil plantations are connected to protected forest reserves and parks including Korup 
National Park, Bakossi National Park, Banyang Mbo Wildlife Sanctuary, Nta Ali Forest 
Reserve and Rumpi Hills Forest reserve (Mousseau, 2012). According to Mousseau, 
these sites are “biodiversity hotspots” (p. 5). It is estimated that 80 percent of the World’s 
remaining Drills are in Cameroon and the sites of the plantations are considered 
important habitats for this species (Greenpeace, “License to Launder,” 2014, p. 3). In 
addition, certain areas within the demarcated areas are classified as High Conservation 
Value Forest (HCVF), according to Mousseau. Finally, many sacred sites (shrines) 




5.6 Herakles Farms Crisis 
Similar to the Shell case in Nigeria, Herakles Farms in Cameroon is facing an 
ongoing crisis of confidence and a breakdown in organizational operations. These crises 
disrupt organizational routines and pose heavy threats to the survival of the organization. 
And just as in the Shell case, Benoit’s (1995, 1997) two conditions in determining 
whether or not an organization is in a crisis hold true in the Herakles Farms situation: 
first, Herakles is accused and held responsible for actions or occurrences; and second, 
these actions or occurrences are considered offensive by Herakles’ stakeholders (see 
Benoit, 1997, p. 178). 
The crisis confronting Herakles in Cameroon has two phases/periods. The first 
period dates back to the early years of its operations in Cameroon (2009-2013). This 
period covers the company’s early struggles with government officials concerning the 
legalization of the company’s operations. This period was also marked by oppositional 
struggles with villagers and environmentalists (local and international NGOs). The 
second period of the crisis runs from 2014-2016. During this period, oppositional 
struggles with villagers and environmentalists (local and international NGOs) intensified. 
To better situate the complexities and situational exigencies in this crisis, these two 




5.6.1 Crisis Phase I (2009-2013) 
Three actors – the host government, the villagers, and the environmentalists (local 
and international NGOs) – vigorously opposed Herakles Farms’ palm oil plantation 
project during this period.   
5.6.2 Government Opposition to Herakles Farms  
Government opposition came particularly from the Presidency of the Republic; 
the Ministry of Forestry and Wildlife; and the Ministry of Agriculture, Planning and 
Rural Development. These institutions must be involved in “development” projects in the 
forestry and agriculture sector that cover vast forestland in the country.  
In May 2011, the Presidency of the Republic of Cameroon, “rejected” a land title 
application from Herakles Farms on the grounds that the land title application needed 
“additional review” (US Embassy Diplomatic Cables, March 24, 2014). Officials in the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development stated that the “primary problems” with 
the Herakles’ project had to do with the “size and location” which is “adjacent to several 
national parks and protected areas” (US Embassy Diplomatic Cables, March 24, 2014, 
B6).  
By this time, the company had already begun developing the forestland for the 
project. The Ministry of Forests issued a stoppage order against the clearing of forestland 
by the company on February 1, 2012 until the company provided “supporting documents 
that empower” the company “to proceed with the clearing” (Regional Delegation of 
Forestry, February 1, 2012). The Forestry official’s correspondence also highlighted the 
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need for a map that clearly identified the area to be cleared. Herakles was also accused of 
extending 1 km (1.6 miles) outside the land prospected for the project. The Ministry of 
Forestry also accused the company of unlawfully felling trees (Regional Delegation, 
2012). The Ministry issued a subpoena for the company to appear before an investigating 
committee on April 25, 2012.  
Another charge against Herakles by the Ministry of Forestry was that the 
company’s palm oil project was directly competing with the livelihood of the local 
population. The Ministry also stated that “the loss of opportunities offered by forest 
resources” is huge compared to a “few precarious employments in the plantation” 
(Ministry of Forestry, “Fact Finding Mission Report”, 2013, para 1). 
On April 22, 2013, Cameroon’s Ministry of Forestry issued an order stopping 
Herakles Farms operations in the country. The US embassy in Yaoundé, in diplomatic 
cables released on March 24, 2014, quotes an “independent forest observer” recruited by 
the Government of Cameroon who justified the stoppage order: “SGSOC conducted tree 
felling without authorization inside the permanent forest estate” (B7(A)). The forest 
observer added that “SGSOC did not follow the procedures and legal terms guiding the 
alienation of permanent forest estate” (B7(A)). The diplomatic cables also quoted the 
forest observer as saying “the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development and the 
Ministry of Forests and Wildlife were not associated to the implementation of the […] 
project in the area requested, according to the regulations in force” (B7(A)). The 
stoppage order from the Ministry of Forestry carried a US$50,000 fine as penalty, and 
“condemned the tree-cutting as illegal” (US Embassy Diplomatic Cables, March 24, 
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2014, B7(A)). The order also “required HF to renegotiate its Establishment Convention” 
(US Embassy Diplomatic Cables, March 24, 2014, B7(A)). On May 18, 2013, Herakles 
Farms announced in a press release that it was suspending its operations in Cameroon and 
laying off 690 workers (Musa, 2013; Hinshaw & Tumanjong, 2013; Makia, 2013; Viban, 
2013).  
5.6.3. Community Opposition to Herakles Farms   
Early opposition to Herakles farms by villagers emerged in 2009. The first 
recorded community opposition came from the Batanga community in Ndian (Mundemba 
and Toko Districts) division. This community opposed the issuance of a land certificate 
to Herakles “on all lands presently owned and occupied by the Batanga” (para 1). The 
communities raised worries over the destruction of their forests should a land title be 
issued to Herakles Farms. The local communities also pointed to problems of 
environmental degradation and stated that “we find this current move to deforest our 
lands by Sithe Global Sustainable Oils contrary to the preservation of the biosphere” 
(Mbile, 2009, para 3).  
As community opposition grew against the company, between 2010 and 2012, 
there were 26 recorded petitions in which villages sought to or effectively did stall the 
operations of Herakles Farms. Issues raised in these petitions revolved around the loss of 
farmlands (a major source of livelihood), “abusive invasion” of sacred shrines, and 
destruction of forest products (another source of livelihood) (see Ngoe, 2010; Fabe, 
2011a; 2011b; Masaka, 2012; Bita, 2012). Besides the issue of land loss, local 
communities stalled the company’s operations for “developing land without the consent 
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of the communities that surround and depend on it” (Cannon, 2016, para 1). In 2012, 
villages in the surrounding operations area of the palm oil plantation project accused 
Herakles of “grabbing communal land” and land which they said was inherited from their 
ancestors (Opio, 2012, para 7). 
5.6.4. Oppositional Struggles by Local and International NGOs  
Local and international environmental organizations including SEFE, Oakland 
Institute, and Greenpeace charged the Herakles project for non-compliance with 
guidelines on environmental protection. Baboon populations in the region as well as 
water rights issues were reported to be at stake. Notably, the Herakles Farms 
environmental and social impact assessment report indicated the potential danger to the 
quality of groundwater as a result of the chemicals and fertilizers and pesticides that 
would be used in the plantations sites (see Mousseau, 2012, p. 2).  
The Oakland Institute, an environmental conservation agency based in California, 
published a report in 2012 detailing the impact of Herakles palm oil plantation and 
calling the project a “deceit” of local communities. The NGO noted that the Herakles 
palm oil plantation project would lead to “irreversible environmental impact” since the 
area of the company’s operations is “an important area for high biodiversity” (para 15). 
The Oakland institute report also pointed to the displacement of village populations as a 
major potential impact of the project. The organization accused the company of “the 
destruction of livelihoods for thousands of Cameroonians” (para. 8) and stated that 
because the primary occupations in these villages are farming, hunting, fishing, and 
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collection of forest products (e.g., wild food, medicinal plants, and fuel wood), Herakles 
Farms palm oil plantation project would result in loss of livelihood (para. 8).  
Greenpeace, in a press release of February 19, 2013, accused Herakles Farms of 
undertaking a project that would result in “massive carbon emissions and the destruction 
of habitats critical to threatened animal species” (para. 1), and stated the company must 
be “stopped” (para. 1). The Greenpeace press release also quotes a local Cameroonian 
environmentalist, Nasako Besingi, Director of Struggle to Economize Future 
Environment (SEFE), a local NGO, who stated that “the proposed plantation is located 
between five protected areas and any attempt to open it up will have catastrophic effects 
on the environment” (para. 5). Greenpeace and Oakland Institute also reiterated 
accusations of land grabbing which communities had already raised.  
Along with environmental concerns and stripping local communities of land, 
there were accusations of corruption and intimidation of villagers who opposed the 
plantation project. On corruption allegations, Greenpeace, in a report published on 
September 6, 2016, pointed to allegations that Herakles Farms “used bribery” and the 
“promise of future benefits to certain individuals to obtain support from local 
communities and administrative authorities” (“Herakles Farms chaotic history,” p. 5). 
Greenpeace also cited another study conducted by the Ministry of Forestry in 2013 which 
found that land negotiations were done “with [a] lot of intimidation and bribery, targeting 
the chiefs and some few influential decision-making members of the communities” (p. 5). 
The Greenpeace report also cited a French newspaper, Le Monde, in which the Director 
of Operations for Herakles’ subsidiary (SGSOC) at the time “promised to secure 
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employment for family members of a high-level employee” (p. 5) who worked with 
Cameroon’s Ministry of lands. According to US Embassy cables there were accusations 
that suggested Herakles Farms “may have violated the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act” 
(B6).  
Regarding accusations of intimidation, the company came under criticism for 
arresting and putting into detention villagers who protested its operations. Greenpeace, in 
a report on May 3, 2013, stated: “When residents protested against the plantation … they 
met with intimidation and arrests” (p. 5). The Greenpeace report also noted that in 
November 2012, when members of the local environmental NGO SEFE and their leader 
prepared “a peaceful demonstration” they were “arrested” at the NGO’s main office and 
“held without charge” (p. 5).     
However, on November 25, 2013, Cameroon President, Paul Biya, signed a 
decree allowing Herakles to carry on its operations on 19,843 hectares (49,033 acres), 
down from the initial 73,086 hectares the company had already prospected. The decree 
described the nearly 20,000 hectares as a “temporal concession” to the company 
(Achobang, 2013, para 1). A Reuters news report of November 26, 2013 stated that the 
decree required that Herakles pay US$408,600 as land tax (Djoyum & Bate, 2013). 
Herakles memos had earlier stated that the government of Cameroon agreed to a 99-year 
land lease with the company (also see Hinshaw & Tumanjong, 2013).  
Summarily, the major accusations Herakles faced in the first phase of the crisis in 
Cameroon revolved around disrespect of Cameroonian law, land grabbing (including loss 
129 
of livelihood for communities who rely on farmlands and forest products to survive), 
destruction of forest reserves and biodiversity, particularly endangered animal species 
(e.g., baboons, drills), corruption, and intimidation and arrest of protesters. 
5.6.5. Crisis Phase II (2014-2016) 
 Once Herakles Farms obtained its authorization from the Cameroon President, 
oppositional struggles came primarily from local communities and environmental groups. 
But because the company’s community relations had severely been damaged, operations 
were stalled. Herakles Farms in this period gradually shifted attention to timber logging 
and exporting to foreign markets including China (Greenpeace, “License to Launder”, 
2014).  
Environmental activists accused Herakles of illegal logging on grounds that the 
company was not registered as a timber company. Their reports also cited the 
“Establishment Convention” in which it is suggested that all trees felled during the 
clearing of forests would be handed over to the government of Cameroon. One 
Greenpeace report quotes a Herakles official who in 2012 said, “As we are not 
commercial loggers, we will cut it, trim it and stack it for the government” (“License to 
Launder,” 2014, p. 7). Yet in 2014, Greenpeace reported that Herakles was facing 
“financial difficulty” and was turning to illegal logging (“License to Launder,” 2014). 
On May 29, 2015, Herakles Farms abandoned “all operations” in Mundemba and 
Toko in Ndian division according to a press release by the local NGO SEFE published on 
the website of Forest Peoples’ Program (“Herakles Abandons All Operations,” 2015; 
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also see Ndi, 2015). The release quoted a spokesperson of the company who blamed 
management for “prioritizing timber extraction over planting of palms” (para. 2). An 
environmental reporter in Cameroon, Manka Grace, confirmed that Herakles Farms “no 
longer have an office” in the location (personal communication, July 20, 2015). Manka 
added that the signboard of the company “together with office properties” had been 
moved (personal communication, July 20, 2015).  
 Evidence of a Herakles reorganization was reported by Greenpeace on September 
15, 2016. Herakles reported new investors and a new Chairman and General Manager, 
Jonathan Johnson-Watts, who was installed in November 2015. The Greenpeace report 
also mentioned that “Herakles Farms is confirmed to have sold SGSOC to new investors” 
(p. 9). Johnson-Watt and his business associate James Stevenson-Hamilton are 
shareholders of several UK registered companies. It is important to note that they are 
both also directors of Volta Red Ghana. Volta Red Ghana is the new company that has 
taken over Herakles Farms palm oil plantation project in Ghana following similar 
community oppositional struggles (see “Herakles Farms’ Failed Venture Ghana,” 2014).   
Oppositional struggles against the company continue. Some 244 farmers in 
Cameroon, on September 27, 2016, filed complaints against the company for 
“trespassing” (“244 Cameroonian farmers,” para. 1; also see Ngalame, 2016). The 
complaints filed in the Court of First Instance in Bangem (Nguti), one of the 
administrative districts hosting Herakles Farms operations, accused the company of 
failing to “respect a 5km buffer zone around their farmlands” (“244 Cameroonian 
Farmers,” 2016, para. 2). Greenpeace claimed that the initial land demarcated by 
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Herakles “encroaches on many farms in the forest areas” (“244 Cameroonian Farmers,” 
para. 2). 
Summarily, this second phase of the corporate crisis faced by Herakles Farms in 
Cameroon entailed principally accusations about illegal logging and land grabbing.  
5.7. Herakles Farms Crisis Management and Communication 
Approach 
 The discussion in this section focuses on the communication process with which 
Herakles sought to engage stakeholders in addressing the oppositional struggles they 
encountered.  
5.7.1. Phase I Crisis Communication Response 
During Phase I of the crisis, the company responded to accusations and 
confrontations with rhetorical strategies that denied the legitimacy of the claims levied by 
opposing government officials, local communities, and international environmental 
organizations. However, while the denial strategy dominated the company’s 
communication, other strategies used by company leaders included: transcendence, 
bolstering, differentiation, and ingratiation. These strategies emerged during the coding 
process described in Chapter 3. I elaborate on these strategies in the following 
paragraphs. 
Company leaders denied accusations that they were operating illegally and in 
disrespect of Cameroonian laws. In two Open Letter webpage entries addressed first to 
the public in September 2012 and then to investors in March 2013, then CEO Bruce 
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Wrobel stated, “Herakles Farms has a long-term agreement with the government of 
Cameroon [and had acquired] all necessary consents, approvals and permits required to 
operate legally within the country” (“Investment Opportunity,” p. 3). Company 
executives also denied allegations that the company was facing opposition from the 
government. Herakles told investors that the project has “Strong government support and 
commitment,” which they explained, “is a result of the Cameroon Plantation providing an 
economically underdeveloped region of Cameroon with decades of large scale 
employment and needed infrastructure including roads, schools and hospitals” 
(“Investment Opportunity,” 2013, p. 3).  
In response to accusations that the company was grabbing land and stripping 
locals of their land rights, hence taking away the source of livelihood for village 
communities, the company denied these allegations. Instead, in another response 
published on March 20, 2012, it was stated that the company is committed to “not 
planting on land where villages and farms currently exist, leaving land for their future 
generations’ expansion, as well as buffer zones to ensure plantation operations do not 
impact them” (“Response to Inquiries,” p. 4).  The company also stated that “in the few 
cases in which villages have wished to be excluded from the plantation area, we have 
accommodated these requests by removing the land from our leased area” (“Response to 
Inquiries,” 2012, p. 5). Yet in 2011, an Environmental Social Impact Assessment (ESIA) 
study conducted on behalf of the company pointed out that “traditional livelihood 
activities inside the Concession such as subsistence agriculture, gathering and use of 
NTFPs [non timber forests products], and hunting will be adversely impacted by the 
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Project due primarily to the loss of land available for these activities” (ESIA, 2011, p. 
xxvii).  
Addressing accusations of environmental (biodiversity) destruction, Herakles 
Farms denied these allegations and clearly stated in an Open Letter in September 2012 
that “none of the distribution maps showing important areas of birds, mammals, reptiles, 
amphibians and plants showed the project site as an important biodiversity conservation 
site” (Herakles Farms, 2012). The company not only denied the allegations but also 
shifted blame to local communities’ farming methods, stating that “we recognize the 
value of the environment which surrounds us, its importance to the local people and to 
the global community” (“Herakles Exposed,” 2013, p. 6); further, “activities that have 
contributed to the area’s reduced biodiversity include [past] logging in some places, and 
small scale farming in others” (p. 6). The company said “slash-and-burn small-scale 
agriculture and other unsustainable practices have enhanced land degradation” (“Herakles 
Exposed,” 2013, p. 6). The company explained that the location for project sites was 
chosen, among other criteria, because the land “had been previously logged and is not 
covered by any existing ecological protections, thereby enabling SGSOC to build-out a 
sustainable oil palm operation” (ESIA, 2011, p. xiii). 
 A rhetoric of denial was also applied to the corruption charges made against the 
company. The company cited the anti-corruption policy of the organization, asserting 
“Corrupt business practices will never be tolerated at Herakles Farms” (Anti-Corruption 
Policy, cited in “Herakles Exposed,” 2013, p. 2). In another response, the company 
stated:  
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Herakles Capital and SGSOC take corruption very seriously. All of our 
employees, contractors and subcontractors are required to sign a document committing to 
compliance with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), and as an American 
company that utilizes multilateral financing, we cannot afford to engage in or be 
associated with any corruption (nor do we wish to partake in such activity) (“A Response 
to Inquiries,” 2012, p. 6). 
The Company responded to accusations of illegal logging by denying it was 
involved in logging: “We surrendered the timber to the government … We are not 
commercial loggers. We will cut it, trim it and stack it for the government” (“Open 
Letter,” 2012, as cited in “Herakles Exposed,” 2013, p. 1). There was a subtle shift in the 
company’s response to the allegation of illegal logging in 2013. The company stated: 
“We would also like to clarify that our company only has rights to the area’s timber and 
natural resources as needed for the plantation’s development. Therefore, any timber that 
we fell beyond that amount is for the government’s use and sale” (“Herakles Exposed,” 
2013, p. 1). 
The company also used the strategy bolstering. This strategy was used in 
statements pointing to other sectors of the African economy where the company was 
doing well. Other statements pointed to the good characteristics of the company and its 
CEO; yet, other statements reminded and even praised stakeholders for standing with the 
company (see Coombs 2007). For example, the creation of the company was depicted as 
beneficial and sustainable for Africa:  “Inspired by a desire to ‘do something’ for Africa 
after a visit to war-torn West Africa in 1999, our CEO, Bruce Wrobel, quit his job to start 
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Herakles Capital with a commitment to using his skills in large-scale project development 
for the benefit of sustainable economic development in Africa” (“Response to Inquiries,” 
2012, p. 1). The company presented its successes in other sectors: “Herakles Capital has 
helped found several award-winning projects across the continent, bringing numerous 
benefits to the corresponding regions…and we are developing our latest project, SGSOC, 
in the same spirit” (“Response to Inquiries,” 2012, p. 1). This is also an example of what 
Coombs calls the bolstering sub-strategy of “reminder” (2007, p. 170). Thus, there is 
evidence of rhetorical strategies seeking to enhance the company’s public reputation. 
The company praised some stakeholders in order to advance a social 
responsibility image. For example, Herakles Farms praised the government of Cameroon 
for its Free Trade Zone program stating that “such incentives are important to attract 
foreign investment to supplement the fragile investments the state is capable of making,” 
adding that “the region in which we operate has very little cash in the economy, as most 
of the population lives subsistence lifestyles” (“Response to Inquiries, 2012, p. 4). The 
company also stated that “the government alone cannot develop markets in the area, and 
taxing these people is nearly impossible when they operate in an informal economy with 
very little cash income” (p. 4). In another statement, Herakles Farms praised the women 
in a village community called Fabe. While the village had opposed its operations, the 
company’s website applauded a Women’s Day ceremony acknowledging SGSOC. The 
company stated: “For International Women’s Day this year, we were honored that the 
women of Fabe in Mundemba district demonstrated their appreciation for SGSOC’s 
presence with a ceremony” (“Response to Inquiries,” 2012, p. 5). Coombs (2007) has 
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referred to this kind of crisis communication strategy as “ingratiation” (p. 170) which is a 
sub-strategy of bolstering.  
The company also used a strategy called differentiation (see Benoit, 1995, 1997; 
Harlow et al., 2011, p. 81). In this strategy, organizational leaders and spokespersons talk 
about the differences between the company’s actions as compared to similar acts that 
might have occurred in other sectors or with other companies especially competitors. For 
example, in a statement to stakeholders, the company stated:  
Unfortunately, we launched this project at a time when there have been an 
increasing number of speculative investors seeking land in African countries. 
Given some examples that have been set by others, we understand that the 
investment incentives we have been awarded have attracted the attention of 
critics” (“Response to Inquiries,” 2012, pp. 3-4).  
This statement clearly sought to separate Herakles Farms operations from other 
companies in the same sector. 
Another strategy the company used in its crisis communication is transcendence. 
According to Benoit (1995, 1997; also see Harlow et al., 2011), companies use this 
strategy when they position the act in a different context. Company leaders tell 
stakeholders to focus on a broader context within which the act occurred. In the case of 
Herakles Farms, the company attempted to situate the palm oil project in a bigger context 
so that communities might clearly see the benefits of the project. For example, the 
company stated that “through its work in Africa, Herakles Capital has identified food 
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security as one of the major issues, and responding to the interest of the Government of 
Cameroon in being self-sufficient in basic food staples, Herakles Capital launched the 
SGSOC project in 2009” (“Response to Inquiries,” 2012, p. 3). In this statement, the 
company situated the company within the context of “food security,” an issue of local, 
national, and global importance. 
It should be noted that bolstering, transcendence, differentiation, and ingratiation 
are strategies used to “reduce the offensiveness” of the crisis as perceived by 
organizational publics/stakeholders (Benoit, 1995, 1997). In other words, Herakles Farms 
used rhetorical strategies aimed at reducing perceptions of corporate wrongdoing and 
promoting an image of social responsibility and beneficence. 
5.7.2. Phase II Crisis Communication Response 
 In Phase II, the company made a major shift in its approach to communication 
and crisis management. The approach emphasized elements in the Discourse of Renewal 
model as discussed in the next section. 
5.8. Herakles Farm’s Discourse of Renewal 
5.8.1. Ethical Communication 
Ulmer, Sellnow, and Seeger (2011) stated that “organizations that institute strong, 
positive value positions with key stakeholders, such as honesty, responsibility, 
accountability, and trustworthiness” (p. 215) are able to attain renewal. This ethical 
element of the Discourse of Renewal is evident in recent communications by Herakles 
Farms’ leaders and other spokespersons. Speaking to the press following a joint 
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governmental ministerial commission to assess the operations of the company in the 
project sites, a Herakles Farms’ executive evoked such positive value positions by 
indicating that the company would be transparent in its relationship with local 
communities. The company executives stated that the company will “work with 
cooperatives societies and allow small scale holders to fully participate in the project” 
(Mvogo, 2016c). Cooperative societies as seen in this quote are “small scale holders,” 
that is, local palm oil and other agriculture product producers in these communities.  
These “small scale holders” are the backbone of community organizing in these 
communities. Communicating openly with these groups strongly suggests that the 
company was aiming at positioning itself as a transparent organization. The company 
executive also sought to align the company with being socially responsible, noting that 
Herakles would “train” small scale holders, “give certain privileges and amenities” to 
communities and undertake “timely salary payment” of workers from the surrounding 
communities (Mvogo, 2016c). In 2012, then CEO, Bruce Wrobel hinted at this ethical 
component in a news report published on June 12, but that discourse was eclipsed by 
increasingly defensive communication strategies which the company strongly adopted. 
For example, in the June 2012 news report, Wrobel stated: “Herakles Farms is committed 
to listening to the concerns of all stakeholders and modifying our practices where 
necessary. We want to be a responsible leader in developing sustainable agriculture that 
prioritizes community development” (Rothenberg, para. 6). Wrobel also stated, “Going 
forward, we want to foster greater openness, transparency and collaboration in our 
activities” (Rothenberg, para 6).   
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5.8.2 Prospective vs. Retrospective Vision 
The Discourse of Renewal suggests that organizational leaders and spokespersons 
communicate by focusing on a brighter future, a future that is more promising than 
looking back on the past. Leaders should not engage in defensive communication; they 
should avoid blame tactics, and instead show stakeholders that a more important future is 
achievable, that the crisis is actually an opportunity for growth and renewal. A company 
spokesperson stated in a news report that “in the future we plan to spend about 29 billion” 
(Mvogo, 2016d) and also told stakeholders that the company was now fully focusing its 
efforts on developing the plantations in a sustainable manner (Mvogo, 2016b). Another 
spokesperson in another news report stated that “there are new shareholders who have 
joined the company” (Mvogo, 2016b). This further communicated the notion of renewal 
through a prospective focus.   
5.8.3 Organizational Learning 
The Discourse of Renewal model prescribes that leaders “should illustrate how 
the organization is learning from the crisis and what they are doing to ensure the crisis 
does not happen again” (Sellnow & Seeger, 2011, p. 215). In this regard, it is significant 
that Herakles’ new communication approach was framed as a “revamped impetus” 
(Mvogo, 2016b). The company officials acknowledged that the problems of the past were 
a result of the company not having “duly respected” norms of forest exploitation, and 
also asserted that if further clearing of the forest for plantation land was to be undertaken, 
this would be done “reasonably” (Mvogo, 2016a). This clearly suggests that the company 
had learned from the crisis about forest clearing and environmental protection.  
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To show how the company was willing to enact changes to rectify and avoid 
future problems, a Herakles Farms executive stated that “environmental considerations 
are now given due attention to right the wrongs of the past” (Mvogo, 2016a). The 
company executive also stated that “we have two environmentalists who are with us right 
now in the country and he [sic] is really tackling that particular area” (Mvogo, 2016a). 
Further, addressing one of the most contentious aspects in the crisis, the company official 
mentioned that “about 30 percent of the concession area would be preserved” to ensure 
that biodiversity is protected (Mvogo, 2016a).  
5.8.4 Effective Organizational Rhetoric 
The Discourse of Renewal suggests that organizational leaders effectively 
structure crisis rhetoric such that organizational publics or stakeholders can make 
informed decisions. Leaders and spokespersons are advised to “frame the crisis in a way 
that inspires, empowers and motivates” (Sellnow & Seeger, 2013, p. 98). The new crisis 
rhetoric that Herakles Farms adopted was more measured compared to previous crisis 
rhetoric. There were visible attempts to contextualize the crisis in ways that indicated the 
company was moving beyond the crisis. Company officials sought to communicate a 
“bigger picture” for events surrounding the crisis. For example, one of the company’s 
executives framed the palm oil project as a community project stating that the company is 
“encouraging small scale holders to develop individual farms to become an integral part 
of the palm project” (Mvogo, 2016c).  
Summarily, the Discourse of Renewal endorsed by Herakles Farms was a clear 
contrast with its previous crisis rhetoric that was both defensive and reactive. The new 
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communication approach aimed at rebranding the company in ways that suggested to 
stakeholders that the company was adopting a more ethical stance to management and 
that the company had learned and was willing to implement lessons to prevent future 
crises. The company’s rhetoric was more optimistic and future oriented. The ethical 
dimension of the discourse sought to effectively align the company with important 
community values including transparency. The following section is a discussion of how 
local communities and international environmental organizations responded to Herakles 
Farms’ Discourse of Renewal.  
5.9. Communities’ Response to Herakles Farms’ Discourse of 
Renewal  
  Herakles Farms’ Discourse of Renewal failed to convince local communities and 
international environmental organizations. In public venues, Herakles Farms adopted a 
new communication approach beginning in January 2016.  By September 27, 2016, some 
244 local farmers filed “two collective complaints” against the company (Greenpeace, 
“244 Cameroonian Farmers,” 2016, para 2). The farmers argued that negotiation did not 
occur between local communities and the company before lands were given to the 
company. A villager stated: “One day, I came to my farm and I found that they had 
bulldozed everything. I knew I was going to develop this place to earn my living and 
when I die, my children would remain there, but today, I have no place. We are all crying 
here, and we don’t know how we can be rescued” (Greenpeace, “244 Cameroonian 
Farmers,” 2016, para. 4). Cannon (2016) quotes a former local government official in 
Mundemba who pointed out that the company started work on the lands “without local 
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communities’ knowledge” (para 20). At issue is how negotiation is understood within 
these local communities.  
In the same report by Greenpeace (2016), Sylvie Djacbou, a Cameroonian 
environmental activist, reiterated charges earlier raised against the company: “SGSOC 
violated the law many times and didn’t fulfill the numerous promises they made to the 
communities, such as the building of roads and schools, so one can’t think how they 
could improve” (para. 8). Djacbou also emphasized “always protecting local communities 
and the great biodiversity that surrounds them,” characterizing the company as “a 
destructive project” which “must end” (para. 8). She also pointed to earlier accusations 
made against the company: “SGSOC activities are tainted with illegalities: not only does 
their establishment convention with the Cameroonian government violate the law, but 
they also cleared the forest without a permit, intimidated several traditional chiefs and 
used bribery and promises which are yet to be realized to obtain local authorities’ favor” 
(para. 7). Thus, despite the company’s attempts at renewal, activists and community 
members remained disaffected by the company’s rhetoric. 
 In another report published on April 7, 2016, author John Cannon quotes a French 
agronomist-geographer, Laurène Feintrenie who had worked in Cameroon with CIRAD, 
the French agriculture and development research organization. Feintrenie stated that 
“informed consent of local communities” was not sought “at all” (“Lessons from 
Herakles,” para. 6).  The French agronomist is quoted praising community actions, noting 
that it was a good thing that local communities stood up to “the abuses of the government 
and the company” (para. 8).  
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 Meanwhile Greenpeace stated in its October 4, 2016 report that, together with a 
coalition of NGOs, it has launched a petition in Cameroon and outside the country calling 
on the government of Cameroon “not to extend nor to renew” the provisional land lease 
issued to Herakles Farms through a presidential decree (“244 Cameroonian Farmer,” 
2016, para. 7).  Clearly, the Discourse of Renewal enacted by Herakles Farms in Phase II 
of the crisis did not resonate with local communities. Oppositional struggles continue as 
seen in the suit filed against the company by 244 farmers from communities within the 
operation areas of the company barely months after the company executives and 
spokespersons emerged with a Discourse of Renewal.  
5.10. Lessons Learned  
   What follows is a discussion of lessons learned in this case and the limitations of 
the Renewal model.  
(1) Herakles’ Discourse of Renewal failed to address the socio-cultural, communal modes 
of organizing characteristic of communities within which the company’s operations 
occurred. Communication failed to reflect the important role of traditional communal 
institutions that bond these communities. 
(2) The company’s focus on community titular leadership failed to acknowledge how 
communities themselves identified leaders. There is need to attend to the situationality of 
leadership, what it means to be a leader in these communities, and how leadership is 
represented or constituted.  
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(3) The company’s prospective vision failed to address the past (history) of these 
communities. Oppositional struggles over land ownership are situated within an ancestral 
past that justifies community land rights based on ancestral ties irrespective of the 
existence of legal instruments regulating ownership of these resources. 
 (4) The Discourse of Renewal was overly organization-centric. The organization 
as rhetor structures the discourse from the point of view of the corporation. The ongoing 
politics of representation in the model summons a corporate vision that aims at aligning 
affected communities to the realities constituted by corporate systems of representation.  
  (5) The belief system of a people is an indispensable variable in an effective 
communication approach that aims to address situated exigencies. Communities accused 
the company of disregarding their ancestors by demarcating forestland that cuts across 
ancestral shrines. Ancestors are considered part of the community. 
Summary 
Contestations over land ownership by communities, land grabs, destruction of 
livelihood, manipulated negotiation, environmental degradation, illegal logging, and 
intimidation, unlawful arrest and detention and accusations of disrespecting Cameroonian 
law were at the center of the crisis. The company generally denied accusations from local 
and international stakeholders. A change in communication strategy and crisis 
management that, whether intentionally or not, endorsed a Discourse of Renewal, did not 
remedy the situation. The lessons evince the limitations of the model. In the next chapter, 
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a philosophy of Africentric communication and its principles is reviewed in order to 




6 African Communication Concepts 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter conducts a review and critique of concepts drawn from African 
communication philosophy. The overarching goal is to address the second research 
question: which elements of Afri-centric communicative principles are most salient to a 
multinational crisis renewal response? The case analyses in Chapters 4 and 5 showed that 
the crisis renewal model is not universal and must address both crises and communicative 
relations more responsively. The larger significance is rethinking the Discourse of 
Renewal through multiple frames of knowledge, history, ethics, and power in order to 
develop a more contextually and situationally responsive model. This chapter therefore 
introduces African communication philosophy and considers how the principles of such a 
perspective apply to the corporate crisis response.   
6.2. Review of African Communication Concepts 
 African communication scholars generally agree that communicative practices are 
situated geopolitically, culturally, and historically and they advocate for a paradigm that 
reflects the structure and relations of African communities. Faniran (2008), for example, 
thinks communication education in Africa “remains largely an import from Western 
Europe and North America” (p. 146). For Faniran, Africa needs a communication 
framework that can be said to be “homegrown” (p. 146). It is against this backdrop that 
African communication scholars propose an “indigenous paradigm” which 
conceptualizes communalism as paradigmatic to communication in Africa (Faniran, 2008, 
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p. 146; also see Ansu-Kyeremeh, 1997, 2005; Tarawalie, 2008; Wilson, 2008; Langmia, 
2013). 
This conceptualization posits that communication is “primarily concerned with 
confirming, solidifying, and promoting the communal social order, while its secondary 
purpose is to maintain or improve interpersonal relationships” (Faniran, 2008, p. 152). 
Thus, communication exists as “human interrelationships that build up the community” 
(p. 153). For Faniran, communication cannot be separated from communalism as there is 
a “consensus” among African scholars that “the powerful, taken-for-granted framework 
of understanding or the root paradigm of these [African] cultures remains communalism” 
(p. 150; also see Ikuenobe, 2006; Famakinwa, 2010; Oyeshile, 2004). As such African 
cultural communalism is seen as the “template for African communication” (Faniran, 
2008, p. 149). Ansu-Kyeremeh (1997, 2005) also argues for the communalistic nature of 
communication by explicitly calling for a return to small group, interpersonal, 
community-oriented communication structures. To paraphrase Ansu-Kyeremeh, 
communal communication basically is small group-oriented, rooted in the local culture, 
dialogical, interpersonal, instantaneously produced, interactive, and “utilizing 
concurrently the senses of sight and sound in face-to-face encounters” (p. 20).  
Other scholars who support communalism with an emphasis on its participatory 
character include those who have vigorously called for the revalorization of indigenous 
knowledge systems in communicative practices (e.g. Mogweku, 2013; Awotiya, 2013; 
Langmia, 2013).  
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Scholars advancing the communal paradigm insist relations in African cultures 
are tied to duties that emphasize the moral supremacy of the community, such as respect 
for community values, sensitivity to the plights of community members, and respect for 
the elderly (Gyekye, 1997, 2003; Famakinwa, 2010; Ikuenobe, 2006). Hence, 
communication’s primary purpose is to foster these humanistic duties. These duties are 
enshrined in community values that emphasize the common good of the community and 
include mutual aid, caring for others, selflessness, interdependence, solidarity, reciprocal 
obligations, social harmony and mutual trust (Oyeshile, 2004, pp. 294-295). Oyeshile 
explains the importance of these communal values noting that “it is these values that 
define and guide the social relationship in the form of attitude and behavior that should 
exist between individuals living together in a community” (p. 294). Oyeshile is explicit in 
his call for a return to these communal values if Africa is to overcome its slow 
development. 
However, it is important to note the differential perspectives underpinning the 
practice of communalism in cultures across Africa. For example, while African 
communication scholars and African philosophical thoughts agree on the communal 
character of African communities, there are also disagreements on the nature or 
manifestation of communalism. For instance, even though African philosophy scholars 
agree on the moral supremacy of the community, and communication scholars push for 
communalistic frameworks capable of adequately addressing these communal relations, 
there is disagreement on which factors promote the moral supremacy of the community. 
Gyekye (1997) argues that the individual is morally obligated to the community by virtue 
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of the individual’s natural community membership; that duties such as respect for 
community values, sensitivity to the plights of others, and respect for the elderly are 
accomplished by virtue of the individual’s natural membership in the community; and 
that even though the individual holds certain rights as an independent human being, in the 
case where those rights clash with community values, the primacy of the community 
must prevail. For Gyekye such individual rights must “enhance the cultural development 
and success of the community” (p. 64). Gyekye (2003) also argues that communalism 
“cannot make a fetish of rights … priority will not be given to [individual] rights if doing 
so will stand in the way of attaining a more highly ranked value or a more preferable goal 
of the community” (p. 308). But whereas Famakinwa (2010) agrees on the moral 
supremacy of the community and that individuals owe obligations to the community for 
duties (such as respect for community values, sensitivity to the plights of community 
members, and respect for old age), he contends that such duties are not accomplished by 
virtue of the individual’s membership to the community. For Famakinwa, belonging to a 
cultural community does not justify the performance of those duties by the individual; 
other factors such as poor health of an elderly relative (for respect of old age, for 
example) might justify why an individual renders the duty, not because she or he is a 
member of that community. 
I am bringing up these conflicting views on the practice of communalism in 
African cultures to suggest that while communalism is advanced as a paradigm for 
African communication, and while African philosophers agree that communalism defines 
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relations in African cultures, there is need to critically examine the specificities of this 
framework.  
6.3. Key Concepts of African Communication 
 Scholars explaining communication in Africa have suggested a conceptualization 
of communication that brings the following themes together: indigenization of 
communicative practices, grassroots participation (e.g., Ansu-Kyeremeh, 1997, 2005), 
the valorization of indigenous knowledge (e.g., Mogekwu, 2013; Awotiya, 2013; 
Langmia, 2013), blending or hybridization (e.g., Faniran, 2008), and structural 
overhauling of communication processes from centrifugal to centripetal (e.g., Ansu-
Kyeremeh, 1997).   
6.3.1. Indigenization 
The concept of indigenization of communication is explained by Ansu Kyeremeh 
(1997) as the transformation of external or exogenous communication practices into what 
appears to be uniquely native. The purpose is to valorize native practices such that any 
communicative practice (including the use of symbols) that does not reflect native norms 
is converted into what is customary in native practices. Emphasis is on how external or 
exogenous experiences are transformed such that they reflect or reproduce local norms, 
values, traditions, and beliefs systems characterizing the indigenous community. 
In its most basic form, indigenization is making something (e.g., idea, approach, 
or device) to suit the local practices of the community. In contemporary Africa, for 
example, it is not uncommon to notice how African artists are transforming American 
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hip-hop music into native traditional music by giving this brand of music traditional 
rhythms and even ways of dancing that appears to be unique to the native people. The 
sounds and rhythms produced that appear uniquely native are achieved using traditional 
instruments such as nzan, ficaw, nkor, makak, mbem, muyang, egyuk, kwi fon, disam, 
kala, (Blench, 2009). Mbufong (2013) uses the expressions “Cameroonization” and 
“nativization” to explain how indigenization has affected the speaking of English. He 
states that “mixing words, phrases, clauses, and idioms from [local] Cameroonian 
languages” or “switching from one language identity [French, English] into another 
Cameroonian language is becoming a means through which Cameroonians express their 
identity and a ‘linguistic belonging’ to a geographical location called Cameroon” (p. 
476). Such forms of indigenization according to Mbufong also occur for the sake of 
“convenience” (p. 479). Nsamenang (2013) concurs and insists that “the domesticated 
patterns of the external cultures have become inescapable components of the African 
experience” (p. 42).  
Ansu-Kyeremeh (2005) sustained his exploration of indigenous communication 
and maintained, 
“Any form of exogenous communicative system, which by virtue of its origin 
from, and integration into a specific culture, serves as a channel for messages in a 
way and manner that requires the utilization of the values, symbols, institutions, 
and ethos of the host culture through its unique qualities and attributes. (pp. 16-
17)  
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He holds that “communication does not occur in a cultural vacuum”; rather, “it is a 
derivative from the sociocultural context in which it takes place” (p. 19).  
6.3.2. Grassroots Participation 
  The emphasis on grassroots participation as a communicative principle and 
practice in African communication philosophy is on how to address the legacy of 
colonialist communication structures. This principle as articulated is not about “how 
people in local communities communicate among themselves to solve local problems but 
how people at the grassroots level can articulate their views, needs and interests up to the 
district, regional and national level” (White, 2008, p. 7). Working on a project on 
development communication launched by the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) 
in Southern Africa, Mefalopulos presents results that suggest participation at all levels by 
the primary stakeholders was critical for the identification and appropriate 
implementation of policies to fight poverty. He pointed out the need for an inclusive 
approach in which “primary stakeholders” initiate, design, implement and evaluate or “at 
least they would need to be involved in a significant way”; the point is that they cannot 
be excluded from the process (para. 6). This form of communication is particularly 
preferred in Africa on grounds that most communities rely on their group actions and 
organizing to survive (Langmia, 2013; Ansu-Kyeremeh, 1997, 2005). But the concept of 
participation is more complicated than these simple structures of how communication 
should flow and the involvement of primary stakeholders. 
Grassroots participation as a salient communicative principle and practice must be 
attentive to issues of power – empowerment, agency, legitimizing marginalized and or 
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muted voices (Penderis, 2012). Participation becomes ineffective for the marginalized 
communities if it is all about corporate entities engaging, consulting, and involving the 
local people: there is the danger that corporations and state governments may 
“appropriate” participation by using it as a “manipulative tool” to legitimize their actions 
and promote their neoliberal agenda (Penderis, 2012). Power relations must be 
considered if issues of inequality, social justice, empowerment, and grassroots agency are 
to remain the pillars of effective participation (see Escobar, 2011; Cornwall, 2004; White, 
1996).  
To ensure that participation is not appropriated, a thorough analysis of power 
relations in these communities is necessary. By analyzing power relations, we can 
delineate the “spaces” within which participation occurs and determine the degree or 
level of agency that emanates from such spaces.1 While Cornwall (2004b) explains that 
these spaces within which participation occurs are permeable and never static, it is 
important to note that these spaces are venues for power struggles, created for particular 
motives by different power structures, with specific “terms of engagement” (Penderis, 
2012, p. 11). Unless a participatory approach that builds on grassroots agency is enacted, 
participation remains a “legitimizing device” (Penderis, 2012, p. 3) for corporations and 
state governments; participation becomes, in short, a way to promote social exclusion. In 
the communication process, grassroots participants must have agency, be architects, and 
                                                 
1 Participatory spaces have been categorized as institutionalized and non-institutionalized (see Penderis, 
2012). Institutionalized spaces are portrayed as ‘close’, ‘well-behaved’, ‘patronizing’, ‘summoned’, 
‘invited’ and ‘provided’.  Non-institutionalized spaces or popular spaces are explained to be ‘contested’, 
‘claimed’, ‘captured’, ‘invented’, ‘resisted’ and ‘conquered’ sites of interaction (see Aiya, 2010; Escobar, 
2011; Gaventa, 2004; Cornwall, 2002a, 2002b). 
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act proactively, and not reactively if marginalized voices are to be emancipated and 
legitimized. 
Recall the tensions that ensued over community representatives working in the 
GMOU framework in the Shell case in Niger Delta. Villagers contested the legitimacy of 
people sent to ‘negotiate’ with local communities and insisted their own chosen 
representatives talk with the oil company. In the Herakles Farms case, villagers 
vehemently contested the role of local leaders and chiefs whom they rejected as speaking 
for them. These people wanted to speak for themselves through their traditional 
communal structures and practices, insisting that if any negotiations were to occur, the 
multinationals should come to their land and talk with them in ways that respected these 
existing processes.  
6.3.3. Sankofa or Renaissance  
Sankofa is a call for the rejuvenation of what is African yet with a willingness to 
incorporate what will work within communities. Sankofa emphasizes the need for 
“finding answers from within” (Ansu-Kyeremeh, 1997, p. 79). In this sense, sankofa 
could be seen as being complementary to hybrid experiences. The concept originates 
from the Akan language in Ghana and was coined into communication studies by Ansu-
Kyeremeh (1997). In the Akan tradition, sankofa means “go back and get it”: San - to 
return; ko - to go; fa - to fetch, to seek and take (“Sankofa,” 2016). The concept was 
introduced into African communication studies as an invitation to scholars to return to 
their African roots and re-ignite traditional African values and knowledge systems in 
theorizing communication. Sankofa “seeks to achieve the recognition of the capacities 
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and attributes of indigenous communication systems as the basis for exploring other 
forms of communication” (p. 80). Contemporary use of the concept is an invitation for 
Africans to go back and reclaim their past so they can move forward and also understand 
why and how they came to be who they are today.  
Other interpretations of the concept hold that no matter how far away one travels 
they must always return home. The basic underpinning of sankofa is that one’s past is an 
important aspect of one’s future; that is, in order to make the best of one’s future, one 
must visit one’s past. This concept is depicted in the Akan tradition in the symbol of a 
bird whose head is faced in the opposite direction of its body emphasizing the fact that 
even though the bird is advancing, it periodically makes it a point to examine or return to 
its past for a better future (Armwood, 2012). While this principle was found to be salient 
in a multinational crisis response in these contexts, the principle also risks repeating the 
silencing of marginalized communities. Scholars should therefore be cautious in how the 
principle is articulated such that it does not become another occasion for speaking for and 
about the marginalized. 
That said, there is very strong evidence that villagers in the Nigerian and 
Cameroonian case lay claims on land and oil ownership based on their ancestral past. The 
past in the two cases was constitutive of the present. The legal instruments regulating 
ownership of these resources were not sufficient to deter ancestral claims. Thus, the 
Discourse of Renewal tenet that a prospective rather than a retrospective vision should 
characterize corporate crisis rhetoric must consider what is meant by prospective and 
retrospective if understood through sankofa. 
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6.3.4. Hybridity 
While proposing communalism as paradigmatic to communication in Africa, 
scholars acknowledge the need to hybridize communicative practices in African cultures. 
Nsamenang (2013) explains the social and cultural situation in Cameroon arguing that the 
social reality in the country (just like in other parts of contemporary Africa) “is 
characterized by an uneasy co-existence of endogenous and exogenous value systems and 
hybrid generation of Cameroonians” (p. 42). The social status quo in Cameroon and 
Africa in general is seen as being characterized by the “triple existence” (p. 41) of 
African heritage cultures, Eastern traditions, and Western legacies. Hybridization 
becomes inescapable for survival within the social and cultural spaces in the continent. 
The “hybrid generation of Cameroonians” referred to by Nsamenang, is understood in the 
Cameroonian context to define three groups of people: those who lived through 
colonialism, those born in the postcolonial era, and those with extensive Western 
interaction by virtue of their education, career and living experiences abroad. Thus, 
hybridization is socially and culturally multi-layered and multidimensional, not a simple 
additive process combining different elements. 
It is important to notice that African communication scholars are unanimous that 
hybridization is an important component for any communication paradigm that aims at 
effectively addressing complexities and exigencies in African communities. In his call for 
a return to African communal values to enhance Africa’s stagnating development, 
Oyeshile (2004) suggested the need to “adopt new values and ideas such as will promote 
future development” in Africa (p. 291). Oyeshile contends that “it is no longer possible to 
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maintain cultural isolation” noting that “any attempts to postulate a ‘unique African 
personality’ involving African ways of knowing, thinking and acting … would be 
spurious” (p. 300). For Mogekwu (2013), African indigenous knowledge “adopts from, 
and adapts to, the world around it” (p. 62). However, while hybridization is another 
salient communicative principle and practice for the cases analyzed in this dissertation, 
such calls for hybridity must also be situated within the tensions that characterize 
differential power relations and ongoing politics of representations. I will have more to 
say about power and representation in my discussion of hybridization as an element in the 
amendment proposed in Chapter 7. 
6.3.5. A Shift from Centrifugal to Centripetal Structures    
For communication to be meaningful in African communities, scholars have also 
suggested a shift from centrifugalism to centripetalism (Wilson, 2008; Tarawelie, 2008; 
Ansu-Kyeremeh, 1997).  It is argued that centrifugal and centripetal structures organize 
power struggles, with the former seeking to appropriate the source of power, and the 
latter seeking to decentralize the source of power in communication.  In centrifugal 
communication “power radiates from the center with ripple effect, in centripetal power at 
the center depends on the collective co-operation of peripheral units” (Ansu-Kyeremeh, 
1997, p. 92). These scholars champion centripetal communication flow, if the grassroots 
are to be part of the power structure for a participatory path towards development in 
African nations. The focus is a transformation of centrifugal structures of 
communication.    
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Ansu-Kyeremeh sees centrifugal communication as the direct outcome of 
colonialism in African colonies. He explains that when newly independent nations 
emerged, the elites who had been trained within the colonial administration inherited and 
fortified centrifugal communicative practices through the central government structures. 
For Ansu-Kyeremeh, the centrifugal structure of communication is not only 
“authoritative” but is also a “unidirectional approach to knowledge transmission” (p. 92) 
(emphasis in original) which marginalizes community participation and deprives the local 
people from having a voice in the communication process.   In the Shell crisis, the 
GMOUs exemplify this kind of centrifugal flow that on one hand seems to empower local 
communities and on the other hand nullifies that empowerment through a paternalistic 
execution of the agreements.  
6.4. Lessons Learned for Multinational Crisis Communication 
Following are two critical lessons learned for multinational crisis communication 
in relation to the discussion and case application of salient Afri-centric communicative 
principles and practices to the Discourse of Renewal.  
(1) Multinationals need to reconsider the notion and application of ethical 
responsibility. The two case analyses indicate that ethics as conceived in the 
Discourse of Renewal model does not have to be a universal application of the 
principles of “doing good” for the greater majority of people (utilitarian 
principle) and being “open” and “honest” during crises (transparency 
principle). Clearly utilitarianism and transparency are often commendable 
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stances but their limitations as universal principles must be acknowledged 
rather than ignored through claims of moral leadership. The dangers of 
paternalistic ethos and imperialism under the guise of moral rectitude require 
vigilance. Ethics must be responsive to the specific geopolitical, moral-
religious, and sociohistorical relations wherein the multinational is operating.  
(2) There is also the lesson of significant choice articulated in the Discourse of 
Renewal principally as rationality. This conception of “significant choice” 
impels the need for organizational leadership to communicate about “what is 
best for the stakeholders” (p. 217), a requirement to disseminate complete 
information that allows stakeholders to make rational choices in their 
decision-making processes. However, the idea that all stakeholders will 
employ rational criteria in decision-making, that epistemological transparency 
and completeness can be realized, or that actualizing such ideals is simply a 
matter of corporate transmission is in itself flawed. In the context of 
multinational crises in West Africa, the assumptions about western logic 
and/or rationality do not acknowledge such alternative sensemaking logics as 
the ancestral claims over land and oil ownership in Nigeria and Cameroon.  
(3) Crisis communication by the multinationals addressed contextual issues as 
problems that locals could resolve (as in the GMOUs), 
administrative/regulative issues to be managed (as in Herakles’ assumption 
about government permits) or obstacles to be removed (as in 
Shell/government crackdowns). Yet, my analyses pointed to the complexities 
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of indigenous organizing practices, existing interest conflicts such as those 
among local people, traditional rulers, and wealthy elites, and relations among 
multiple, often fluid interests including governing authorities, NGOs, tribal 
groups, even language traditions. 
The lessons learned point to the need for a model of renewal that engages with 
indigenous practices and principles in addressing a crisis affecting subaltern groups. Yet 
principles of Africentric communication philosophy are abstract. They are ideals rather 
than working practices. In the following section, I offer reminders of the situational 
complications that characterize multinational operations in the Sub-Saharan countries. In 
particular, these complications trouble the ethical mandate at the core of the Discourse of 
Renewal. Specifically, I consider the prevalence of bribery and corruption as taken-for-
granted practices of governance and social life. In engaging such realities, are the moral 
commitments of a Discourse of Renewal merely forms of imperialism that require 
denigrating and disciplining Others? Or does complicity with such practices as the “cost 
of doing business” render such commitments moot? Or do ethical commitments become 
strategies of manipulation in themselves?  
6.1 6.5. MNCs and Capitalistic Corruption 
Issues of bribery complicate relations between MNCs, host governments, and 
local communities because even though bribery is arguably a ritual in governmental 
structures in both Cameroon and Nigeria, bribery is a nuanced term (in practice) when 
situated within global relations. According to Lambsdorff (2010), bribery is contextual 
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and therefore no universal notion of bribery can capture the concept in a holistic manner. 
In a study on the perception of bribery tapping 70,000 households in 66 countries 
(including Nigeria), Lambsdorff noted that a victim’s perception of bribery differs from 
the person who benefits from the act. Lambsdorff’s argument that perceptions of bribery 
might be embedded in specific social relations is an important consideration in 
understanding what constitutes bribery as an unethical practice. Lambsdorff’s research 
suggested that “bribes are not globally condemned to an equal extent” (p. 18). He argued 
for moral relativism, urging attention to specific contexts in order to clearly ascertain 
notions that explain bribery as an unethical phenomenon. 
But critics of moral relativism argue that such an approach to ethics/morality 
“perpetuated the rule of geographical morality by allowing multinational corporations to 
hide behind ‘culture’ as the reason for their participation in corrupt business transactions 
in Africa, Asia and Latin America” (Ala’i, 2000).  For these critics, “geographical 
morality” – a concept introduced by Edmund Burke (See Ala’i, 2000) suggesting the non-
universal nature of moral principles – needs to be eliminated by “requiring uniform 
standards of conduct by private and public officials, irrespective of geography” (Ala’i, p. 
877). These struggles between the universal/particular binary in conceptions of ethics 
have not succeeded in dissipating support for geographical morality as the notion 
continues to inform contemporary anti-corruption movements. 
Inconsistencies between laws and morality-in-practice in Cameroon is another 
relevant complication. The Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) whose members are principally developed countries explains a “facilitating 
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payment” as not constituting bribery, but rather as “a payment done to speed up an 
administrative process where the outcome is already pre-determined” (Walters, 2006). 
According to United States federal legislation, a “facilitating payment” or “grease 
payment” as defined by the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act amended in 1988, is a payment 
to a foreign official, political party or party official for ‘routine governmental action’ 
such as processing papers, issuing permits, and other actions of an official, in order to 
expedite performance of duties of non-discretionary nature, i.e., which they are already 
bound to perform. (Deming, 2005, p. 15). Such payment is explained as “not intended to 
influence the outcome of the official’s action, only its timing” (Deming, 2005, p. 15). 
Consequently, facilitation payments are exempted from US federal anti-bribery law 
(Deming, 2005). 
But these definitions of “facilitating payments” or “grease payments” as explained 
by the OECD and US law appear to be incongruous with specific national-cultural 
contexts. For example, in Cameroon, public officials’ approach to routine tasks is often 
discretionary; and when these tasks are being performed, it is with some form of inertia. 
Further, public officials more often than not do not feel they owe an obligation to the 
public when discharging their duties; their allegiance is to the government authority who 
appointed them to that position. Given such circumstances, defining “facilitating 
payment” or “grease payment” as bribery becomes more complex. Yet this Cameroonian 
situation creates difficulties for an American multinational especially in the process of 
obtaining permits or other licenses to operate in the country, and also when responding to 
charges of bribery from local stakeholders. What constitutes bribery in the American and 
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European contexts appears to conflict with how bribery manifests within social, 
economic, and political relations in Cameroon. Indeed, local appellations are used in 
specific Cameroonian contexts by various actors to “water down” the “pejorative 
meaning attached to bribery” (Fomumdam, 2011, p. 1). These include: “choko”, “Kola 
nut”, “myjar”, “petrol”, “chokuchoku” (Fomumdam, 2011, p. 1); and I will add “mimbo.” 
Bribery is “informally” accepted in the Cameroonian context. 
Even though bribery is an offence punishable by law in Cameroon, Justice Mbah 
Rose Acha Fomumdam who is currently in charge of the Supreme State Control (a 
government body whose responsibility is principally to purge the Cameroonian 
government of corruption) asserts that bribery is almost an accepted norm in the 
economic, social, and political relations in the country.  In a 2016 “most corrupt 
countries” ranking by the NGO business monitor Transparency International, Cameroon 
and Nigeria ranked among the countries perceived to be most highly corrupt. Cameroon’s 
corruption perception index is 27 and Nigeria’s is 26 so both countries fall within the 
category of “highly corrupt” zones in the world (Transparency International 2016; also 
see U.S. Department of State, 2010; Fominyen, 2010). A Reuter’s report has described 
the corruption phenomenon in Cameroon as a “worst-kept secret” (Fominyen, 2010) 
because although citizens are aware of the phenomenon, and acknowledge it in daily 
conversation, no one has the courage to take corrupt practitioners to court. The judiciary, 
penitentiary, the police, business, and all sectors of governmental structures in Cameroon 
are implicated in this phenomenon. The country’s government officials do not see it as 
strange to accept or push for bribery while performing state functions and public services. 
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Not surprisingly, a recent drive to purge the country of corruption has led to the arrest 
and imprisonment of dozens of persons, many of whom are former government ministers, 
on charges of embezzlement/misappropriation of public funds. 
Nigeria has been described as a powerhouse of corruption. In a recent BBC news 
report, previous British Prime Minister David Cameron described Nigeria as being 
“fantastically corrupt” (BBC News; The New York Times). Transparency International 
noted in its 2016 corruption report that Nigeria has consistently maintained its ranking as 
one of the most corrupt nations. The report notes that while the fight against corruption is 
one of current President Muhammadu Buhari’s priorities, corruption was “rampant” 
under the previous administration headed by Goodluck Jonathan. For example, the 
former petroleum minister of Nigeria is currently seeking refuge in the UK from 
corruption charges during her term under the former government. The Transparency 
International 2016 report also notes that “more than US$157 billion has left the country 
illicitly” (p. 1); and “corruption hits hardest at the poor in Nigeria who make up more 
than 40 per cent of the 179 million people” (p. 1). Corruption, the report states, is 
“everywhere” in Nigeria with all sectors of the government indebted to the phenomenon. 
Otusanya, Lauwo, and Adeyeye (2012) in their study of multinational companies’ anti-
corruption policies in Nigeria found that MNCs are heavily involved in bribery and 
money laundering contrary to their mandates for so-called “responsible social conduct” 
(p. 1). Otusanya,  et al., argued that “MNCs have used the political elite in developing 
countries to seek to advance their global earnings and competitive advantages by offering 
bribes and other inducements to secure government contracts in Nigeria” (p. 1). 
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The point here is that ethical ideals and universal moral principles are not only 
differently articulated across cultures but that these ideals and principles are unhelpful as 
operating practices in a crisis communication model. There is need to understand how 
context affects conceptions and practices of corruption:  
(1) Notions of corruption (as in bribery) in some Western contexts appear to be 
incongruous with notions of bribery in some non-Western contexts.  
(2) How corruption manifests itself in relations within some non-Western contexts 
reframes the ethical, legal, political, and economic implications of such acts and cannot 
be judged by Western laws or standards.  
(3) At the same time, the level of corruption in countries like Cameroon and Nigeria 
renders social and legal protections for those most affected by MNC exploitation 
ineffectual without recourse to international courts operating under transnational legal 
systems. 
(4) The impact or offensiveness of the act of bribery attenuates within specific social, 
economic, and political contexts in Cameroon and Nigeria.  
I have described the complications of bribery and corruption at length to 
demonstrate the need for more responsive strategies of renewal that might engage more 
effectually in local situations that do not accord with the assumptions underlying the 
dimensions of the model. A Discourse of Renewal must include not a prescribed ethical 
stance but reflexivity and vigilance in response to such contextual complexities.  
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Summary  
An emerging African communication philosophy offers communicative principles 
and practices salient to multinational crisis renewal response while at the same time 
espousing ideals that evoke tensions of their own. The lessons learned are takeaways that 
inform the amendment I offer. The discussion of capitalistic corruption through the lenses 
of moral relativity and geographical morality pointed to complex contexts that unsettle 
the moral rectitude underlying the Discourse of Renewal model. The amendment I offer 
in the next chapter must be seen as adding to the current Discourse of Renewal so that a 
responsive approach to crisis communication between multinationals and local 
communities may be established.  
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7 Discourse of Renewal: Amendments 
 
7.1. Introduction 
The lessons learned in the cases analyzed in Chapters 4 and 5 and the discussion 
of African communication principles and practices in Chapter 6 are important resources 
for amending the Discourse of Renewal and this is the principal focus of the current 
chapter. First, I begin with a review of what went wrong in the multinationals’ crisis 
communication approaches taken by Royal Dutch Shell in Nigeria and Herakles Farms in 
Cameroon.   
7.2. Communication Issues 
 Issues emerged based on assumptions about communicative relations and the 
operationalization of communicative processes in the cases analyzed. These issues point 
to important power inequities and limitations that inform the proposed amendment.  
7.2.1. Organization as Rhetor 
A major issue that created conflicts in the entire communication process between 
the companies and local communities was that communication emerged predominantly 
from the corporate standpoint. The Discourse of Renewal enacted by Shell and Herakles 
Farms positioned the corporation as the rhetor and defined “renewal” from the corporate 
perspective. Even though Shell championed transparency, accountability, and open 
communication with local communities as the backbone of its new community relations, 
evidence from documents analyzed show the multinational was only transparent in what 
168 
the company wanted the public to know and how the company chose to represent 
information. For example, information about the volume and impact of oil spills was 
restricted to what the company decided to share. Amnesty International insisted that Shell 
manipulated data from an investigation by underestimating the actual volume of oil spills, 
the duration, and the impact. As such, transparency and accountability, important ethical 
elements in the Discourse of Renewal, were determined from the corporate standpoint. 
Further, it was actually the corporation that conceived, designed, and determined how to 
communicate and eventually implement the Global Memorandum of Understanding. 
Community relations were largely managed from the corporate standpoint. Even though 
the company explained that the GMOU arrangement allows local communities to 
“decide” and “drive” their development, evidence emerged that indicated Shell was at the 
center of the entire process. The organizational rhetors (company leaders and 
spokespersons) ensured that the corporate interests and goals of the company were 
protected. It is possible to see that in this crisis, “renewal” for Shell was to create an 
enabling environment to do business at any cost.  
Similarly, a major problem with the communication approach adopted by 
Herakles Farms was that the company itself emerged as the primary communicator after 
the death of the CEO Bruce Wrobel. This entitization of the company meant that all 
communication was to be conceived, designed, and disseminated by leaders, 
spokespersons and other decision makers in the organization; this, even as Herakles 
Farms’ Discourse of Renewal claimed the company was engaging in an open relationship 
with stakeholders. Thus, suspicions about the company’s lack of transparency could not 
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be resolved. By remaining at the center of communication, a corporate-centric discourse 
emerged that disregarded communities’ norms, practices and modes of organizing.  
Additionally, the corporate-centered approach to communication is heavily top-
down. This largely affected how stakeholders and the companies’ publics perceived, 
related to, and sought to engage with the organizations. Social justice, stakeholder 
protection, accountability, and open dialogue were clearly subordinated to corporate 
interests even in the case of Herakles’ part in All for Africa’s grand visions for “saving 
Africa.” Further, speaking for the Other was apparent in both cases as corporate 
representatives articulated community needs and interests for jobs, housing, and 
education (Herakles) and community development and infrastructure projects (Shell); or 
denigrated locals as destructive and lawless. This pattern exhibits an implicit sense of 
superiority/inferiority that warrants ignoring indigenous modes of deliberation and 
communality. It reproduces the colonialist legacy in the assumption that the corporate 
rhetor is the only one with something worth saying (or a way of saying it that is 
worthwhile). The colonialist representation of self vs. the “Other” is characteristic of the 
rhetor in these complex relations between MNCs and local populations. As postcolonial 
theory tells us, the Other can only be recognized in these relations (of the colonizer and 
the colonized) through oppositions of superior/inferior as well as a “diminished” version 
of the dominant self (cite here—Fanon? Bhaba?). This requires mimicry – in which the 
Other mimics the representations of the corporation such as going along with the GMoU 
(in the case in Nigeria) or repeating the promises of Herakles Farms (in the case in 
Cameroon)(cite here—again, Bhaba?).  
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7.2.2. Communication as Transmission 
 Another significant communication issue compromising the Discourse of 
Renewal is the transmission approach to communication. Here I want to make a 
distinction between the idea of a transmission model based in the classic Shannon and 
Weaver frame and transmission as a manipulation within a social construction model of 
communication. The Discourse of Renewal model itself is premised on a constructionist 
conception of communication in which the corporate rhetor becomes ethically 
responsible for disseminating (and enacting) a prospective vision capable of altering the 
view of reality for stakeholders. However, as evidenced in the case of Shell in Nigeria, 
communication became a transmission tool prioritizing dissemination of corporate 
messages while rendering the company’s public as passive receivers. In the crises in 
Nigeria and Cameroon, local communities complained they were not consulted nor 
engaged in negotiations. Even though both multinationals revised their communication 
strategies to incorporate what can be recognized as aspects of the Discourse of Renewal, 
both retained the prerogative of the corporate rhetor to define realities about the 
enterprise from a corporate perspective as they sought to rebrand and market the new 
Shell and the revived Herakles as renewed corporations.  
7.2.3. Participatory Communication from Above   
It would be misleading to think that Shell never attempted to engage local 
stakeholders in its communication process. But the issue is the manner in which the 
company enacted participation. Communication continues to flow from top to bottom 
with company officials firmly determining the process. When some half-nude women 
171 
protested against Shell, accusing the company of not implementing the GMoU, in 
response, a company spokesperson is quoted in a telephone interview saying the 
company has a channel through which the women should transmit their grievances (Eze, 
2014). The implication was that unless the protesting women used the company’s 
existing channels for their grievances, the company would do little or nothing to engage 
them in dialogue. But perhaps most revealing was that the half-nude (sexuality) protest 
not only called out the linear, hierarchical structure of Shell’s community relations but 
the paternalistic nature of these relations as well. Shell, it should be recalled, described its 
new approach to confronting the lingering crisis in the Niger Delta as participatory, with 
communities deciding and driving their own development while the company serves as 
funding and capacity building partner. However, local communities protested they are 
unilaterally clustered into the GMOU framework without consultations.2 
Communication by Herakles Farms in Phase II of that crisis emphasized that the 
company was effectively engaging local communities in the palm oil project. As noted 
earlier, a company executive clearly stated that Herakles Farms “plans to revamp 
community participation by encouraging small holders to develop individual farms to 
become an integral part of the palm project” (Mvogo, 2016). The company official also 
stated that the company would “work with cooperative societies” which are an important 
economic and social mode of organizing within these communities. Yet cooperative 
societies in local communities are heavily autonomous community groups whose modes 
                                                 
2 Recall from Chapter 4 that some states were added to the regions’ map for “administrative convenience” 
and “political expediency” (UNDP, 2006; Ibaba, 2005). 
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of organizing entail dialogue, deliberations, contestations, and eventual agreement by 
consensus. A top-down communication flow from the corporation to these societies 
disregards this process. Participation within local cooperative societies does not simply 
require a show of hands to arrive at decisions. These cooperatives function as community 
meeting groups and members are bound by community values.  
7.2.4. Renewal 
 The last major issue in the communication process adopted by Shell and Herakles 
Farms revolves around the notion or concept of “renewal” which is a key concept that 
informs the Discourse of Renewal model. Renewal as described in this model requires 
organizational leaders and spokespersons to look beyond the crisis and focus on the 
future by exploiting the opportunities for growth and changes in an organization 
following a crisis. This requires a prospective and optimistic focus and not a retrospective 
and strategic focus. Yet even though the Discourse of Renewal encourages organizational 
leaders to be proactive rather than defensive and reactive, the notion of renewal largely 
remains corporate-centric.  
 Unsurprisingly, then, local communities still accuse Shell of applying “divide and 
rule tactics” in managing the crisis, pitting communities and segments of the population 
against each other by working with “friendlier” communities and isolating communities 
perceived to be “hostile” to the company (Amaize, 2012). Local communities accused 
Shell of creating “antagonism between members of the [Cluster Development Board] and 
the community development committees” (Amaize, 2012, para 6) by wanting to work 
instead with members of the development committees in the management of the oil spill 
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rather than work with the CDB as enshrined in the GMoU. The same accusations were 
made by 300 communities who “accused the oil multinational of using divide and rule 
tactics against the people” according to Vanguard’s July 11, 2016 edition (Amaize, 2016, 
para 1). The accusation was that the company was “sidetracking” the agency chosen by 
communities to negotiate. Similar accusations of “divide and rule” tactics have been 
raised by other communities (see Uwugiaren, 2016; Dugbe, 2014; Onah, 2011; Eze, 
2014). My point is that “renewal” was enacted by Shell as a ploy to manage community 
resistance. Build within a paternalistic framework, Shell’s discourse of renewal sustained 
‘benevolent’ relationships that failed to address the logics-in-use in these contexts. 
7.3. Summary Comparison 
The crises analyzed in this study occurred in two different countries and in 
different economic or industrial sectors. In the Niger Delta region of Nigeria, the crisis 
was in the extractive industry (crude oil) while in the case in Southwest region of 
Cameroon, the crisis occurred in the Agro-industry (agricultural sector). The cases differ 
in terms of duration, violence, MNC size, value of the products, intra- and inter-tribal 
relations, environmental contamination and destruction, the role of the state, and industry 
and investor tolerance. However, it is clear that both multinationals struggled against 
local opposition apart from the intricacies of state corruption and complicity as well as 
international investment, regulation, and market discipline. In both cases, major points of 
conflict revolved around ancestral ownership of resources. In the Niger Delta region of 
Nigeria, local communities laid claims over crude oil and land; in the Southwest region 
of Cameroon, communities made similar claims over land and forest resources. Other 
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major issues raised by local communities in the crises in both cases were on issues of 
negotiation, participation, disrespect of traditional institutions, marginalization, and 
exploitation. The multinationals responded to these claims by attempting corrective 
measures; however, these measures failed to situate the multinationals’ efforts within 
community practices, modes of organizing and sociocultural, economic and even political 
relations that define the lives of the region’s inhabitants.  
Crisis communication by the multinationals addressed contextual issues as 
problems that locals could resolve (as in the GMOUs), administrative/regulative issues to 
be managed (as in Herakles’ assumption about government permits) or obstacles to be 
removed (as in Shell/government crackdowns). Instead, the analyses pointed to the 
complexities of indigenous organizing practices, existing interest conflicts such as those 
among local people, traditional rulers, and wealthy elites, and relations among multiple, 
often fluid interests including governing authorities, NGOs, tribal groups, even language 
traditions. 
Evidence from the analyses also pointed to important communication issues in the 
crisis responses of Shell (Nigeria) and Herakles Farms (Cameroon). In both cases, 
evidence pointed to limitations in the conceptualization of communication inherent to the 
Discourse of Renewal model of crisis communication. The first is the overarching role of 
the organization as the rhetor in the communication process. Communication emerged 
from the corporate standpoint with little attention to local exigencies. The second major 
problem is the distortion of the social constructionist premises of the model by practices 
of transmission. Communication in these cases became a tool to transport and 
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disseminate information while anticipating an intended impact on an audience arguably 
perceived to be passive, docile, inferior, and gullible. The third major issue that emerged 
is the self-serving corporate definition of participation as complicity. Participatory 
communication was orchestrated from above, that is, under the guidance of the 
corporations. The fourth significant issue is the conceptualization of “renewal” itself. The 
Discourse of Renewal model conceptualizes renewal as serving the interests of the 
corporation even while the impulse may be benevolent. Thus in the case of mulinationals 
operating in postcolonial arenas, renewal reproduces colonialist legacies that disregard, 
denigrate, and suppress indigenous alternatives in favor of corporatization and 
neoliberalism as organizing principles.  
Taking into consideration these significant issues, I argue on the basis of the two 
cases that an adequate model of corporate crisis communication must acknowledge the 
colonial and neocolonial experiences and residual tensions drawn on the histories of these 
communities and relevant contexts critical to multinational relations with local 
communities. 
7.4. Amending the Discourse of Renewal 
The amendment I offer to the Discourse of Renewal advances a concept I call 
responsive hybridity. This notion of hybridity is informed by African communication 
philosophy. Adding this tenet (responsive hybridity) to the Discourse of Renewal is 
intended to make the model more culturally responsive and expands on the ethical 
component already included in the Discourse of Renewal. Ulmer, Sellnow, and Seeger 
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(2011) argue that crisis situations inherently involve ethical issues and dilemmas given 
that blame, responsibility, fairness, justice, and rights are inherent to such exigencies. Yet 
they recognize that moral frameworks differ from one group, one corporation, or one 
culture to another and that there are differing values and definitions framing ethical 
conduct. Sellnow and Seeger (2016) argue that “Organizations are part of a larger social 
context and thus should adhere to the larger norms and values that govern that context” 
(p. 222). At the same time, they advance what appear to be transcultural ethical criteria: 
--responsibility/blame, significant choice based in transparency, and the open and free 
flow of information (“open, truthful, honest and immediate,” p. 227);  
--care for the well-being of others (to “’hear, understand, and be responsive to the 
subjective voices, experiences, and contexts of community members rather than operate 
on assumed knowledge of members’ (Simola, 2003, p. 358)”);  
--virtuous conduct by leaders; and 
-- adherence to standards of justice, equity, and fairness (with particular regard for the 
benefit of the least advantaged members of society).  
The Discourse of Renewal builds on ethical relationships with stakeholders that 
Ulmer, Sellnow and Seeger (2011) describe in equally transcultural terms: 
“Organizations that institute strong, positive value positions with key organizational 
stakeholders, such as openness, honesty, responsibility, accountability, and 
trustworthiness, before a crisis happens are best able to create renewal following the 
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crisis” (p. 215). The model assumes that corporations have crystallized such core values 
to guide their decision-making and communication in crisis situations.  
Even though they recognize that cultures differ, the Ulmer, et al. Discourse of 
Renewal model promotes a normative conception of ethics and implies that there are 
transcultural ethical standards that obligate MNCs. However, there are both differing 
values and differing definitions of seemingly shared values across cultures, places, 
histories, and situations. Thus, while corporations and their leaders may design ethical 
statements and codes of conduct applicable to the corporation’s operations and 
expectations, there is need for a less prescriptive ethical approach in the design and 
delivery of communication with local stakeholders. Hence, my amendment is for 
“responsive hybridity” – this suggests that renewal will create hybrid forms, 
relationships, practices guided by self-reflexivity and ethical vigilance. To be self-
reflexive is to pay “careful consideration of the ways in which [‘our’] past experiences, 
points of view, and roles impact [‘our’ very own] interactions with, and interpretations of, 
the research scene” (Tracy, 2013, p. 2). That means to be self-reflexive in crisis situations 
is to be continually sensitive to the ways that personal, organizational, community, or in 
more general terms, cultural contexts affect perspectives, possibilities, and actions. The 
ethical vigilance which my amendment summons is conveyed through the African 
communicative concept of sankofa which I argue, calls for ongoing monitoring of our 
being and that affects how we relate within the crisis context.  
This means that renewal as a creative process of cultural hybridity entails ongoing  
monitoring of both corporate and community standards and values in order to address the 
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inevitable gaps and differences between cultures (geonational, cultural, 
corporate/community, etc.). For example, definitional differences and conflicts can derail 
efforts to renew commitments with stakeholders or to recover a positive image. For 
example, the GMoU in the case of Shell in Nigeria allowed company executives to 
prescribe to communities what the company perceived as good leadership: “we will 
continue to engineer development and partner with communities that are well led by 
notable individuals,” a spokesperson for Shell told members of the Romourianwo 
community during the inauguration of the community town hall (Chinwo, 2013, para. 7). 
The spokesperson also prescribed the ability for community leaders to “think outside the 
box” (Chinwo, 2013, para. 3). But these prescriptions and the underlying characterization 
of what constitutes leadership clashed with communities, and these communities often 
protested this approach to leadership noting that these so-called community leaders did 
not represent the aspirations and interests of their communities but the self-interests of 
these leaders as well as the multinationals.  
In another example, the quandary of bribery and corruption as taken-for-granted 
modes of doing business in both Cameroon and Nigeria is of interest to my argument in 
support of responsive hybridity. American and European definitions of “facilitating 
payments” or “grease payments” as propounded by the Organization of Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) and United States law appear to be incongruous 
across specific cultural contexts. In Cameroon, public officials’ approach to routine tasks 
is often discretionary; and when these tasks are being performed, it is with some form of 
inertia. In this context, defining “facilitating payment” or “grease payment” as bribery 
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becomes more complex. What constitutes bribery in the American and European contexts 
appears to conflict with how bribery manifests within social, economic, and political 
relations in Cameroon. 
In both of these examples, a Discourse of Renewal that is amended to include 
ethical self-reflexivity and vigilance would engage more effectively with local cultures 
and practices. So, hybridity might mean that MNCs and local communities seek out 
alternative definitions of what is in crisis; they include local knowledge about the crisis, 
its causes, and responses; they work through local decision-making structures; they 
remain open to hybrid projects that reconstruct relationships, infrastructures, and build 
new opportunities. All of this would be subject to vigilance about ethical issues and 
dilemmas and responsive to differences in values and moral codes.  
My conceptual approach to responsive hybridity draws from a postcolonial 
theorization critical of the concept of hybridity (Kraidy, 2005, 2002). The underlying 
theoretical explication of hybridity from Kraidy’s argument is that hybridity is never 
neutral; it carries with it ideologies of particular contexts. Hybridity is a “risky notion” 
when taken as a simple “association of ideas, concepts, and themes” (Kraidy, 2005, p. vi). 
The “emptiness” of the concept is even more vivid when given a universal frame that 
ignores or fails to acknowledge the complexities of situational tensions. This explains 
why Kraidy argued for the need “to situate every analysis of hybridity in a specific 
context where the conditions that shape hybridity are addressed” (p. vi). Kraidy’s 
framework of critical transculturalism primarily deconstructs uncritical discourses and 
conceptions of hybridity which he argues generally promote “ideologies of integration 
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and control – not pluralism and empowerment” (p. vii). Thus, for failing to show how 
issues of power and control play out in processes of hybridity, the concept becomes 
“strategic rhetoric” that “facilitates a broader negation of power” (pp. vii-viii) and 
“frames hybridity as natural, commonplace, and desirable in intercultural relations, and 
therefore noncontentious” (Kraidy, 2005, pp. vii-viii). Further describing an uncritical 
approach to hybridity as “hegemonic,” Kraidy (2002) argued that seeing hybridity as a 
simple “mixture” in global cultural relations fails to explain the concept as a 
“communicative practice constitutive of, and constituted by, sociopolitical and economic 
arrangements” (p. 319); and this blurs the tensions within the contexts in which the 
concept is applied. Kraidy (2005) maintains that while issues of inequality are not 
adequately addressed by this simplistic conception of hybridity, “when hybridity is 
posited as a naturally occurring and globally desirable condition in public discourse, it 
reproduces the prevailing global order” (p. 152) and in this light becomes the “cultural 
logic of globalization” (p. 148). This has provided the impetus for corporations including 
foreign media to use the concept of hybridity as “transcultural wedges” (p. 148) for their 
activities in local communities.  
Frello (2005) also evoked the need to consider contexts and power in hybridity 
processes in her discussion of what she termed “transgression concepts” (i.e., hybridity, 
creolization, transculturalization, syncretism) noting that forms of cultural mixture occur 
in environments “that are always marked by unequal relations of power (p. 5). Frello has 
argued that hybridity must be seen from a critical dimension “since the celebration of 
hybridity sometimes works in favor of hiding unequal power relations” (p. 4). There is 
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always the need to pay attention to the interests which hybridity serves in public 
discourses. Frello also evoked the element of context noting,  
Hybridity can be articulated in many different ways, depending on the context and 
on who defines the situation: It can be seen as a threatening contamination of a much 
valued purity; it can be seen as a creative mixture of disparate cultural elements; it can be 
seen as a subversive insistence on equality through difference – displacing the 
‘givenness’ of the centered perspective; and it can be seen as yet another strategy for 
upholding existing power relations. (p. 5) 
At one point, hybridity could be seen as erasing binaries in a world in which “we 
no longer have the secure capacity to draw the line between us and them” (Ang, 2003, p. 
141), yet hybridity could be seen as reinforcing these binaries as in “pure” and “impure” 
cultures. The argument is that if there is never a pure culture, there would be no need for 
a mixture. In contrast, Jonathan Friedman and Modood (1997; also see Werbner, 1997) 
think all cultures are always already hybrid. 
Silliman (2015) draws from these arguments to insist that hybridity must not just mean 
“simply mixture nor should it refer simply to cultural encounters in ‘zones of difference’” 
and should not just be another “window dressing” (p. 282) for theoretical frameworks. To 
reduce hybridity to a synonym of “mixture,” “fusion,” or “intercultural encounters” (p. 
282) neutralizes the interpretation of these encounters which hybridity must be able to 
“unpack” (p. 283).  As such there is the risk for binaries to emerge, as well as the danger 
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of marginalizing rather than empowering disempowered communities when hybridization 
occurs within the framework of simplistic mixtures or fusion (Silliman, 2015).  
Discussing the multinational corporation as a hybrid space, Frenkel (2008) has 
noted that “the transfer of management knowledge and practice within the MNC is 
increasingly a matter of relations between dominating and dominated societies” (p. 925). 
Thus, hybridization does not often occur on a “level ground of equality” even as some 
scholars see it this way (Smith, 2004, in Frenkel, 2008, p. 927). The conception of 
hybridity in the proposed amendment is sensitive to these issues of power and difference. 
In the following section, I discuss how responsive hybridity might affect the existing 
dimensions of the Discourse of Renewal model. 
7.5. Reframing the Discourse of Renewal 
7.5.1. Ethical Leadership 
Beyond the fact that leadership in the crisis renewal model is heavily 
individualistic and paternalistic as seen in the role of the corporate rhetor, there is also the 
neocolonialist assumption of white men and capital saving Africa. This is clearly 
illustrated in Chapter 5 in discussions of Herakles’ CEO Bruce Wrobel’s narrative about 
his company’s investments in Cameroon and Africa. Because neoliberalism expands 
opportunities for profitable capital accumulation (Harvey, 2006; El-Ojeili & Hayden, 
2006) multinationals tend to avoid forms of inclusivity that appear to constrain this open 
market and profiteering approach to management. As the analysis of Shell’s GMoUs in 
Nigeria suggests, communities dependent on or subject to the operations of 
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multinationals are only marginally included with little or no power to affect the 
parameters of their relationships. This calls for a more radical approach to the notion of 
inclusivity. 
Mumby’s (2013) critical communication perspective of leadership not only points 
to disempowering approaches in communication, but argues that leadership should be 
thought of as a “socially constructed phenomenon” (p. 256), noting that social, economic, 
and political conditions interact to frame our perceptions of what leadership entails. 
Mumby warns against the framing of “leadership” by “a discourse” emerging from 
centers of power, and calls for the need to problematize what we think we understand to 
be “leadership” by exploring the concept of leadership as “complex, ambiguous, and 
uncertain” (p. 257). The critical communicative perspective offers a different view on 
leadership by disrupting the commonplace organization-centric explication of leadership.  
In Mumby’s words, leadership is clearly “coproduced among organizational 
members”; and emphasizes the notion that “leadership is [a]socially constructed process 
in which social actors interdependently create what leadership means in specific 
organizational contexts” (Mumby, 2013, p. 270; see Fairhurst, 2007; Fairhurst & Grant, 
2010). Communication is “central to the ways leadership is socially constructed.” By 
analyzing talk or texts, for example, it is possible to see how leadership is socially 
constructed. The critical communication perspective “decenters” the “great man” as 
leader. Instead, leadership is seen as being distributed throughout the organization and 
occurring through interactions. Another major focus of the critical communication 
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perspective sees leadership as entangled with issues of power and control (see Zoller & 
Fairhurst, 2007; Conrad & Poole, 2012).  
There is evidence that supports this idea from the data analyzed in this study. In 
both the Nigerian and Cameroonian cases, oppositional struggles between local 
communities and the companies exposed the disjuncture created by a community 
perspective of leadership and what the companies constructed leadership to be. For the 
companies, leadership is more about the organization – achieving efficiency and attaining 
organizational goals. This placed the multinationals in disparate power relations with the 
multinationals operating from a paternalistic standpoint; that is, organizational leaders 
determined action as in a father-child-relationship. The GMoU in the case of Nigeria 
allowed company executives to prescribe to communities what the company perceived as 
good leadership: “we will continue to engineer development and partner with 
communities that are well led by notable individuals,” a spokesperson for Shell told 
members of the Romourianwo community during the inauguration of the community 
town hall (Chinwo, 2013, para. 7). The spokesperson also prescribed the ability for 
community leaders to “think outside the box” (Chinwo, 2013, para. 3). But these 
prescriptions and the underlying characterization of what constitutes leadership clashed 
with communities, and these communities often protested this approach to leadership 
noting that these so-called community leaders did not represent the aspirations and 
interests of their communities but the self-interests of these leaders as well as the 
multinationals.  
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African communication philosophy points to the need for inclusivity in 
communication practices. White (2008) for instance noted that participation in 
communicative action should be about “how people in local communities communicate 
among themselves to solve local problems [and] how people at the grassroots level can 
articulate their views, needs and interests up to the district, regional and national level” 
(p. 7).  Mefalopulos (2003) from a similar perspective insisted on a participatory 
approach in which “primary stakeholders” are able to initiate, design, implement and 
evaluate or “at least they would need to be involved in a significant way” (para. 6). Even 
these conceptualizations of participation or inclusivity appear to be too simplistic and 
fragile for marginalized communities in their relations with multinationals. In fact, this is 
the same form of participation which the leaders of Royal Dutch Shell touted in their 
GMoU with Niger Delta communities. Shell claimed communities conceive, design and 
implement their development projects while the company provides funding. But the 
relationship is such that communities rely on the benevolence of the company to secure 
funding for their projects. The “divide and rule” tactic which many communities decried 
in their relations with the company was partly the result of the perception that Shell was 
working with communities that aligned with the terms and values set down by the 
company while neglecting those that did not fully collaborate with the company (Amaize, 
2016; Uwugiaren, 2016; Amaize, 2012). This form of participation constrains community 
empowerment and continually mutes already muted voices – e.g., muted histories.  
In the Niger Delta case, issues of the appropriation of the negotiation process by 
Shell (Amaize, 2011; James, 2015), poor community representation (Uwugiaren, 2016; 
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BBC Monitoring Africa, 2012; Oyadongha, 2016), and even the clustering of 
communities into Community Development Boards are examples of how a corporate 
paternalistic approach to participation impacts marginalized communities (see Amaize, 
2011; James, 2015). Royal Dutch Shell exerted a lot of power in its community relations. 
Some communities accused the multinational of unilaterally deciding to “dissolve the 
board [a CDB] against the provisions of the Global Memorandum of Understanding 
entered into by both parties” (Amaize, 2013). Other aspects in the Nigerian case that 
point to the need for a more critical conceptualization of participation include the 
accusations against the multinational concerning issues of selectively implementing or 
defaulting on the implementation of signed agreements with communities (BBC 
Monitoring Africa, 2012; James, 2015), and accusations of abandoned projects 
(Onoyume, 2013). Such inequitable power relations should be considered if issues of 
inequality, social justice, empowerment, and grassroots agency are to remain the pillars 
of effective participation (see Escobar, 2011; Cornwall, 2004; White, 1996). Reframed by 
responsive hybridity, the element of inclusivity ascribes to possibilities of responsive 
empowerment – communal empowering, communal agency, legitimizing marginalized 
and or muted voices – which as Penderis (2012) has argued cannot be neglected if the 
grassroots must become architects in the participatory process. This conceptualization of 
inclusivity challenges a simplistic approach to participation in which multinationals use 
participation as a “legitimizing device” (Penderis, 2012, p. 3). Participation for these 
companies thus becomes a means to portray the company as being socially responsible in 
order to fully establish its operations in these communities. 
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7.5.2. Prospective versus Retrospective Vision 
The Discourse of Renewal theorizes the importance of a prospective vision and 
cautions against a retrospective vision. That is, organizational leaders should focus on the 
future and avoid issues of blame which often is the result of looking into the past 
following with the intention to deny or scapegoat. Reframed through responsive 
hybridity, this component of the model entails a more collective vision and the need for 
respecting the role of the past – that is the past as constitutive of the present. The past 
constitutive of the present is also informed by the concept of ‘sankofa’ – a way of being 
that is responsive to your roots. Evidence from the crises in Nigeria and Cameroon 
suggests that in the existing Discourse of Renewal, “prospective vision” is largely flawed 
given the model’s inability to theorize the present. The communities’ claims over 
ownership of land and crude oil in the two cases analyzed clearly summoned the present. 
Further, these claims were based on communities’ attachment to their ancestral past. In 
the Niger Delta, communities claimed the oil belongs to them because it was produced on 
land they claimed was owned by their ancestors and passed down to the current 
generation. Similarly, the claims of land ownership and accusations of land grabs against 
Herakles Farms emerged from the history of communities’ reverence for their ancestral 
past as well as long-held practices of subsistence agriculture and resource use. In both 
cases, there is a reverence of the past that conditions the present and the future. 
Communication must be able to address this complexity of time.  
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7.5.3. Organizational Learning 
While the Discourse of Renewal holds that it is important to communicate and 
implement organizational learning following a crisis, I argue that learning cannot happen 
outside the contexts of organizational action and change. So, the power dynamics of a 
postcolonial encounter have to be engaged. Learning should not simply be the 
organization implementing and communicating lessons learned from the crisis to 
stakeholders (whether these lessons be mandated by regulatory agencies or simply 
implemented proactively by the organization). There is another kind of learning that is 
just as critical: the need for MNCs to move beyond the dominance/subjugation dynamics 
of the MNC/African encounter. MNCs must learn to reject the inherent sense of 
superiority that warrants ignoring indigenous modes of deliberation and communality – 
treating these modes/practices as inferior or less worthy in these encounters. 
Multinationals mustbe willing to learn from local norms and locally lived experiences. 
But the relationships that define the learning process must not be superior/inferior – 
learning must occur in relations of equity, not paternalism. The outcome of such learning 
processes can become culturally responsive.  
7.5.4. Ethics 
Much has already been discussed about ethics but the focus at this point is to 
show how ethical applications must be responsive rather than prescriptive. I do this by 
looking at the aspect of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). 
CSR is relevant to my amendment to the Discourse of Renewal because this 
model entails an ethical component that expands on the idea of “social responsibility” 
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beyond the profit motive. While MNCs are profit-making endeavors, both the Discourse 
of Renewal and CSR are conceptions of corporations as subject to obligations beyond 
those imposed legally or through the market. CSR need not be counter to the profit 
motive; indeed, Hilson (2012) observes that it is generally accepted that “there are 
incentives for business to proactively embrace environmental and community 
development concerns” (p. 132). However, many multinationals take advantage of CSR 
activities to promote their profit-agenda, considering CSR to be good business strategy, 
not necessarily an obligation which the multinational must undertake. Multinationals’ 
CSR activities are not “goodwill” but carried out in order to ensure smooth operations 
within communities. As such, for multinationals, CSR is “good business” and “good for 
business.” Both CSR as a business strategy and the corruption of CSR for profits have 
particular ramifications for MNCs in developing countries. I turn first to a discussion of 
the profit incentive for CSR and then to the case of CSR by MNCs in the developing 
world. 
According to Knox and Maklan (2004), five incentives drive CSR: (1) consumer 
preferences will increasingly favor products and services from socially responsible, 
transparent and trustworthy firms; (2) investors will increasingly favor responsible 
companies and irresponsible companies will find their cost of borrowing rises; (3) 
potential employees will be attracted to more responsible companies; (4) engaging with 
stakeholders encourages innovation; and (5) being trusted by stakeholders and pursuing 
socially responsible policies reduces risks arising from safety issues, potential boycotts 
and deteriorated corporate reputation (p. 506). Yet apart from these incentives, CSR 
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properly managed is not solely about marketing or profit but must become integral to 
corporate policies and practices. Cash (2012) indicates that there has been a failure on the 
part of many MNCs to “integrate social responsibility policies within company 
frameworks … [for] corporate accountability” (p. 132). Perceptions even become bleaker 
if the notions of avoiding regulation are evoked in this discussion of MNCs’ corporate 
social responsibilities.  
El-Ojeili and Hayden (2006) indicate that MNCs show very little social 
responsibility in the less developed world. While the presence of MNCs in Sub-Saharan 
Africa – and the African continent in general – was integral to the colonial governments 
in Africa, MNCs’ influence became a dominant force in Africa in the 1970s when 
neoliberalists advanced the open-market doctrine. To gain easy access into African 
economies, MNCs used, among other strategies, promises of services and infrastructure 
provision and by the 1980s, the “obvious financial benefits” of CSR provoked a profit-
driven agenda (Hilson, 2012, p. 132). The “development agendas” of MNCs portrayed 
corporate social responsibility as being significant to economic and social growth of 
African nations where there were huge potentials in the extractive industries especially in 
countries like Nigeria and Angola, and for agricultural products including cocoa, banana, 
and palm plantations in Cameroon and the Ivory Coast. Fonjong (2014), for example, 
points to the optimism that galvanized large-scale land acquisition in Cameroon 
following promises made by multinationals to create employment on and off farms, pay 
royalties and taxes, improve rural infrastructure including road, water, health posts, 
schools, and access to technologies. Yet without explicitly incorporating CSR into their 
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policies and frameworks that govern their operations in overseas territories – such that 
CSR becomes a corporate obligation (see Cash, 2011) – CSR remains solely and 
cynically a marketing and profit strategy. MNCs tie their CSR to corporate benefits that 
will accrue as a result of undertaking such social responsibility.  
At the same time, incorporating CSR as a market ploy into corporate structures 
and policies is not only unethical but damaging to communities and environments. For 
example, Hönke and Thauer (2014) criticize MNCs in South Africa for “commercial 
priorities” that limit CSR to the immediate vicinity where corporate operations are 
located, resulting in an “unequal distribution of collective goods” (p. 711). In Sub-
Saharan Africa, MNCs have resisted “proactive CSR” (Ackah-Baidoo, 2012) as they 
failed to invest socially, environmentally, and economically in communities other than 
what is required by law or regulation. As Chapters 4 and 5 indicated, the lack of socially 
responsible operations can have devastating consequences. For example, in the case of 
the Niger Delta, local communities have seen the “economic exploitation of the region’s 
vast crude oil reserves by multinationals … and the specter of environmental devastation, 
excruciating poverty, and recurrent rule of impunity” (Orogun, 2010, p. 460). Thus, 
Hilson (2012) argues that crediting MNCs with CSR in developing nations—where for 
decades they have been involved, for instance, in the extractive industry, in shipping 
billions of tons of crude oil to markets across the Atlantic Ocean, polluting communities, 
grabbing lands, and engaging in corruption—is nothing but a “delusional assessment” (p. 
132). Thus, there is need for a critical assessment of CSR by MNCs in developing 
countries. 
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Clearly, this discussion of MNCs’ distorted CSR is intended to show how 
complicated it is to want to use the current Discourse of Renewal to address crises 
involving MNCs entangled in differential relational complications. All components of the 
current model might contribute to the rhetoric of an MNC intent on protecting their 
profit-driven agenda. For example, a prospective vision might be geared to the need to 
protect corporate profits leaving key community concerns unaddressed. Organizational 
leaders might reframe reality during a crisis to favor corporate intentions. Using effective 
organizational rhetoric could mean the organization manipulating communities by 
minimizing issues that could affect corporate profits. In addition, the ability for 
organizations to “learn” from a crisis vis-à-vis local communities is not certain, after all, 
MNCs are in stronger power positions in their relations with local communities. For 
example, in discussing organizational learning as a component in the current Discourse of 
Renewal, Ulmer et al., mentioned three kinds of learning (systemic, paradigmatic, and 
behavioral) and suggested that organizations should aim for systemic learning – that is, 
organizations should show evidence of proactively or preemptively avoiding the 
reoccurrence of a crisis. I argue that with little or at least very weak obligation on the part 
of MNCs to justify their actions in relations with local communities, and with a focus on 
profits, this component could be problematic in the manner in which “learning” has been 
enacted in the current Discourse of Renewal.  
A more critical sense of Corporate Social Responsibility in the contexts of the 
Discourse of Renewal’s application to the cases analyzed is that CSR is in collusion with 
the Renewal model; both emerging from a corporate-centric standpoint and relating to 
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local communities in strongly paternalistic ways that repeat the silencing of these 
communities. Reframed by the responsive hybridity amendment, the ethics of CSR must 
be responsive to the contexts within which the corporation operates in the world. The 
Herakles Farms crisis in Cameroon and the oppositional struggles Shell faced in the 
Niger Delta of Nigeria could well be examined from the point of view of these 
companies’ failure to ethically situate their operations in terms of communal ethicalness. 
In Cameroon, Herakles Farms was perceived not to be interested in enhancing harmony 
and the overall good of these communities. Besides, signing the establishment convention 
with the government of Cameroon was not enough reason for communities to accept the 
Herakles Farms’ operations, partly because the establishment convention failed to 
consider a historical past that the people remained attached to in the claims they made. 
Similarly, in the Niger Delta of Nigeria, oil spills (delayed cleanups), gas flaring, and the 
death of community activist Ken Saro Wiwa all contributed to exacerbating Shell 
community relations and these are not incidents that show Shell cared for the community. 
A communal approach to ethics goes beyond communicating a company’s intentions or 
desires to be honest, transparent, and accountable – even if the company is perceived to 






Table 5. Amended model: Responsive Hybridity as addition 
















7.6. Implications for Current Crisis Renewal Model 
The two cases analyzed in this dissertation allow me to delineate some 
implications on the Discourse of Renewal, Multinational Communication, and crisis 
communication scholarship and practice.  
 The first implication is that the focus on “renewal” in this model may be too 
optimistic as a strategy of crisis response. There are crisis conditions that are simply 
beyond an optimistic focus--or beyond corporate crisis rhetoric in general–whether 
renewal or apologia. For example, in the case of Nigeria, decades of impoverishment of 
the people of the Niger Delta region, decades of corruption and environmental 
destruction, and the spiraling of intra- and inter-tribal conflicts in this region are truly 
conditions that cannot be addressed mainly through corporate crisis rhetoric. In addition, 
Shell’s perceived complicity in the violence that has literally gotten out of hand in the 
Niger Delta region – militant groups competing with each other – as well as the 
company’s disregard of suffering masses renders a Renewal Discourse quite insufficient. 
The second implication is that if non-crisis conditions are such that ethical 
practice and Corporate Social Responsibility cannot operate without distortion and 
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corruption, crisis communication responses become inadequate. The cases in Cameroon 
and Nigeria indicated that corruption has seemingly been normalized even though there 
are legal instruments regulating corrupt practices. When non-crisis conditions are such 
that ethical practice cannot thrive during crises, a corporate discourse in this regard 
becomes insufficient. The Herakles’ case in Cameroon indicated how the multinational 
bribed government officials as well as tribal chiefs to have their operations established in 
the country negating effective participatory governance as well.  
The third implication is that if multinationals cannot be held accountable by 
African governments, the power of the multinational will remain unchecked during crises 
– hence these multinationals will have little “obligation” to address the situation. 
Amnesty International (2017) noted that “Shell’s US law firm is refusing to hand over 
more than 100,000 internal documents crucial to a legal case in the Netherlands which is 
alleging the oil giant’s complicity in the unlawful arrest, detention and execution of nine 
men in Nigeria in the 1990s” (para. 1). This is the case concerning the “Ogoni 9” 
murdered by the military regime among whom was Ken Saro Wiwa. The widow to Wiwa 
was among those who filed the case in Netherlands after 20 years of fruitless legal battle 
in Nigeria.  
This chapter has detailed the responsive hybridity amendment to the Crisis Renewal 
Model and discussed the way all dimensions of the model are affected by this 
amendment. In chapter 8 I return to the research questions that motivated the dissertation 
to summarize my findings and arguments. I also discuss limitations of this research and 





 Chapters 6 and 7 addressed the research questions that motivated the case 
analyses and the amendments in this dissertation. I begin this chapter by summarizing the 
findings in response to the research questions. The research questions are as follows: 
RQ1: What are the limitations of the Crisis Renewal model for multinationals operating 
in West African countries? 
RQ2: How can this model be amended based on African communication principles?  
8.1.1. Summarizing Research Questions  
RQ1: My analyses indicated several limitations to the renewal model applied to 
crises faced by multinationals operating in West Africa. The failure of companies to 
recognize the complexities of the crises they faced or to respond ethically to the 
consequences of corporate exploitation as well as the resistance of local communities in 
Nigeria and Cameroon indicated that the renewal model fails to adequately engage the 
agency of marginalized stakeholders. Local norms, exigencies, and the complex 
relationships that are part and parcel of communities’ lived experiences cannot be 
disregarded by multinationals as they craft a crisis response. While an amended renewal 
model cannot fix the corruption, politics, and the complex relationships between the 
multinationals and local communities in Nigeria and Cameroon, the purpose has been to 
rethink the concept of “renewal.”  
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The lessons learned indicated that there is need for a reframing of the conception 
of “renewal” in order to go beyond renewed ties between stakeholders and the corporate 
rhetor (as the model suggests). Rather, this dissertation argues for “renewal” as an 
emergent and ethically vigilant hybridization of local and multinational organizing 
practices rather than a corporate-centric paternalistic approach. This means that renewal 
as a creative process of cultural hybridity entails ongoing monitoring of both corporate 
and community standards and values in order to address the inevitable gaps and 
differences between multinationals’ and communities’ ways of organizing. In addition, 
renewal entails a co-constructed version of the realities of the present and the presence of 
the past. Rather than guilt and blame, the presence of the past involves respect for 
traditions and histories and an acknowledgment of corporate and community differences 
in values, knowledges, and realities. A responsive hybridity remains vigilant in the 
acknowledgment that extant inequities deny the subaltern the power of self-representation 
and that entrenched inequities and self-disciplining forces undermine corporate ethics. 
Amending the renewal model with responsive hybridity has ramifications for all of the 
dimensions of the Discourse of Renewal.  
(1) Prospective versus retrospective vision: Data analyzed indicated that 
organizational leaders cannot focus on moving forward, and remaining optimistic 
about the future (prospective vision) thereby not focusing on issues of blame 
(retrospective vision) and be responsive to the in situ communicative demands of 
a non-Western crisis context. In the Nigerian and Cameroonian cases, the theme 
of ancestral land rights and oil ownership pointed to the fact that communication 
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must be able to address non-rational decisional criteria. The ancestral claims made 
by local people also entail sankofa or the renewal of past in present and this as 
well refigures the conception of retrospective vision beyond concerns over 
corporate reputation and relationships. 
(2) Organizational learning: In applying this component of the Crisis Renewal Model, 
MNCs must learn to beat the inherent sense of superiority that warrants ignoring 
indigenous modes of deliberation and communality – treating these 
modes/practices as inferior or less worthy in these encounters. Organizational 
learning must be responsive to local norms and locally lived experiences. More 
importantly, the relationships that define the learning process must not be 
superior/inferior; learning must occur in relations of equity not paternalistic 
dependencies.  
(3) Ethical leadership: When applying the renewal model, MNCs must be cautious 
about relying on titular leadership as a sufficient proxy for local communities. In 
addition, MNCs must be vigilant against reinscribing neocolonialist and 
neoliberal assumptions of white men and capital saving Africa. For example, in 
the Nigerian case, Shell’s GMoUs allowed company executives to prescribe to 
communities what the company perceived as good leadership: “We will continue 
to engineer development and partner with communities that are well led by 
notable individuals,” a spokesperson for Shell told members of Romourianwo 
community during the inauguration of the community town hall (Chinwo, 2013, 
para. 7). Communities often protested this approach to leadership noting that 
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these so-called community leaders did not represent the aspirations and interests 
of their communities but the self-interests of these leaders as well as the 
multinationals. 
(4) Effective organizational rhetoric: Ethical communication must be responsive 
rather than prescriptive. As discussed earlier in Chapters 2 and 7, the model’s 
concept of “significant choice” is important, mandating both beneficence and 
transparency. That is, organizational leaders and spokespeople are exhorted to 
construct realities that are not skewed by corporate interests alone and to provide 
all necessary available information to stakeholders so they can make independent 
decisions. Yet there are such complicated extenuating circumstances in any crisis 
situation but particularly those involving deeply entrenched power differentials 
and alternative epistemological frames that these mandates are rendered 
implacable. This dissertation suggests that ethical communication must be 
focused on bettering communities rather than on bettering corporate stakeholder 
relationships and must be responsive to the intricate complications of histories, 
knowledges, ethics, and power enacted in local contexts in order to do so. This 
therefore, means, locally lived experiences and perspectives should be 





RQ2: How can this model be amended based on African communication principles? 
Having analyzed the Nigerian and Cameroonian cases, evidence emerged that showed the 
following are important African communication concepts with critical implications for 
enacting the renewal model in a multinational crisis response.  
(1) Sankofa 
This concept emphasizes the importance of how the present and the future are influenced 
by looking back in order to be conscious of who we are, where we come from, what our 
roots are. In the cases in Nigeria and Cameroon, the ancestral claims over land and oil 
could be interpreted as a function of the concept of sankofa. A multinational Discourse of 
Renewal must be responsive to differing cultural significances in relations among past, 
present, and future and find ways of integrating this into its renewal discourse. 
(2)  Indigenization 
In its most basic understanding, this means transforming something, e.g., communication, 
an idea, or an approach to suit the local practices of communities. A renewal discourse 
(as seen through the GMOU in Nigeria) should be responsive to communities’ practices 
and norms. While this may seem obvious, the discussion of corruption and bribery as 






I have argued against a commonplace conception of hybridity as simply the melding or 
combination of endoganous and exoganous elememts. In addition, I have warned against 
an instrumental conception of hybridity that lends itself to corporate strategic rhetoric. 
Instead, I have argued for hybridity as a “transgressive” concept that compels 
responsiveness to inherent power inequities, implicit binaries, and superficial relations. 
By responsiveness, I mean both self-reflexivity and a deconstructive stance toward taken-
for-granted meanings, relations, and practices in encounters between MNCs and local 
communities. I have argued that renewal can involve creating hybrid forms by seeking 
out alternative definitions of what is in crisis; including local knowledge about the crisis, 
its causes, and responses; working through local decision-making structures; and taking a 
risk on new relationships, infrastructures, and opportunities emerging from hybridization. 
8.2. Reflections 
 In this section, I reflect on the limitations and future directions of my research. 
Perhaps more importantly, I discuss what I consider a critical argument for praxis in 
crisis communication.  
8.2.1. Limitations 
 In part, the limitations of this research are inherent to the conventional 
methodology of crisis communication studies, that is, the use of publicly available data 
and case studies. I address each of these in turn. First, second-order data from 
newspapers, radio texts, and NGO reports can be considered a limitation of this research. 
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These are, of course, not neutral sources. From my journalism background, I am aware 
that personal, organizational, political, economic, and market forces (e.g., advertising 
money) can have a huge impact on how stories get reported. At the same time, such 
publicly available texts clearly shape the meanings and trajectories of crisis situations as 
well as the lives and possibilities of those affected. 
The use of case studies is a limitation in crisis communication research that has 
been acknowledged (Coombs). The specificities of a case study make this approach 
useful in understanding the complexities of crisis situations. At the same time, this very 
advantage makes generalizing from case studies difficult. Yin (2009, 2004) has argued 
that the potential to generalize research results using a case study approach is a rigorous 
process since the purpose in a case analysis is not always to generalize results to an entire 
population, but rather to theoretical propositions. However, and as Yin agrees, while 
multiple case analyses are appropriate for replicating results, a single case that critically 
challenges existing theoretical frameworks is sufficient for generalizing research 
findings. Nonetheless, I am sensitive to the limits of case analysis in forwarding an 
amendment to the renewal model.  
8.2.2 Proactive Renewal Studies as Engaged Scholarship 
A troubling limitation in the crisis communication literature that has become 
apparent to me is that while the renewal model advances a positive communication 
approach for recreating mutually beneficial stakeholder relationships, there remains a 
lack of critical reflection and engaged scholarship aimed at transforming oppressive 
conditions. I recognize that proposing an engaged role changes the nature of crisis 
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communication research by foregrounding a critical political commitment that I argue is 
implicit in the proactive renewal model. 
This dissertation set out to offer an amendment to the Crisis Renewal Model of 
crisis communication developed by Ulmer, et al. (2007). While there are other crisis 
communication models, this Renewal model was chosen specifically because of its 
proactive approach to crisis response, an approach that avoids reducing crisis 
communication to an image/reputation management practice. But even with this promise 
to avoid making reputation its central focus, the model remains tied to a classical 
rhetorical tradition that values the role of the corporate rhetor and the ethics of corporate 
leadership and falls short for not providing a global purview to the central tenets that 
constitute the model. My amendment, the outcome of lessons learned from cases 
analyzed on multinational corporate crises in Nigeria and Cameroon and informed by a 
review of African communication principles and concepts, sought a more complex 
conceptualization of the rhetorical strategies that comprise the model. The dissertation 
argues for renewal as an emergent and ethically vigilant hybridization of local and 
multinational organizing practices. Ethical vigilance is a call to be responsive to the 
logics-in-use in different contexts, and to engage in a constant monitoring of 
corporate/local stakeholder assumptions, meanings, practices, and power relations within 
crisis contexts. This emergent and ethically vigilant hybridization of local and 
multinational organizing practices and perspectives is supported by African 
communicative concepts including indigenization, hybridity, and sankofa. 
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In doing this research I have come to realize a larger responsibility for scholars in 
this area. I realized that in crisis communication studies, it is not imperative for scholars 
to take a more critical and engaged role. Yet in cases of MNCs operating in the African 
continent, blending the activist and scholarly role may be more ethically imperative. I am 
in concurrence with observations by Manuh (2007) who pointed out: 
I think that in Ghana and the Third World generally, researchers do not 
have the luxury to cleanly demarcate the separations [between activism 
and research]. If the person is genuinely concerned about justice and 
change then s/he will, whether activist or researcher, merge the two…Also 
because Third World intellectuals are still very much free to confront and 
struggle for all kinds of democratic and political changes, they/we are 
compelled to act. (p. 138).  
In other words, the role of a public intellectual is significant in these contexts. In 
order to realize this role, the amendment I have developed must be refigured as an 
invitation to engaged scholarship. While conventional crisis communication scholarship 
is posed as case-driven and adopts the distanced stance of the researcher examining post 
hoc crisis data, engaged scholarship seeks to develop collaborative relationships with 
stakeholders in a crisis case in order to develop co-constructed understandings and 
promote transformations in oppressive conditions and relationships. 
 Putnam and Dempsey define engaged scholarship as “research that highlights 
practical problems, develops reflexive bridge between scholars and practitioners, and co-
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develops knowledge among stakeholders” (2015, p. 11). They identify five “faces” of 
applied scholarship: applied communication research; collaborative learning; activism 
and social justice; practical theory; and public scholarship (p. 13). Of these, my 
amendment to the Discourse of Renewal might most readily facilitate an applied 
communication research approach involving adapting principles of the renewal model 
modified by responsive hybridity to address community-identified problems and 
interventions that mediate corporate interests and community needs. However, I am 
drawn to the face of practical theory focused “on three activities: mapping, engaged 
reflection, and transformative practice” (p. 16). Adopting this approach would require 
refiguring the crisis case approach “as generative and as working reflexively with the 
tensions between theory and practice” (p. 16). 
In such a refiguring, the engaged activity of mapping might entail in situ dialogue 
as a mode of data collection and organizing the detailed descriptions of a case around the 
practical implications of struggle against oppressive conditions. The activity of engaged 
reflection can be addressed by my argument for self-reflexivity and ethical vigilance as 
components of responsive hybridity. As engaged scholarship, such reflexivity would be 
part of a collaborative scholarly inquiry into the contradictions between corporate and 
community “norms or standards for evaluating practice” in a crisis situation. The goal is 
to eschew “a normative logic of technical moves designed to address problems” in favor 
of a grounded practice of responsive hybridity. Finally, the third engaged activity of 
transformative practice would take the renewal model as a mode of transformation 
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bridging theory and practice together in the particular situation in order to “transform 
experiences through co-producing knowledge in conversations with practitioners” (p. 16). 
While I have posed the lack of a practical scholarship orientation as a limitation, it 
is also a direction for future research and one that I am determined to explore. There are 
other trajectories that would contribute to the development of an amended model of 
renewal as well. 
8.4. Future research  
Future research is need to develop both the amendment I have proposed and its 
implications for the renewal model. I suggest activities such as conducting additional 
case studies and developing ethnographic studies of crisis renewal and responsive 
hybridity. 
First, additional case studies should be conducted in order to enhance the value of 
the amendment and to consider its modifications in other situations. For example, there 
are certainly more MNC crises in Africa that would provide opportunities for further 
application of the amended model. Such cases might include the sweet potato project in 
Senegal by an Italian company, land rights crises in Ghana (Babator, Okumaning, and 
Brewaniase communities). Another important direction for future research is to apply the 
amended crisis renewal model to non-Western MNCs. While both of the corporations I 
studied were based in Western countries, there are Chinese MNCs operating on the 
African continent whose operations would provide an alternative context for considering 
crisis renewal. 
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In this vein, another direction for future research would involve considering the 
appropriateness of the African communication concepts I have based my amendment on 
in corporate crises affecting marginalized populations beyond the African continent. For 
example, the recent stand-offs by Native American tribes against the Transcontinental 
Pipeline from Canada offers a case that might stretch such Afri-centric concepts as 
sankofa. At the same time, responsive hybridity is meant to offer possibilities for in situ 
adaptations. Hence, applying it to cases in which relationships between corporations and 
marginalized populations raise Spivak’s question of “Can the subaltern speak?” seem 
critical. 
A second direction for future research is to refocus corporate renewal by 
conducting ethnographic studies and qualitative interviews. Here again there are 
implications of this suggestion that do not accord with the conventions of crisis 
communication research. Specifically, the foregrounding of corporate reputation, 
leadership, and rhetoric would be displaced. Instead, doing ethnographic work would 
emphasize the lived experiences of corporate crises, both for those in the corporation and 
those in affected stakeholder groups. There is an extant literature detailing such cases; for 
example, the many studies of stakeholder experiences and the reputational crisis of the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) following Hurricane Katrina and 
Hurricane Sandy in the US. However, an ethnographic approach would have particular 
value in the crisis cases I have examined in this dissertation. For example, the lived 
struggle among those in the Cameroon forest who find their ways of life threatened by 
the MNC palm projects cannot be adequately conveyed through an examination of 
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corporate apologia and renewal alone. Further, my own understanding of how Afri-
centric concepts play out in actual interaction among stakeholders and the MNC would 
benefit greatly from ethnographic observation and immersion. 
Finally, a third direction for future research might involve doing a focused study 
about corporate renewal discourse from the perspective of those charged with 
communication strategies in a MNC like Herakles Farms or SPDC in the Niger Delta. 
While the renewal model was initially developed on the basis of cases that focused on 
exemplary corporate leaders, it is clear that corporate spokespeople often create and 
disseminate corporate crisis responses. This role is one where the political struggles, 
ethical quandaries, and cultural clashes between a non-African MNC and local tribes and 
communities might come to the fore. This might happen because such spokespeople are 
themselves caught in double-binds and paradoxes in the effort to craft reputation-
salvaging images and respond to demands and anger from stakeholders; or because such 
spokespeople become caught up in the complexities of MNC operations involving not 
only layers of company requirements and actors but the demands of industry, regulatory, 
and media entities. In any case, exploring crisis renewal and responsive hybridity from 
such a perspective would contribute to the development of the amended crisis renewal 
model. 
In closing, there is a growing need to examine corporate crisis rhetoric on the 
African continent given the growing presence of multinational corporations incentivized 
by the need to exploit resources, labor, and land and entangled in complex 
interdependencies with local, state and international actors. This condition has resulted in 
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a plethora of oppositional struggles with local communities. Issues of land rights and oil 
ownership point to the concerns about survival in this complex mix. These antagonisms 
invite corporate crisis rhetoric to not only engage in post hoc analyses, but to be 
responsive to the logics-in-use. Not only the success and profitability of multinational 
projects but the wellbeing and indeed the very survival of local communities in the 
African continent may depend on the responsiveness of crisis rhetoric.  
Acknowledging the complexities of postcolonialism and global neoliberalism, the 
analyses in this dissertation sought to situate crisis rhetoric within the local experiences 
of multinational operations in order to critically confront relations of power that confound 
the crisis renewal model’s goals of equity, transparency, and ethicality. A critical analysis 
of both apologia and renewal strategies in multinational crisis communication and the 
responses of local stakeholders precipitated lessons learned that informed an amendment 
to the Discourse of Renewal. Drawing on concepts of sankofa, indigenization, and 
hybridization, responsive hybridity mandates more responsive local engagements that 
integrate ethical vigilance, self-reflexivity, and creative hybridity into corporate crisis 
strategies. This amendment reframes the dimensions of the renewal model and sets the 
determination of renewal itself as contingent on the engagements of responsive hybridity. 
Reframing the renewal model in this way encourages a reframing of studies of corporate 
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